Psychology Of Dialectical Thinking Research Paper

1. Dialectical Thinking As Methods Of Reasoning

Dialectical thinking as a method of reasoning has a long tradition in Western thought. One of the earliest examples of the dialectical method is Plato’s Dialogues, in which he sought to study truth through discussion in the form of questions and answers. Aristotle also referred to dialectics as a method of reasoning but used it often as a synonym for the science of logic. The first thinkers who distinguished dialectical reasoning from formal logic were Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel. Kant maintained that logical reasoning is very effective within the confines of science, but ‘all the worse for the beyond’ (Kant 1781 1965). He believed that there are ways to go beyond things as experienced (‘phenomena’) and to seek the ultimate reality of things in themselves (‘noumena’); this is Kant’s transcendental dialectic. Hegel, meanwhile, believed that the evolution of ideas occurs through a dialectical process—that is, a concept (or thesis) gives rise to its opposite (antithesis), and as a result of this contradiction, a third view, the synthesis, arises. The synthesis is at a ‘higher’ level of truth than the first two views (Hegel 1812 1967). The Hegelian method of reasoning has since become seemingly synonymous with dialectical thinking in Western cultures.

2. Marx And Engels’ Laws Of Dialectics

One of the most influential thinkers of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx opened new vistas of understanding by applying materialistic and dialectical perspectives to the analysis of civilization and cultures. According to Marx and Engels, there are three basic laws of dialectics: (a) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; (b) the law of the interpenetration of opposites; and (c) the law of the negation of the negation (Engels 1872–82 1940, p. 26). Developed in contrast to the Hegelian idealism that envisioned an end to contradiction in achievement of the absolute ideal, Marxist dialectical thought recognizes the permanence of opposition and contradiction in the real material world, and therefore in thought about reality. According to Marx and Engels, the process of historical development is endless because the synthesis itself becomes a new thesis and is in turn negated by a new antithesis producing a new synthesis, and so on ad infinitum.

3. Dialectical Thinking As A Form Of Argument

Dialectical thinking in contemporary epistemology is defined as a form of argument (Alexy 1989, Habermas 1990, Goldman 1994) that purposely draws out the views of either participant. In formal logical reasoning, an argument is good if the conclusion either follows deductively from the premises, or receives strong evidential support from them, or has only true premises. However, in dialectical argument or discourse where two (or more) speakers successively defend conflicting positions, both citing premises in support of their respective positions, the judgment of the goodness of the argument is a matter of social epistemology and conversational norms (Goldman 1994). In this form of argument, the opposing perspective is invited for the sake of discourse.

4. Dialectical Thinking As A Psychological Concept

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a school of developmental psychologists, frustrated by the limited relevance of Piagetian theories of human development for adult development, started to look for cognitive development beyond Piaget’s adolescent ‘formal operations’ stage. Klaus Riegel, in his 1973 paper on ‘Dialectic operations,’ pointed out that, ‘It has never been shown convincingly that the highest level of operation, i.e., formal operational intelligence, characterizes the thinking of mature adults’ (Riegel 1973, p. 363). Riegel believed that adult thoughts, particularly in creative scientific activities, ‘are dominated by playful manipulations of contradictions and by conceiving issues integratively which have been torn apart by formal operational thinking.’ Accordingly, the final period of human cognitive development and the nature of mature thought are characterized in part by dialectical operations.

A more empirical approach to dialectical thinking was offered by Michael Basseches (1980, 1984), who abstracted 24 cognitive schemata or patterned movements in human thought as basic components of dialectical thinking. These ‘dialectical schemata,’ as Basseches called them, include steps in dialectical analyses and ways of introducing and maintaining dialectical movement within one’s own thought, such as recognition and description of thesis–antithesis– synthesis development, location and description of contradiction, and assertion and description of reciprocal relationships (Basseches 1980). It has been found that such dialectical thinking becomes increasingly important and common in old age (e.g., Basseches 1984, Kramer and Woodruff 1986, Chandler and Boutilier 1992). Middle-aged and older people are more likely to accept contradiction in reality and synthesize contradiction in their thinking than young people (Kramer and Woodruff 1986).

However, some scholars still believe that formal operations can also account for dialectical forms of thought (e.g., Piaget 1980, Kramer 1983). For example, Piaget (1980) argued that there are two types of contradiction: a logical contradiction (‘real contradiction’) that results from an error in the reasoning process and a natural contradiction (‘pseudocontradiction’) that results from disequilibrium in one’s knowledge. Dialectical synthesis, according to Piaget, is a re-equilibration process of formal operations in dealing with natural contradiction. A conciliatory proposal was made by Kramer, who suggested that formal operations and post-formal operations may actually reflect only two different world views, not necessarily two different stages of human cognitive development. Formal operational thought is an analytic world view that emphasizes independence of variables and underlying stability whereas post-formal operational thought is a synthetic world view that assumes interdependence of variables and change as basic to reality (Kramer 1983).

5. Dialectical Thinking As Sources Of Individual Differences

The construct of conceptual or integrative complexity has been used by scholars in many fields of social science to capture individual differences in the complexity of the cognitive rules that people use to process and analyze information (Harvey et al. 1961, Schroder et al. 1967) or situational determinants of complex information processing (Streufert and Streufert 1978, Tetlock 1983, 1985). Levels of integrative complexity in people’s thinking vary. For instance, people’s reasoning and decision-making processes could be characterized as low differentiation (lack of awareness of alternative ways of viewing problems), high differentiation with low integration (awareness of alternative ways of viewing problems, but no recognition of relations between viewpoints), or high differentiation with high integration (awareness of multiple perspectives on problems and of interrelations among perspectives) (Tetlock 1985). Dialectical thinking should be reflected in higher levels of integrative complexity.

Some psychological work on negotiation, conflict management, and decision making has suggested that integration of different perspectives improves efficiency and outcomes. A coordinative negotiation strategy that attempts to establish collaboration between both sides was found to be more likely to achieve an agreement than a competitive negotiation strategy (e.g., Tetlock 1985, Pruitt 1981, Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). In a decision-making process, the method of dialectical inquiry (DI) offers a credible counterplan and conducts a structured debate on both plans. Research suggests such an approach may be preferable to simple devil’s advocacy (DA) that promotes conflict by criticizing a prevailing plan without offering any counter-plan (e.g., Mason 1969, Mitroff and Mason 1981, Schwenk 1990).

6. Cultural Foundations Of Dialectical Thinking

Despite the differences among various conceptions of dialectical thinking, they make similar fundamental assumptions. First, they assume contradiction is a temporary state that will be replaced by integrated or synthesized thoughts (even Marx and Engels’ constant negation assumes at least temporary integration). Second, they assume that the progress of reasoning is linear, logical, and moving in one direction—from a contradiction to a synthesis. Third, they assume integration or synthesis are at higher levels of cognitive functioning (e.g., Baltes and Staudinger 1993) usually considered to be more sophisticated, creative, and advanced models of thought (e.g., Benack et al. 1989). In the end, most of these approaches are rooted in the laws of formal logic, particularly the law of noncontradiction.

It has long been suspected that certain cultural groups are more dialectical in their reasoning and thinking about the world, knowledge, and human life. Peng (1997) (also Peng and Nisbett 1999, 2000, Peng et al. 2001) has suggested that Chinese folk epistemology (folk beliefs of knowing) emphasizes three interconnected principles—the principle of change (e.g., reality is a process, it does not stand still but is in constant flux), the principle of contradiction (reality is not precise, but is full of contradictions), and the principle of holism (in reality, nothing is isolated but connected, and the whole is more than the sum of its parts). These principles form the foundation of Chinese dialectical thinking, which is seemingly at odds with three basic laws of formal logic: the law of identity (if anything is true, then it is true; thus A = A), the law of non-contradiction (no statement can be both true and false; thus A = A), and the law of the excluded middle (any statement is either true or false; thus (A v B) and (A & B)). Such epistemological differences were found in folklore of Eastern and Western cultures. For example, Chinese folklore contains more dialectical proverbs than does American folklore (Peng 1997, Peng and Nisbett 1999, 2000). Americans as a whole preferred non-dialectical to dialectical proverbs and the Chinese preferred dialectical to nondialectical proverbs when they were presented with samples of commonly used proverbs from Chinese, American, and Yiddish cultures (Peng and Nisbett 1999).

7. Effects On Reasoning And Judgment

These epistemological differences of dialectical thinking imply strong cultural differences in reasoning about contradiction. A number of empirical findings have emerged which reveal important cultural differences in dialectical thinking. For instance, in a study of interpersonal conflict resolution, Peng (1997) found that American participants’ resolutions of contradictions in everyday life were noncompromising and polarizing. In contrast, Chinese responses were much more dialectical and compromising. Chinese dialectical thinking may also contribute to the fact that Chinese are less likely than Americans to engage in debates and formal argumentation about truth (Becker 1986). Peng (1997) presented two types of arguments—logical and dialectical—on physics and religion to American and Chinese college students and found that, compared with Americans, Chinese participants preferred dialectical arguments. In a direct test of cultural difference on reasoning about contradiction, Peng (1997) used contradictory research reports as stimuli and asked participants to judge the plausibility of each piece of information. He found that American participants followed a differentiation approach, such that, when presented with (weak) evidence against the more plausible statement, they actually judged it to be more likely than those who saw no contradictory evidence did. Meanwhile, the Chinese participants showed a compromising approach. They judged the more plausible statement and the less plausible statement as equally likely when they presented together. In effect, the Chinese behaved as if they believed that both statements might be (somewhat) true.

8. Conclusion

Dialectical thinking is an important part of everyday reasoning and judgment. While it has long played a pivotal role in various philosophical discussions, it is only beginning to be understood as a psychological issue. It seems clear that dialectical thinking exists alongside other modes of thought, its use differing over the life course, between individuals and across cultures. Still, psychologists have much left to discover in order to fully understand the psychology of dialectical thinking.

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