Lawrence Kohlberg Research Paper

After two years of clinical work he started research for his doctoral dissertation on the development of moral judgment that he finished in 1958. From 1959 to 1961 he was assistant professor at Yale University; 1961–2 fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto; 1962–8 professor at the University of Chicago; 1968–87 professor at Harvard University. Having an incurable disease, on January 17, 1987 Kohlberg ended his life.

Kohlberg changed US psychology. His influence is due to intellectual brilliance, but also to an inspiring personality attracting scientists from all over the world. Kuhmerker et al.( 1991) elicited personal letters from friends and colleagues describing what Kohlberg had meant for their lives. Some core characteristics emerge: Kohlberg was ‘loveable’—and had ‘a remark-able ability to insure this characteristic in those who worked with him … all of whom had not only a peculiarly fanatical interest in the study of moral

 development but also a deep personal affection for Lawrence Kohlberg, the man.’ (Grimley) Kohlberg was persistent; what struck Kegan was ‘that an idea can be compelling enough and an individual devoted enough for the two to spend 25 years together in a relationship as fresh and combustible today as when it began.’ Kohlberg was stern—demanding extraordinary efforts of himself and of others; he ‘would call another scoring workshop whenever he felt his assistants were working less than 80 hours a week.’ His commitment was contagious: ‘At the Center of Moral Education there was a sense of being at the right place at the right time—that terribly new and important breakthroughs were just around the corner … that questions of social justice were on everyone’s mind and we thought we had the answers—or nearly had the answers.’ He was ‘a visionary’ who kept ‘the major questions in focus.’ Had it not been for him ‘many of us would not have become interested in psychology at all’ (Rest).

For Kohlberg the unity of moral judgment and action was not just a theoretical stipulation—it was his very personality. A colleague recalls an occasion when he had initiated a resolution against the invasion to Cambodia. When the question arose who would accompany him in handing it over in Washington:

… the meeting became silent. Motionless. Eerily quiet. These giants of education who daily proclaimed the virtues of equality, of human rights, of democratic citizenship and had themselves just voted overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution now sat in perfect pose, looking at their shoes. Numbed and dazzled by this educational experience. I finally noticed one lone figure somewhat unkempt in attire standing next to me. Although I had met him a number of prior occasions, that was the time I really met Larry. (Sprinthall)

Kohlberg addressed important issues authentically and in an innovative way. This carried others along. Thus, Kohlberg’s theory springs also from collective endeavors—initiated, inspired, and directed by Kohlberg, but advanced by his students, friends, and colleagues as well.

1. Kohlberg’s Approach

Kohlberg’s approach ran counter to the basic assumptions about the nature of human beings, of norms, and of science dominant at the time. Humans were seen as basically passive (shaped by reinforcement schedules in behaviorism, by parental authorities in psychoanalytic theories, or by the gradual unfolding of genetic endowments in maturationism) and primarily motivated by self-serving concerns (avoiding external or superego sanctions). In contrast, Kohlberg—following Piaget—viewed people as active interpreters of their world and also motivated by intrinsic concerns (for mastery, truth, or other values).

Norms were seen as externally given contingent facts. Kohlberg, instead, viewed norms as propositions raising the validity claim of rightness, that is, in need of and capable of being justified. Psychology followed a natural science epistemology: copying or explaining reality is aimed for by standardizing measurement procedures or experimentally isolating and manipulating variables. In contrast, Piagetian analyses seek to trace universal developmental changes in subjects’ interactive constructions of reality; hermeneutic interviews aim at objectivity by guaranteeing not the physical identity of the stimulus, but the identity of its meaning. Kohlberg was one of the pioneers in bringing this Piagetian cognitive frame to bear on academic psychology in the USA.

Also, his interest in moral reasoning was new. Up until then, only normconforming behavior (not moral action) or moral emotions (not moral judgment) had been studied—both from an observer’s point of view. Kohlberg, instead, looked at morality from a firstperson perspective. And he did so with a specific—not uncontested—understanding of morality by focusing on judgment he excluded questions of moral character, of habitualized moral dispositions, of virtues. By defining morality on deontic terms he excluded questions of the good life that he left to ethics and/or to the personal domain. By identifying morality with a justice procedure he largely neglected content. By describing this procedure as ‘moral musical chairs’ he sketched a hypothetical role-taking procedure that remains entirely monological.

2. Moral Development

2.1 The Stage Model

Piaget had described young children’s moral development as progress from a heteronomous stage (characterized by egocentrism; unilateral respect; a focus on consequences rather than on intention; an understanding of rules as objective, absolute and unalterable; a belief in immanent justice) to an autonomous morality produced by peer interaction and cognitive decentering. From his study of adolescent development Kohlberg derived a refined description of the stage model and of developmental mechanisms.

Development consists in changes in the reasoning structure justifying judgments of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and in the concerns motivating norm conformity. Its structural core is a widening of the sociomoral perspective. Universally, there are three levels with two ‘hard’ stages each. The model is based on the following assumptions:

– each stage is a structured whole that is qualitatively different from the others;

– the sequence of stages is invariant, irreversibly progressive without stage skipping;

– the stages form a hierarchy: higher stages are better differentiated and integrated structures that allow morally better solutions to dilemmas.

The stages are described as follows:

At the preconventional level (typical for most children under nine) situations are judged from a concrete individual perspective. Rules are seen to be external to the self. ‘Right’ is defined as obeying rules and authority, avoiding punishment, not doing physical harm (Stage 1) or as meeting one’s own interests and letting others do the same (Stage 2); the reasons for doing right are to avoid punishment and to bow to the superior power of authorities (Stage 1) or to serve one’s own needs or interests (Stage 2).

At the conventional level (typical of most adults) morality is judged from a ‘member of society’ perspective and is identified with socially shared internalized norms. ‘Right’ means living up to the expectations of one’s group (Stage 3) or doing one’s duty in society (Stage 4); the reasons for doing right are the need to be ‘good’ in one’s own or others’ eyes and caring for others (Stage 3) or the need to maintain a good conscience by meeting defined obligations (Stage 4).

At the postconventional level (reached by few adults only) moral values are defined from a ‘prior to society’ perspective in terms of self-chosen universal principles. ‘Right’ is upholding legal contracts (Stage 5) or is defined in terms of universal ethical principles such as equality and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals (Stage 6). The reasons for doing right are obligations to the social contract (Stage 5) or a commitment to principles that have been rationally understood and accepted as valid (Stage 6).

2.2 Tests Of Moral Development

In the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI, Colby and Kohlberg 1987) hypothetical moral dilemmas are given which allow of no ‘right’ answer (e.g., Should a man steal a drug to save his dying wife?) Subjects are first to decide what the protagonist ought to do (uphold the law or preserve life?) and then to justify and defend this decision against moral counterarguments advanced by the interviewer who aims at eliciting the subject’s highest competence level. The responses are matched to structurally similar criterion judgments listed for each stage in the scoring manual.

In the Social Reflection Measure (SRM) Gibbs et al. (1992) developed a brief interview and coding manual that can be used for younger children. Objective tests have also been developed in which subjects rank their preference for a set of standardized responses that express stage-specific considerations (Rest’s Defining Issue Test, DIT, Lind’s Moral Judgement Test, MUT). Preference measures produce scores that are consistently (about one stage) higher than spontaneously produced answers, yet do correlate in medium range with scores in MJI.

2.3 Mechanisms Of Development

In contrast to social learning and psychoanalytic theories which assume identification or modeling as the primary developmental mechanisms, cognitive theories see development as a result of internal restructuring in response to cognitive conflict. There is experimental evidence in support of this mechanism (cf. Walker 1986). The need to reconcile conflicting views may be the reason why taking leadership roles advances moral development.

This understanding of developmental mechanisms has inspired pedagogic interventions. Classroom discussions of moral dilemma tend to produce (albeit slight) moral growth. The institutionalization of just communities, that is, structures allowing for democratic self-government, have been shown to improve the moral atmosphere of schools or prisons considerably and generate feelings of reciprocal responsibility (Higgins et al. in Kurtines and Gewirtz 1984).

2.4 Empirical Support And Criticisms Of The Stage Model

2.4.1 Sequence. Age and stage have been shown to correlate in cross-sectional studies. Regression or stage skipping have rarely been found in longitudinal studies and not been induced in experimental studies designed to produce moral development (Snarey 1985, Walker 1986). Thus, the claim of a developmental sequence and of an invariant order stands.

2.4.2 Hierarchy. There is conceptual and empirical support for the claim of hierarchy. Conceptually, the stage sequence comprises an increasing universalization of perspectives (isolated individual; dyad; group; a given society; a democratically organized society; humanity at large) and an expansion of relevant concerns (negative and positive consequences to the actor; intentions; role obligations; societal institutions and legality; universal rights). Post-conventional thinking makes it possible to integrate and balance these different concerns in view of universal principles of equality and respect for the individual. Empirically, subjects prefer higher and reject lower stage reasoning.

2.4.3 Universality. Kohlberg has been accused of ethnocentrism and gender bias in claiming universal validity for a stage model that was initially developed from interviews with males in the USA only. Two issues are at stake: first, is there a universal core to morality, and second, is Kohlberg’s stage sequence universal? The first issue is dealt with theoretically in moral philosophy and practically in endeavors to win worldwide acceptance for human rights. The second issue sparked extensive empirical research.

The universal presence of stages 1–4 is reported in a review of 45 studies from 27 widely diverse cultures involving over 5,000 subjects. Postconventional thinking was found in urban samples only, not in traditional tribal or village societies either in Western or non-Western cultures (Snarey 1985). Principled thinking thus seems a ‘metalevel’ feature necessary for adjudicating conflicts between subculture-specific norms and not required in normatively integrated and isolated cultures.

Gilligan (1982) has claimed the existence of two moralities: a rigid justice orientation more typical for males (corresponding to stage 4) and a flexible morality of care and responsibility more typical for females (corresponding to stage 3). Empirically, reviews of research involving 19,000 subjects have shown that either there are no stage differences between the sexes (Lind et al. 1987 ) or else they tend not to disadvantage women, or to disappear when education and employment are controlled for (Walker 1984). Conceptually, Gilligan starts from a more encompassing understanding of morality than Kohlberg by including questions about the good life. Also, there are some theoretical confusions: ‘care’ often is experienced as a ‘duty’ by women, and flexibility—if not a mere reflection of powerlessness—seems a correlate of a modern secularized moral understanding (‘ethics of responsibility’, Max Weber) rather than of sex membership.

2.5 Another View Of Moral Development?

One core issue concerns the relationship between judgment and action. This problem has been dealt with in several ways. First, the claim was raised and empirically supported that consistency will increase with moral development (Kohlberg and Candee 1984, Blasi 1980). This makes sense given that subjects referring to self-serving concerns will be assigned to lower stages. Later, responsibility judgments (expressing the personal relevance of moral judgments, Higgins et al. 1984, Blasi 1984), and the distinction between types A (considering pragmatic concerns) and B (exclusively focusing on moral values) have been introduced (Kohlberg 1984, Colby and Kohlberg 1987). These additions are remedies to deal with the fact that individuals differ in intensity of moral commitment—as is especially clearly evidenced by Colby’s and Damon’s (1994) ‘moral exemplars’.

A more far reaching theoretical revision, however, may be called for in view of recent studies on children’s moral understanding. Turiel (1983) and Nucci and Turiel (1993) have shown that young children distinguish between moral rules (enjoying universal, unalterable, intrinsic validity) and conventional or religious rules (that depend on authorities or God and are valid only for in-group members). Nevertheless, most young children expect a wrongdoer to feel good and only gradually begin to ascribe negative emotions (Nunner-Winkler and Sodian 1988). Until about six or seven years (i.e., before self-reflexive role-taking is developed) these predict moral behavior. By about 10 years almost all children (even those low in moral motivation) say they expect a wrongdoer to feel bad. In justifying these negative emotions most children tend to refer neither to impending sanctions nor to empathic identification with the victim but to the fact that a wrong had been committed. These departures from Kohlberg’s description of preconventional thinking result from differences in problems addressed and measurement procedures used: Turiel and Nucci and Lee questioned children’s understanding of norm validity. Nunner-Winkler focused on the intensity and type of moral motivation. Kohlberg asked for action recommendations in moral dilemmas. Until they begin to care about morality children will guide these along prudential rather than moral considerations.

A new reading of moral development suggests itself. Universally, children acquire an early understanding of the categorical ought: they know that moral norms are intrinsically valid and motives should not be self-serving. Thus, from early on, all have a good cognitive grasp of the constitutive feature of the moral domain—its deontic character. Moral competence, however, requires more. Sociocognitive development (which constitutes the structural core of Kohlberg’s stage descriptions) and the acquisition of knowledge are needed for passing judgments in more complex situations. Moral motivation is needed to translate knowledge into action. These requisites are acquired in later and differential learning processes.

3. Kohlberg’s Legacy

In discussing Kohlberg’s contribution, Rest (in Kuhmerker et al. 1991) notes that the stage concept may dwindle away and additional variables (e.g., content, motivation, or character) may prove of import. What will remain is Kohlberg’s part in the paradigm shift from behaviorism to cognitive psychology. More specifically, what will remain is his emphasis on the cognitive side of morality; his striving for reconstructing it from a participant perspective and linking it with philosophical quests for justifiability; his insistence that intrinsic motivation exists (still an urgent claim given rational choice reductionism); his emphasis that there is more to morality than ‘being friendly with your friends’ (Rest). In theory and practice Kohlberg was committed to an understanding of morality that demands building just institutions and treating all human beings with equal respect.

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