Precautionary Principle Research Paper

The precautionary principle’s rapid rise to prominence can be attributed to several factors. First, the notion of precaution is intuitively appealing, perhaps because we have been told from an early age that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.’ Second, with the growing realization that human activities are creating global problems, such as global warming, the depletion of the ozone layer and the reduction in biological diversity, such admonishments have become all the more urgent. As the scales of the problems we face have grown, so too have the stakes. The higher the stakes, the less we can afford to take chances with the future. Third, as the size and complexity of the problems have grown, so too have the uncertainties. Thus, traditional science is unable to provide unequivocal answers. Given the stakes involved and absent clear solutions, it seems only prudent to err on the side of safety and take action now rather than later. If we wait for clear scientific proof of harm, it may be too late to do anything.

The term precautionary principle (Vorsorgeprinzip) was first used explicitly with regard to environmental policy in the former Federal German Republic in the 1970s (O’Riordan 1994, p. 306, O’Riordan and Jordan 1995, p. 193, Boehmer-Christiansen 1994). Subsequently, the precautionary principle was incorporated into many national and international environmental policies and protocols. The earliest use of the pre- cautionary principle in an international agreement was in the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea in London in 1987. This declaration stated that ‘in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of some substances before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence’ (Cameron 1994, pp. 267–8). In 1989, the Nordic Council’s Conference on Pollution of the Seas called for a precautionary approach ‘eliminating and preventing pollution emission when there is reason to believe that damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even where there is inadequate or inconclusive scientific evidence to prove a link between emissions and effects’ (Cameron 1994, p. 268). In 1992, the precautionary principle was boosted to prominence by its incorporation as Principle 15 in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Similar language was used in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the 1992 UNCED Biodiversity Convention (Cameron 1994, p. 269). Many other similar definitions have been proposed. For example, a group of academics and environmental activists called the Wingspread Group have concluded that there is compelling evidence of harm from toxic substances, global warming, ozone depletion and nuclear materials, and that existing environmental regulations are inadequate. The group proposed that ‘When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically’ (Risk Policy Report 1998).

The precautionary principle comprises three core ideas. First, it is necessary to take protective actions in advance of clear scientific proof, because scientific proof is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future, and delay in action may ultimately prove more harmful and more costly to correct after the fact. Advocates of the precautionary principle argue that the uncertainties inherent in problems such as global warming and ozone depletion necessitate taking action prior to clear scientific proof. Because the uncertainties are inherent, traditional scientific methods can never eliminate them, so waiting for clear scientific evidence is foolhardy. Wynne (1992) identifies four kinds of uncertainty—risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminancy. He proposes that a precautionary approach that recognizes these uncertainties and the limitations of traditional scientific methods is necessary. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992) argue that the nature of environmental problems changes as the decision stakes and levels of uncertainty increase. Applied scientists and professional consultants (such as engineers) are able to provide adequate solutions for environmental problems with moderate to low decision stakes and levels of uncertainty. As we move into the realm of problems such as global warming, the stakes and the uncertainties are so high that a new kind of science is necessary. Post-normal science relies on the use of ‘extended facts’ and an extended peer community for review. Thus, advocates of the precautionary principle call for greater use of civic science based on negotiation, quasi-formal predictions and evaluations, and more attention to the process rather than the content of the analysis (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995, Hunt 1994).

Second, traditional methods of economic analysis, such as the use of discount rates and cost benefit analysis, are inadequate because of the nature and likelihood of the harm, the extent of uncertainties, and the delay before the harm becomes evident (Perrings 1995). Traditionally, economists assume that the growth in capital resulting from current investments will more than compensate future generations for possible harm. Unfortunately, this means that little value is placed on impacts 25 years or more in the future, and it remains unclear what the impacts will be on natural capital. Advocates of the precautionary principle argue that the likelihood, nature and magnitude of the future costs of environmental problems, such as global warming or biodiversity loss, are unknown and cannot be calculated using traditional economic methods (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995).

Third, there is a need to shift the burden of proof to the ‘developer’ to show that the technology or activity is ‘safe.’ Under many current legal and policy frame-works, the presumption is that a technology or activity is ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ The precautionary principle would change this to presume that a technology or activity is ‘guilty until proven innocent’ (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995, O’Riordan 1994).

O’Riordan and Jordan (1995) identify several other elements that characterize precautionary approaches. These include the need to: (a) maintain proportionality between the likely harm and the cost of preventive measures; (b) take preventive measures to safeguard ‘ecological space’ to prevent pushing natural systems beyond thresholds that result in irreversible change; (c) recognize that natural systems have intrinsic value and there is a moral imperative to protect them; (d) shift emphasis to meso-term planning (i.e., 25–100 years); and (e) pay for the ecological damage caused by those who were less than cautious in the past.

The precautionary principle has been criticized on several fronts. O’Riordan and Jordan (1995, p. 192) fear that the principle runs the risk of following the ‘dangerously successful pathway pioneered by sustainability.’ The principle has broad intuitive appeal but lacks rigorous consensual definitions, and while it has been adopted widely as a laudable goal for environ- mental policy there are no clear guidelines for its implementation. Like sustainability, the precautionary principle is neither a well-defined principle nor a stable concept. It has become the repository for a jumble of adventurous beliefs that challenge the status quo of political power, ideology and civil rights. Neither concept has much coherence other than it is captured by the spirit that is challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost–benefit analysis, the powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity (O’Riordan and Jordan 1995, p. 191).

Bodansky (1994) argues that the precautionary principle underlies many of the environmental laws enacted in the 1970s in the US, but that its impact has often been contrary to the intent of the framers of these laws. He argues that the precautionary approach of the original Clean Air and Clean Water Acts led to delays in the promulgation of regulations. He also suggests that shifting the burden of proof to the proponent of a technology or activity may do little to enhance safety, since harmful impacts are often dis- covered only belatedly, as in the case of DDT and CFCs. Furthermore, shifting the burden of proof may actually exacerbate harm by discouraging the introduction of beneficial technologies. Bodansky questions whether it is feasible to establish guidelines that determine what levels of harm and scientific certainty are necessary to trigger the precautionary principle, and whether we should always err on the side of safety even if the social costs are very high. Bodansky (1994, p. 225) concludes ‘Simple rules promise simple answers. But, in the end, there may be no practical alternative to the imperfect, difficult, often dissatisfying task of muddling along.’

Perrings (1995) and Costanza and Cornwall (1992) are more optimistic about the practical application of the principle. Perrings (1995, p. 159) believes that in the absence of better (i.e., more certain) information the precautionary principle ‘leads to a sequential approach in which the decision maker reserves judgment about the uncertain outcomes of each activity, assuming the worst-case outcome until evidence is provided to the contrary’. Thus, the decision-maker assigns worst-case values to the uncertain outcomes of current activities and attempts to minimize the maxi-mum environmental costs. The pragmatic problem becomes choosing a plausible worst-case for decision- makers.

Costanza and Cornwall (1992) propose combining the precautionary principle with the polluter pays principle to develop an environmental deposit-refund or assurance bonding system. Under this system, an ‘assurance bond,’ equal to the best estimate of the largest potential future damages, would be levied on the proponent of the technology or activity. Portions of the bond would be returned as and when the proponent could show that the suspected damages had not occurred or they would be used to repair or compensate for any damages resulting. Costanza and Cornwall believe this system would shift the burden of proof and the cost of uncertainty from the public to the proponent or developer. The bond would also serve as an incentive for businesses to conduct thorough, publicly accessible research on the environ-mental impacts of their activities and to look for ways to minimize pollution. Unfortunately, many questions about the practical value of such a system remain unanswered: who determines the worst-case scenario and the size of the bond, especially since there is so much uncertainty about the future environmental impacts of so many activities? Who decides if and when the bond should be returned, and how? Is it practicable to think of dealing with myriad environmental problems in this fashion? How would this be implemented at an international level?

In conclusion, the precautionary principle has enormous intuitive appeal and has become an integral part of many international environmental agreements. The future success of the principle, however, rests on the development of clear practical guidelines for its implementation at both the national and international levels.

Bibliography:

1. Bodansky D 1994 The precautionary principle in US environmental law. In: O’Riordan T, Cameron J (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London, pp. 203–28
2. Boehmer-Christiansen S 1994 The precautionary principle in Germany—enabling government. In: O’Riordan T, Cameron J (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London, pp. 31–60
3. Cameron J 1994 The status of the precautionary principle in international law. In: O’Riordan T, Cameron J (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London, pp. 262–89
4. Costanza R, Cornwall L 1992 The 4P approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty. Environment 34: 12–42
5. Funtowicz S, Ravetz J 1992 Three types of risk assessment and the emergence of post-normal science. In: Sheldon K, Golding D (eds.) Social Theories of Risk. Praeger, Westport, CT, pp. 251–74
6. Hunt J 1994 Social construction of precaution. In: O’Riordan T, Cameron J (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle. Earthscan, London, pp. 117–25
7. O’Riordan T 1994 The precautionary principle in environmental management. In: Ayres R U, Simonis U E (eds.) Industrial Metabolism: Restructuring for Sustainable Development. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pp. 299–318
8. O’Riordan T, Jordan A 1995 The precautionary principle in contemporary environmental politics. Environmental Values 14: 191–212
9. Perrings C 1995 Reserved rationality and the precautionary principle: technological change, time, and uncertainty in environmental decision making. In: Krishnan R, Harris J M, Goodwin N R (eds.) A Survey of Ecological Economics. Island Press, Washington, DC, pp. 158–62
10. Risk Policy Report 1998 Wingspread group offers new precautionary principle statement. Risk Policy Report 5: 22–3
11. Wynne B 1992 Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the prevention paradigm. Global Environmental Change 2: 111–27