Organizational Conflict Research Paper

1. Organizational Conflict And Social Psychology

Orthodox social psychological approaches explore conflict through a hierarchy of dyadic interactions that start with the interpersonal and stretch to relations between discrete social entities, such as interest groups, unions, and even nation-states. The ways in which these interactions are played out can be mapped using the dimensions of Process and Structure, thus delineating the two main social psychological models of organizational conflict (Thomas 1976, 1994). The Process model is primarily empirical in approach, as it requires us simply to observe and record conflict as it unfolds. This involves categorizing various generic stages before relating these dynamic circumstances to particular outcomes or ‘settlements.’ These outcomes tend to be classified in economic terms so that resources—frequently the focus of the conflict in the first place under this approach—are distributed be-tween parties, usually in a zero-sum arrangement. In contrast, the Structural model involves identifying the antecedents that shape the dynamics of a particular dyadic conflict. These include cognitive factors (for example, the actors’ awareness of issues and possible settlements, their intentions, etc.) and affective states such as emotions and empathy. Underlying the operation of these structural features of conflict is the assumption of bounded rationality: on the basis of the information available to them, actors in a conflict will move toward satisfying outcomes. Thus, as Thomas (1994) suggests, conflicts are decision-making processes that evaluate possible settlements using a combination of rational-instrumental considerations (what in this for me?) with normative considerations (is this a ‘good’ outcome?).

In practical terms, the Structural and Process models are inextricably bound as the former provides the theoretical basis for the latter. Regardless of the aggregation of the unit (e.g., individual vs. individual, individual vs. group, group vs. group, etc.), this theoretical empirical dependency remains intact to the extent that any dyadic conflict can be considered as:

… a process which includes the perceptions, emotions, behaviors, and outcomes of the two parties. Specifically, in order to differentiate conflict processes from other processes … conflict is the process which begins when one party perceives the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his (Thomas 1976, p. 891).

Thomas’ use of the third person singular pronoun, in generic terms, unwittingly reveals two major assumptions underpinning the psychological approach. First, that we can empirically identify an entity that, much like a self-determining individual, possesses a coherent set of singular, stable, and universal interests, intentions, or affective states. Second, we can also empirically and unambiguously determine these specific psychological characteristics. The effect of these assumptions is to anthropomorphise all conflict relations to the extent that, at any level of aggregation, they will tend to follow certain psychological principles premised on the simplest person-to-person dyad. Beyond this obvious conceptual reductionism there are also strong implicitly functionalist assumptions, notably that the normal state for any collective entity is a healthy coherence that will be encouraged by good husbandry of those conflicts that do occur. Such assumptions give rise to the view that, so long as conflict is managed effectively using rational principles, we can keep the lid on organizational conflict and even use it to the organization’s advantage.

Thomas (1976) offers three reasons why conflict can be functional for organizations. First, there may be a lack of tension in an organization that can create boredom and complacency while, in contrast, a certain level of conflict may stimulate creativity. Second, the existence of conflicting priorities and, hence, ideas may make for better solutions to organizational problems. Third, aggressive behavior need not necessarily be destructive, especially when it initiates conflict resolution procedures. Thomas also notes that, as beneficial side effects of conflict, organizations can identify systemic equity problems, address internal power imbalances, and, in situations where the whole organization is united in conflict with another, improve its internal cohesiveness.

The social psychological approach has spawned a whole industry of expert theory and practice that seeks better methods of containing conflict within the limits of acceptability. Generally speaking, however, two main methods of conflict containment are open to us: the resolution of conflict through negotiation or the regulation and minimization of conflict through governance structures. Psychological studies have emphasized the former option to such an extent that the conceptual terrain of organizational conflict is now dominated by ideas of how to negotiate our way out of it! An indication of the importance of this shift of emphasis can be obtained by comparing the entry on ‘Conflict’ in the first edition of the Handbook of Industrial and/organizational Psychology (Thomas 1976) and the revised entry in the second edition (Thomas 1994). In this latter contribution the validity of the Process and Structural models is largely taken ‘as read’ and most of the space is devoted to outlining subsequent developments in negotiation theory and practice, especially the role played by third-party technocrats in bringing about conflict resolution. Social psychology perspectives typically provide little critical reflection on the adequacy of their models or on the validity of their behavioral assumptions. These shortcomings are particularly troubling: representing all organizational conflict as if it took place through the operation of a dyad fails adequately to capture the complexities of the social relations found in organizations. In the light of this, we shall now turn our attention to alternative treatments of conflict.

2. Ethnographic Approaches To Organizational Conflict

According to Barley (1991), one common misapprehension about the nature of organizational conflict is indicated by our tendency to ‘bracket’ it. By this Barley means that we see conflict as somehow being outside the usual day-to-day events of organizational life. It is to be seen as a special case to be treated in special ways. Barley considers this bracketing to be, indirectly, an artifact of the psychological discipline of conflict and negotiation studies: seeing the world through eyes used to studying dyadic negotiations in laboratory settings predisposes us to look for self-contained conflicts with well-defined antecedents and a limited life span. Barley argues that we need to bring the study of conflict back from the margins and place it at the heart of the quotidian experience of organizations. This means rejecting ideas of utility maximization and individual cognition in favor of an anthropology of specific conflict processes; an approach that involves developing an ‘ethnography of disputing.’ Barley regards the advantages of this approach to be the historicizing and contextualizing of the eternal conflict between organizational actors trying to make sense of their position in a negotiated order. Barley’s position relies heavily on the work of Anselm Strauss and his earlier studies of the unstable divisions of labor found in many organizations. Strauss and his collaborators found that, rather than following externally imposed standardized rules and procedures, individual tasks and duties were more the product of bargaining and negotiation between the staff themselves.

In general, an anthropological approach to organizational conflict places a good deal of emphasis on the social cultural context in which the disputants find themselves. These include: socially constructed identities (especially ‘insider’ vs. ‘outsider’ status); the size and complexity of networks of dependency relations; the historical nature of social norms (especially those that define what a ‘dispute’ is and the rules by which it is handled); as well as the resources that actors who are seeking to influence the trajectory of a dispute have at their disposal (Barley 1991). Overarching these dimensions is an appreciation of the semantic and material implications of the language of conflict; in this way, the anthropological approach shares a number of methodological similarities with Actor Network Theory (Law 1994) and Domain Theory (Gray 1989). The anthropological approach, as depicted by Barley, serves the important purpose of showing us that we do not have to think of conflict exclusively in psychological terms. Breaking the tyranny of the anthropomorphized dyad allows us to think about conflict as a complex nexus of social relations and avoids the functionalist view that it must be doing some ‘good’ somewhere. Nevertheless, the anthropological study of conflict still remains under-theorized. Indeed, it remains largely an empirical exercise and little theory is at work, an observation that is particularly striking when considering the dimension of power in shaping the antagonistic relations of everyday social settings. For example, Barley’s (1991) conception of power extends little beyond the distribution of ‘resources’ available to parties to influence outcomes in competitive relations, a view that is also evident in some explicitly ‘socio-logical’ treatments of conflict (e.g., Tolbert 1991). Thus, it is little different from social psychological approaches in dealing with the complexities of the power relations mediating organizational conflict. Recently, several authors have addressed this short-coming in anthropological studies of conflict: for example, Sarat and Felstiner’s (1995) application of Michel Foucault to their studies of divorce negotiations. Nevertheless, the general lack of nuance in the treatment of power by theorists concerned with organizational conflict points to an area where studies can be greatly enriched.

The conceptual arena of power underwent profound changes in the late twentieth century, shifting from arid behaviorism to arcane abstractedness, before finally settling into fine-grained analysis (see Flyvbjerg 1998). In part this shift was symptomatic of a return to a less moralistic and more Machiavellian view of power. We shall return to these themes in the last section of this research paper.

3. Organizational Conflict And Neo-Darwinism

The basic premise of neo-Darwinian approaches to human behavior, such as the Evolutionary Psychology movement (e.g. Buss 1995), is that the human mind is stuck in the prehistoric African Savannah of our hominid ancestors. Behavioral traits—for example, human aggression and a predisposition toward inter-subjective conflict—survived because they conferred adaptive advantage on us as a species. Thus, we can established ex post facto explanations for almost any empirically observable form of behavior—on the basis of natural selection then, if it was not adaptive, it would have been bred out. Nicholson (1997) suggests that common characteristics of organizations, such as a predilection for gossip, the love of ritual, and even the existence of hierarchy, can be traced to biologically determined human nature.

The increasing influence of the neo-Darwinian approach (incidentally, a viewpoint that is opposed by many evolutionary biologists who see it as a misappropriation of Darwin’s ideas) is already being felt in studies of organizational conflict. For example, Ehin (1995) considers the tension between conflict and cooperation to be part of our biological destiny. Moreover, he contends that, by studying the mutual dependence systems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, we are able to define a set of desirable social principles for current organizations that are ‘… more congruent with human nature’ (Ehin 1995, p. 667). Adopting a dualistic model of innate characteristics, Ehin argues that humans display either agonic (aggressive, individually territorial, and hierarchical) or hedonic (mutually supportive, group-centered, and egalitarian) tendencies. The extent to which we display one or the other is determined by context and, citing studies of chimpanzee behavior as evidence, Ehin contends that, if we can return to our ‘natural’ settings, the hedonic predisposition will prevail. It is only when we are removed from this setting—in this case, placed in a hierarchy of work organization—that we tend to display agonic characteristics. This work stands as the intellectual equivalent of Hobbes’ primitive ruminations and the organizational implications are clear. First, conflict is an evolutionarily advantageous response to many ‘unnatural’ forms of organization and, second, if only we can return to a more natural form of organization, then conflict will be, to all intents and purposes, banished as we revert to our hedonic state. This reflects an increasingly popular view that presence of cooperation and the absence of conflict are not just virtuous aspirations within the modern society, they are biological necessities that ensure the continuation of our species (Fukuyama 1999). Not only is this view naive with respect to issues of power, it is also a contestable interpretation of Darwin’s idea of natural selection. In particular, to two specific objections can be laid against it.

The first is fundamental: according to Darwinian adaptation, evolution occurs through random mutation rather than strategic intent and anything that involves intent cannot be explained by Darwinian ideas. Of course, axiomatically this rules out all social situations, including those where parties are in conflict over the relative moral status of competing norms or the distribution of resources. But, as if this misinterpretation of Darwin was not sufficient, such studies can never satisfy the requirements of evolutionary science. This point has been particularly well made by de Jong and van der Steen (1998) who persuasively demonstrate the inability of any psycho-logical study to establish that anything so abstract and socially constructed as a behavioral trait (for example, a predisposition toward conflict) could be advantageous from an evolutionary perspective. Few would deny that heredity plays no part in behavior but it is stretching it beyond the conceptual and methodological bounds of Darwinism to suggest that the dynamics of organizational conflict will be determined by human genetics.

4. A Neo-Machiavellian View Of Organizational Conflict

By control to the previous approaches to organizational conflict, we wish to offer a fourth framework for thinking about the problem. Our starting point is that we must acknowledge that conflicts matter in any organization and we are all players—even in the face of denial or ignorance (being devious or stupid does not disengage one from conflictual processes). There are four basic ways in which the political maneuvering of organizational conflict proceeds. The first three of these invariably lead to protagonists being ousted in conflict. The organizational agent who is not politically skilled will fail. Returning to the Machiavellian theme, the key implication is that skill in the arts of political engagement, strategy, and discourse should be central to organizational competencies.

The first typical mode is to be in denial of conflict. We can characterize this as unrealistic, for few rational actors could be insensitive enough to their organizational surroundings to survive in this state for long. Second, there is passive acceptance without resistance of what one is in conflict with. This is naive: it accepts what it does not seek to understand/or counter. Third, there is active recognition without action, where one realizes the nature of the conflict but proposes no strategic counterpoint for dealing with it. We may characterize this as incompetent. Finally, there is strategic cognition and treatment, where one recognizes the phenomenon as conflict and treats it appropriately through devising strategies to manage it, with and through the use of power. We may characterize this, after Buchanan and Badham (1999), as developing ‘power-assisted steering.’

Essential to these competencies is the ability to be able to creatively improvise around organizational conflicts, through developing a diverse repertoire. This includes: image building; selective information release and dissemination; scapegoating of conflictual others; building formal alliances with potential allies; networking with friends and enemies of enemies; striking up appropriate compromises where necessary; being able to manipulate rules, and being ruthlessly pragmatic. Such tactics require deployment in specific organizational contexts, characterized by diverse stakeholders and variable political entrepreneurship. The exercise of power, in ongoing action, will be accomplished through the production of plausible accounts, the creation of viable reputations for political operators, and the achievement of outcomes regarded as ‘wins’ (Buchanan and Badham 1999). Essential to these capabilities is a capacity to analyze strategies of power discursively. Those who would be players need to be able to ask questions about the extent to which their power games—actual or projected—will be characterized as ethically acceptable, contextually reasonable, and plausibly accountable? What will the consequences be for those whose reputations are involved in the stakes: who will be weakened, strengthened, or unchanged?

Organizational life involves developing and deploying political competence. (The theoretical derivation of this view of organizations are elaborated in Clegg [1989] and Buchanan and Badham [1999].) Sometimes the skill will be in containing conflict or nipping it in the bud, other times ensuring where and when it flares, in what arenas, and with what participants. Conflicts represent opportunities for honing the skills of political competence in whatever normative order the organization constitutes. Clearly, these are highly variable—but even the most sacred may be as readily characterized in these terms as may be the most profane—as any reader of Trollope’s ‘Barchester’ novels could attest. Political strategy does not depend on the normative environment in which it is lodged so much as the strategic capabilities deployed. On this reading, Machiavellian skills are appropriate in any organizational context.

Bibliography:

1. Barley S R 1991 Contextualizing conflict: Notes on the anthropology of disputes and negotiations. Research on Negotiation in Organizations 3: 165–99
2. Buchanan D A, Badham R 1999 Power, Politics and/organizational Change: Winning the Turf Game. Sage, London
3. Buss D M 1995 Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for social science. Psychological Inquiry 6: 1–30
4. Clegg S R 1989 Frameworks of Power. Sage, London
5. de Jong H L, van der Steen W J 1998 Biological thinking in evolutionary psychology: Rockbottom or quicksand. Philosophical Psychology 11: 183–205
6. Ehin C 1995 The quest for empowering organizations: Some lessons from our foraging past. Organization Science 6: 666–71
7. Flyvbjerg B 1998 Rationality & Power: Democracy in Practice. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
8. Fukuyama F 1999 The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order. Free Press, New York
9. Gray B 1989 Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems. Jossey Bass, San Francisco
10. Law J 1994 Organizing Modernity. Blackwell, Oxford, UK
11. Nicholson N 1997 Evolutionary psychology: Toward a new view of human nature and/organizational society. Human Relations 50: 1053–78
12. Sarat A, Felstiner W L F 1995 Divorce Lawyers and their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
13. Thomas K W 1976 Conflict and conflict management. In: Dunnette M (ed.) Handbook of Industrial and/organizational Psychology. Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA pp. 889–936
14. Thomas K W 1994 Conflict and negotiation processes in organizations. In: Dunnette M, Hough L M (eds.) Handbook of Industrial and/organizational Psychology, 2nd edn. Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA, Vol. 3, pp. 651–717
15. Tolbert P S 1991 Negotiations in organizations: A sociological perspective. Research on Negotiation in Organizations 3: 99–117