Values in Family Theory Research Paper

A note on terminology: although logically one should write about ‘value theory’ (without the -s) the plural form ‘values’ is preferred because ‘value’ and ‘values’ are distinct concepts similar to ‘medium’ and ‘media.’ In writing about ‘values’ the totality of values is referred to as ideational factor, and not to ‘value’ in the sense of the worth of an object.

2. The Significance Of Values

In general three types of attitudes toward the concept of values can be found among social scientists: denial, trivialization, and emphasis. Probably the most radical type of denial of the ‘significance’ of values is to refuse to give any role to ‘values’ altogether. In most economic theories for instance, ‘value’ (without the ’s) enters the picture as a synonym of ‘price.’ ‘Values’ as a cultural factor are rarely considered. This is especially true for neo-classic economists (cf. G. Becker 1981). If ideational factors are allowed in economic models, it is often in terms of tastes, preferences, or needs, and not in terms of values in a sociological sense of the word (cf. infra). But even in sociology some approaches (e.g., structural theories) are notorious for denying the significance of culture (Thompson et al. 1990). Among approaches that explicitly give credit to a cultural argument, several also raise doubt whether the concept of values is needed in the study of culture and social change (Adler 1956, Blake and Davis 1968; see also J. F. Scott’s phenomenological approach (Cancian 1975). They question the usefulness of the concept of values in causal explanations because values can only be inferred from behavior itself or from specific norms and goals. Hence, in this view a direct explanation of human behavior by reference to values is a sociological tautology. Although these critics differ in opinion regarding the type of cultural factors that are significant, they all deny the significance of values.

Trivialization of values may manifest itself in several ways. Values may be trivialized by ‘explaining it away,’ that is by arguing that values are merely spuriously related to behavior. Such a view is congruent with the former critics regarding the tautological nature of any values explanation of behavior. Values may also be trivialized by making them a ‘constant’ or ‘exogenous’ factor in explaining behavior. Within rational choice theory the exogenous character of values is explicit: assuming that there is a rational actor is implying that ‘rationality’ is a natural characteristic rather than a cultural construct. Defining values as an exogenous factor or arguing that values are merely spuriously related to behavior is minimizing their role. However, maximizing their importance can also lead to trivialization. This is illustrated in the work of Parsons (1937) who—perhaps ironically enough—protested strongly against the aforementioned ‘natural science’ kind of attitude toward values. Parsons’ own functionalist approach to values, however, can also be criticized for having an intrinsically trivial nature (Spates 1983). Part of the trivialization is due to the teleological conceptualization of values within the Parsonian tradition: ‘a value is a conception…of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action’ (C. Kluckhohn, in: Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 395). Values determine behavior by definition. By consequence, the question whether they do so is irrelevant. Spates (1983) raises a second caveat, that is that Parsons’ values theory faces the problem of deductive imposition by arguing that values can only be deduced by a careful theorist. Hence, observable reality is forced into accord with a preconceived model. Although theoretically values are emphasized, empirically they are trivialized. Dropping the element of action probably leads to a less trivial conceptualization.

The empirical tradition of studying values by definition emphasizes the significance of values. Conceptualization of values, however, has not proved to be its strongest point. Many researchers do not hesitate to use the concept of values implicitly in their work, assuming a mutually intuitive understanding of the concept. Others have claimed that the empirical tradition merely added to the conceptual confusion rather than anything else (Lautmann 1971). Although there is a grain of truth in these claims, it is felt that they tend to exaggerate divergence. Within the ideational approaches of the concept of values, there is a tendency to fit in with two traditions. (‘Fitting in’ does not mean that scholars fully subscribe to the conceptualization within a tradition, but rather that they share its point of departure.) The Parsonian tradition has already been discussed in the preceding section. Researchers working within this framework seem to agree with Kluckhohn’s idea that values are ‘conceptions of the desirable.’ The second tradition was initialized by the social psychologist Rokeach (1968, 1973), who explicitly opposed the Parsonian concept of values. Instead he argued that ‘a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence’ (1973, p. 5). The major advantage of this definition is that it tries to avoid letting issues open to empirical questioning—such as reference to action— constitute elements of that definition. Presumably, this is one of the reasons why the two values theories that will be discussed in the last section adopt a similar concept of values. Nevertheless, one could interpret Rokeach’s concept of values as being a conservative force since they are defined as enduring beliefs. Although socialization theories (cf. infra) tend to agree with the latter statement, Rokeach himself has pointed out that complete stability is not at issue. To avoid misinterpretation it is suggested the adjective ‘enduring’ is dropped from the nominal definition.

In spite of these arguments several researchers still reject Rokeach’s definitions and prefer Kluckhohn’s conceptualization (Mohler 1987 and Miceli and Castelfranchi 1989). This merely illustrates that both traditions are competing.

It is obviously important to distinguish ‘values’ from other ideational factors (Rokeach 1973, Cancian 1975, Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, and Miceli and Castelfranchi 1989). In family research, three such factors seem important, namely, norms, attitudes, and intentions. Especially the latter two concepts have received much more attention than values in studies of demographic behavior. Since there is little agreement on the meaning of these concepts a view is presented on the major differences. ‘Values’ and ‘attitudes’ differ because attitudes are more ‘object’ and ‘situation specific’ and because values are of a more general nature. Intentions are even more object-related. Consequently, an ‘organization of attitudes’ transcends the specificity of each attitude and may be interpreted as a ‘values orientation.’ Analyses of the European and World Values Studies often adopt such a strategy (Ester et al. 1993) by collapsing scores on different attitudes into one or several values dimensions. Hence, attitudes and values are strongly related. Intentions, on the other hand, are more closely related to behavior. For that reason measured intentions are often modeled as dependent variables as an alternative to indicators of behavior in values research (Inglehart 1977, 1990). At least Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (1975) demurs at such a point of view. Instead they argue that the best predictor of behavior is the intention to do so. A second difference between values on the one hand and attitudes or intentions on the other is that the latter are individual predispositions, whereas values may also be characteristics of depersonalized entities, as in ‘the values of the working class.’ In such a connection values bridge the gap between attitudes and norms. Norms prevail at the society or macro level as products of cultural inheritance. They refer to prescriptions of how to behave. In fact they include sets of (normative) rules. Internalization of these rules may define values orientations.

3. The Role Of Values In Family Theory And Research

The values argument belongs in a broader context concerned with the role of culture in social demography. As far as family research is concerned, one cannot ‘neglect’ noncultural types of explanation. One should not ignore the impact of G. Becker’s New Home Economics (1981) and R. Easterlin’s Social Deprivation Theory (1976, 1980) in explanations of demographic change in recent decades. Pollak and Watkins (1993) recently summarized the various perspectives on how cultural approaches relate to economic perspectives and argued that cultural and economic approaches are compatible when they are consistent or equivalent to one another or when cultural explanations attempt to specify the scope of economic rational choice explanations. Preston (1986) and Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1998) are referred to in particular on this issue. Similarly, Lesthaeghe and Moors (1994) and Lesthaeghe (1998) have demonstrated the usefulness of a frame of reference that includes the complementarity of theoretical perspectives in studying family formation. They argue that our understanding of demographic transitions may improve if we avoid rigidly adopting a single grand theory or aiming at enhancing the supremacy of one particular paradigm. Treating theories as distinct but not mutually exclusive views gives rise to a multicausal theoretical framework that can be used to ‘explain’ historical and geographical variations (Preston 1986, Lesthaeghe 1995) as well as individual differences (Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986, Lesthaeghe and Moors 1994). Irrespective of these notions, Oppenheimer (1994) remains skeptical of researchers who rely exclusively on the idea that values influence behavior. In her opinion, they face the problem that there is little empirical research that actually tests the presumed causal effect. However, the little evidence that does exist supports the theory of ideational change. Using panel data, Moors (1997)—on values—and Thornton and coworkers (1992, see also Barber 1999)—on attitudes—clearly demonstrated that ideational factors influence demographic behavior autonomously. Hence, the ability of values theory to complement other types of explanations, its intrinsic quality in explaining demographic changes, and its empirical merits lead us to conclude that values have a role to play.

4. Values Theory?

In empirical research on values two theories developed in the 1970s drew much attention, namely, Inglehart’s socialization theory (1977, 1990) and Kohn’s role theory (1977, Kohn and Slomczynski 1993). They produced an independent body of research and stirred controversy, but have gained prominence in later decades. In demography Inglehart’s theory has been used by the researchers focusing on values (cf. infra) because the theory is founded on the notion of ideational change. There have been some modifications of Inglehart’s argument, but its core has remained intact. It is founded on two basic premises. First, Inglehart argues that an individual’s values priorities reflect his or her socio-economic environment, people attach relatively more importance to relatively scarce objects. This scarcity argument is complemented by a socialization argument that stresses the importance of experiences in the so-called ‘formative years.’ Inglehart assumes that—in reaching adulthood—values tend to crystallize in the personality. By consequence he ‘predicts’ a generational pattern of change in values orientations toward increasing preference for autonomy and consequent behavior. The idea that a process of social metabolism (i.e., the succession of generations with distinctive profiles) may generate social change was nothing new to demographers familiar with the work of N. Ryder (1965). By consequence, it has been a small step to link a generational pattern of values change with changes in behavior, for example, rising levels of cohabitation, independent living and divorce, an increase in single parenthood, etc. Inglehart’s values theory primarily emphasizes that values influence choices people make. The possibility of reverse causation is not explicitly discussed.

Whereas Inglehart focuses on historical conditions during the formative years, Kohn claims that values are directly influenced by ‘here-and-now experiences’ at the workplace. In Kohn’s theory, values play a mediating role in relating social structure to behavior. As such he primarily focuses on ‘contemporary conditions’ rather than historical circumstances. The key argument of the Kohn thesis is that the normative requirements of a job generate values orientations which are appropriate to the actual circumstances of the job. Hence, the relationship between social class and values can be explained by referring to occupational conditions, that is the level of occupational self-direction. Generalizing this point of view one could argue that people learn to value characteristics that are appropriate to their conditions of life. In contrast to Inglehart, Kohn highlights the adaptation of values to changing conditions. At first glance, the theories yield contradictory propositions. On consideration, however, these theories can be reconciled because they bring together different mechanisms that generate values orientations, that is, values may be socialized (Inglehart) as well as learned by taking up social roles (Kohn). Furthermore, even their difference in locus regarding the issue of values stability and values adaptation need not imply contradiction. To Inglehart values influence behavior because values are relatively enduring characteristics of individuals. Although Rokeach (1973) holds a highly similar position, he also demonstrated within experimental designs that values may change due to strong ‘incentives,’ for example, dramatic or intense experiences (Ball-Rokeach et al. 1984). Kohn’s theory suggests that—given the centrality of work in the life of people—the everyday experience in the workplace may induce such change. Consequently, Inglehart’s notion of relatively enduring values orientations after the formative years is compatible with Kohn’s argument about the significance of temporal occupational conditions. After all, important changes in the life-course may re-affirm values rather than altering them. Young people who value traditional family life may decide to marry for that reason, and may find affirmation of their opinion by the very experience of marriage itself. Hence, even stability forms part of a dynamic process. As a consequence, the key question is no longer whether values change after the formative years, but when (e.g., under what conditions) they do so. By the same token the dynamics of the values-behavior relationship becomes manifest. Values influence the choices people make and the consequences of these choices—in turn—re-affirm or alter the values these people hold. It is important to reconcile both these theoretical perspectives in demography since there is little doubt that changes in family life can be intense experiences. As the research of Thornton et al. (1992, see also Axinn and Thornton 1993) has demonstrated, both historical and contemporary experiences affect demographic transitions. Hence, a life-course approach focusing on the sequential and recursive relationship of values and demographic transitions is most appropriate.

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