Family Processes Research Paper

1. The Constitution Of Couples And Family

Several trends characterize the process of constitution of couples and family in modern societies. First, there is the widespread custom of romantic marriage, where the partners themselves—rather than parents or tradition—choose their spouse and their civil status.

However, various authors have shown that this individualization of the process of mate selection is accompanied by strong homogamy: people often choose their partner within their own social, cultural, ethnic, or religious background. The consequence of this homogamy—which is not so obvious in the middle of the social pyramid than in its extremes— is that love marriage does not disrupt social divisions, but conforms to and possibly reinforces them, as in the case of arranged marriages (Aldous 1996). It should, however, be noted that initial homogamy often alters during the family life course because of the disparity of social mobility between the spouses.

Former linear and standardized sequences of becoming part of a couple (i.e., courtship, engagement, marriage), punctuated by strong rites of passage, are often replaced by recursive and individualized paths, which are not culturally well-established. This is true for both the life course of one particular couple and the frequent succession of several marital stories: Family careers diversify and jostle together. Far from signifying an obsolescence of marital union, this individualization of the process seems to meet the couple’s increasing concern for personal identity and stability within a mobile, polyreferential, anonymous, and segmented society. In the same way, different forms of today’s family ties—cohabitation, one-parent families, step-families, and so forth—can be viewed simultaneously as much in terms of their appropriateness to a complex society as of a factor of stress or deficiency for the person (cf. Kaufmann 1993, Singly 1997).

Although it is individualized, the process of constitution of the couple is also shaped by omnipresent scientific and popular models of ‘the’ good marriage, models which partly replace the role of juridical norms and religious beliefs.

The transition from couple to family has formed the subject of more contradictory theoretical modeling. Economic theories, like Becker’s (1981), model this transition as a balance between the important emotional meaning of the child for potential parents from all social backgrounds, and the cost it involves (loss of profit, restriction to autonomy, contribution and support to education, etc.). Therefore, the number of children born in a family, or their ‘quality’ (i.e., their social endowment), mostly depends on the parent’s material resources. Without denying the growth— within secularized societies—of the importance of intentionality, of evaluation in terms of costs and profits, and concern for family planning, sociological theories are reluctant to limit the meaning of the child to its relational dimension. They add to it a statutory motivation for parents (the child as a resource of prestige, as a means to gain power, as a resource against the outside world) and a motivation regarding the child’s needs (care, protection, attendance, etc.). According to the spouses’ social assets, these different types of motivation can either be in competition with each other (the attraction for the relationship can be balanced by the fear of losing one’s self-identity, professional power, and daily activities) or in convergence. The situation of competition occurs more frequently as the cultural level of the wife increases. This often leads to a delay in producing a child, even when strongly desired, or even to this being renounced it completely by the couple (cf. Teachman et al. 1999).

2. Types Of Functioning

Once the families are constituted, how do they work? Early analysis on this theme (e.g., Burgess et al. 1949) have contrasted traditional families (institution)— strongly institutionalized, with clear differentiation of roles between spouses, hierarchical organization of the relationships, and with instrumental goals (economic survival, social integration) prevailing within the couple—with modern families (companionship), marked by the predominance of expressive goals, of equality as the norm, where institutionalization and the differentiation of family member’s social identities are softened.

But the growing variety of structural types of families has led several researchers to also emphasize the diversity of the types of functioning of contemporary families. Different typologies have been put forward.

First, focusing on primary goals, Farber contrasts the ‘child-oriented families’—where emphasis is placed on children’s social integration, on the differentiation of domestic tasks, and where constraint of socialization prevails on the couple’s personal interests—with the ‘home-oriented families,’ where the emphasis is placed on comfort and mutual support in the family, and a flexibility of regulations, and to ‘parent-oriented families,’ more concerned with the parent’s socioprofessional integration, who place parental constraints over those of children, and promote a certain lack of differentiation of roles.

Second, and more centered on modes of cohesion, the typologies of Roussel (1989) contrast ‘association families’ (strong emphasis on the autonomy of the spouses, a little differentiation of roles, essentially individualized goals) with ‘enmeshed families’ (emphasis on consensus and full sharing in the couple, predominance of emotional goals of the couple, relative flexibility of roles), and ‘alliance families’ (strong institutionalization, predominance of the family’s social integration as a goal, strong differentiation of roles).

Lastly, other authors have focused on types of normative regulations. For Kantor and Lehr, ‘open families’ are characterized by organization standards (roles, behavior, etc.) that evolve with contextual changes, whereas ‘random families’ show almost no intersituational coherence in their norms of functioning, and ‘closed families’ are characterized by a rigidity of their rules and incapacity to adapt to the evolution of the context and to take into account external information. A similar interpretation can be found by Reiss, who contrasts ‘consensus-sensitive families’ with ‘environment-sensitive families.’ Olson’s circomplex model, crossing dimensions of cohesion and regulation, seeks to show that extreme types of functioning (i.e., too rigid or too enmeshed) are more at risk than balanced types. These types of functioning vary according to the social status of the spouses: an increase in economic and cultural assets is linked to a more distinct emphasis on individual autonomy, a flexibility of regulation, and wide receptiveness of the group towards relationships and external information (see Kellerhals et al. 1994 for a synthesis).

3. Distribution Of Roles, Power, Justice

Within the study of these modes of functioning, the question of role and power distribution has obviously occupied a central position. In the 1950s, the dominant idea was that small groups—that is, the nuclear family—generally engender a differentiation between instrumental roles (contribution of external resources, choice of the group’s orientation) and expressive roles (organization of the internal production and the management of relationships), that brings about a higher efficiency of effort and turns out to be essential to the success of the socialization process (Parsons and Bales 1955). However, under the triple influence of feminism, the diversification of lifestyles, and the revisiting of ethnological analysis, the universality of this model has been contested and its functional character challenged by research showing that within a romantic marriage, the sharing of the expressive function and the equality of involvement is a determining factor of relational and educational success (Aldous 1977).

This ‘functionalist consensus’ was then overtaken by a rational utilitarian perspective—the resource theory (Blood and Wolfe 1960)— that understands the exercise of power in the family as a reflection of the inequality of socioeconomic resources between the spouses. According to this theory, the actor with higher outside resources exercises—despite possible egalitarian norms—a greater internal decision-making power; moreover, the comparative significance of the spouses’ resources dictates their respective contribution to educational and domestic tasks. Criticism of this theory has been mostly concerned with the fact that (a) resources, far from being only economic, can also be charismatic, can concern expert knowledge, or be normative; (b) the weight of the latter vary according to the cultural context; and (c) the power of the other depends on the ego’s alternatives. This triple determination can explain the permanency of sexism or domestic violence, as much as the unequal distribution of tasks in contemporary families. However, contemporary formulations of the problem emphasize the fact that by increasing the wife’s potential independence and economic power, professional integration of women also increases her motivation and ability to speak for herself and require some consideration, while these elements will in turn reinforce the actor’s power in negotiations (cf. Szinovacz 1987, Gelles 1995). The mechanistic exchange model is thus taken over by a sociocognitive formulation, where processes by which identity is constituted play an important part.

This transition from one paradigm to another has had repercussions particularly on the theorization of feelings of justice (fairness) in the family. The extent of inequality suffered by couples on a long-term basis tends to show that the simple equity theory—according to which feelings of injustice (unfairness) appear when the balance between one actor’s contributions and rewards is different from another—is not always appropriate here. In fact, criteria of fairness vary according to status (social rank, age, sex), to the primary goals of the group, and to its type of cohesion. Three very different concepts of justice can thus be drawn (Kellerhals et al. 1997). The ‘voluntarist’ concept considers that justice comes when all concerned parties have been duly referred to and have been able to make an explicit or implicit agreement concerning the distribution of tasks or rewards in the family. Agreement between each other’s will creates fairness. The ‘finalist’ concept defines the occurrence of fairness when the distribution of rights and duties brings positive outcomes to the individual or the group, with no primary consideration for merit or agreement. Finally, the ‘comparative’ concept considers that fairness occurs when people with the same status are treated in a similar way.

As we can see, these concepts of justice enable individuals to allow or make sense of very strong objective inequalities. They result from a collective construction of meaning, rather than from a static comparison between debts and bonds. This collective construction varies according to the type of cohesion of the group (normative families with a strong sense of unity tend to favor the ‘comparative’ concept, whereas more associative and negotiator families prefer the ‘voluntarist’ concept), and to social status (‘comparative’ concepts are more common at the bottom of social hierarchy, whereas ‘voluntarist’ ideas prevail at the top). Lastly, the spouses’ concepts are not necessarily identical, so much so that the fairness unfairness debate often seems to refer more to the confrontation of ideals, rather than to the objective disparity between contribution and retribution.

4. The Educational Relationship

Every family has to comply with an educational task that usually aims at providing children with social competencies (cognitive skills, social skills, and sense of autonomy belongingness) essential to their social integration. However, in doing so, the parents’ educational strategies vary greatly. They have often been characterized by their degree of permissiveness or control, on the one hand, and by their degree of warmth, commitment, and support (vs. lack of concern or hostility), on the other. It is on that basis that Baumrind, for instance, distinguishes between an authoritarian style (weak support and nurturance, quite strict and punitive authority, little rational communication), as opposed to a permissive style (high support and weak control, either rational or punitive), to a harmonious style where parents try to have influence on their children by egalitarian negotiation, and an authoritative style (high degree of support and control) which favors rational communication and the child’s autonomy. Many researches show that an average degree of control and support are favorable to a good acquisition of social competencies and good self-esteem, whereas too much authority and punishment—or conversely too much protection—lead to blocks or rejections (cf. Rollins and Thomas 1979).

The parent’s social status (education, occupation, income) affects educational strategies. Kohn (1977), for instance, shows that self-control, autonomy, and curiosity are given more value at the top of the hierarchy, whereas immediate conformity tends to be emphasized at the bottom. Concerning educational methods, it has been found that coercive methods are slightly more used in poorer backgrounds, with emphasis on motivation increasing along the social scale (Gecas 1979). According to Kohn (1977), these disparities reflect the occupational situation of the parents: The more their occupation necessitates initiatives, autonomy, and symbolization, the more their educational methods will value these elements, and vice versa.

Subsequent studies have improved the rather mechanistic aspect of these analyses by giving more importance to a mutual, joint, and socially constructed character of socialization. First, observation of infants has shown how their reaction can modify the mother’s attitude. Moreover, the mutual ability of children and adults to establish synchronies, turn-taking, or behavior state matching proved to be an important factor of the attachment to, and the transmission of, norms (Peterson and Rollins 1987). Lastly, sociocognitive aspects, expectations relating to the ‘good child,’ and common knowledge relating to interpretations of deviant behavior model the adult’s response to the child’s actions and doings. This diversity of perspectives leads naturally to viewing the educational process as a site of interinfluence of the family microsystem, the institutional mesosystem, and the society macrosystem (Bronfenbrenner 1986). This ‘ecological’ perspective has notably shown how much the quality of the relationship between husband and wife affects the mother’s relationship with her child (second-order effect). In the same way, it has also been proved that educational style is an integral part of the family’s type of cohesion: ‘associative’ families are likely to insist on autonomy and creativity, whereas merged families concentrate mostly on mimicry and conformity (Kellerhals et al. 1994). Then again, mechanistic models have been taken over by more symbolic interactionist perspectives.

5. Families And Kinship Network

Because families have so many tasks to accomplish, there is a question as to whether they generally face these problems on their own or not. In this regard, the idea of the modern family withdrawing into itself has not stood up to several studies on the theme of family solidarity which show that the kin group’s support in the family management—purchase of property, child care, moral support, and so forth— is often essential, due to its flexibility, versatility, and speed (Pitrou 1992). However, these kinship ties are often characterized by a poor number of effective links, a clear primacy of vertical links (filiation) over horizontal links (sister brother link), the predominance of the mother’s kin, and by a much higher involvement of women. Kinship solidarity is, therefore, much affected by geographical distance, divorce, and professional occupations of both spouses, three points which limit availability.

Moreover, because kinship relationships often rely on affinity rather than on duty or status, and because the number of recomposed families following a divorce is multiplying, the kinship tie looks increasingly like a network (weak bond connections and absence of an important center point) rather than like a group concentrically focused on forebears and endowed with a strong collective consciousness (cf. Coenen-Huther et al. 1994).

6. Adjustment And Divorce

The study of family processes logically leads to research concerning reasons for the success or failure of the family faced with its tasks; in other words, concerning factors of adjustment. But what criteria of adjustment can be used?

Measuring marital and family adjustment in regard to the propensity for divorce creates confusion between the question of relational difficulties and economic or cultural obstacles preventing separation. Situations where marital stability coexist with disappointment often occur. However, it is important to try to define what are the factors of divorce. Before and during the 1960s, marital separation was usually interpreted with deficit models. Poor adjustment has therefore been viewed as a result of deficiency in the socialization to the other: couples getting married and having children very young, and also those whose parents have failed to pass on stable or harmonious models of marital union, have a higher rate of divorce than others. It has also been shown (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994) that probability of divorce is higher in second unions, where there is often a lack of clear cultural models to guide relationships between generations.

Poor adjustment has also been related to a deficiency of symbolic or economic resources. The emphasis on happiness, communication, and consumption often found in contemporary family’s plans demands financial resources that are not always available. Consequently, it is understandable that couples with low income and poor education separate more often, the distance between objectives and means being so large.

Poor adjustment has finally been viewed as the result of pronounced cultural differences between spouses, which finds expression in a lack of shared codes and values. A higher rate of divorce has therefore been noticed among mixed religion or nationality couples, or among heterogamous couples in age or social level (cf. Faust and McKibben 1999). However, once again, we should be aware that the social meaning of difference is probably even more important than the difference itself: hypergamous couples (where the man occupies a higher position than the woman does), for instance, are far more stable than hypogamous couples (where the situation is reversed), who are not so well accepted socially. But these different deficit models fail to explain the majority of contemporary divorces. More global, but also less verifiable, interpretations have been suggested, like Berger’s, for whom too much expectation regarding the couple and the family explains the extent of disillusion. Other analyses (Popenoe, Bellah, Roussel) insist on the incompatibility of individualistic concern for personal genuineness with constraints related to community commitment; others also have placed the accent on the existing hiatus between egalitarian models of marital relationship and very unequal marital practices. In all these approaches, divorce appears to be more like an intrinsic property of contemporary couples, rather than linked to clearly identifiable individual deficiencies (Roussel 1989).

Given the biases of the ‘divorce’ indicator, there have been attempts—since initial studies by Burgess and Cotrell—to measure marital adjustment with a great many multidimensional scales (implying, e.g., degree of satisfaction, cohesion, consensus, and emotional expression) and to examine factors that affect this marital quality. These are due to the marriage’s previous history (homogamy, socialization to appropriate role models), to the spouses’ current resources (integration and community support, economic level, educational level), and to the nature of their interaction (quality of communication, appropriateness to roles) (Gelles 1995). One can believe that these different ‘resources’ make it possible to avoid extreme forms of cohesion (enmeshment or disengagement) and of normative regulation (rigid or chaotic) which themselves limit the family’s ability to cope with stress, to adapt to external changes, and to manage disruptions (cf. Olson et al. 1983, Boss 1988).

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