Economic And Social Explanations in Family Theory Research Paper

As far as family and population research is concerned, contributions are made regularly from a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds. The phenomena that needed to be explained, such as the fertility or mortality transitions or the change in demographic behavior and household structures, have drawn the attention of sociologists, historians, economists, anthropologists, geographers, biologists, epidemiologists, and statisticians alike. As a consequence, the field of population studies—or demography in a broad sense—has always had firm interdisciplinary roots. The leading journals, such as Population Studies (UK), Demography (US), Population and Development Review (US), and Population (France) have remained loyal to their interdisciplinary tradition, and they are still firmly in the lead over their more ‘monodisciplinary’ competitors.

Yet, there have been skirmishes and frustrations. The former have often been similar to the nature– nurture debate in psychology. But in the field of family and population research, they emerge in the form of an economics vs. culture debate. The demand theory used by economists in explaining declining fertility or differential fertility between social groups is matched by a diffusion theory, advanced by economists and noneconomists alike. In the latter, the roles of social learning and the worldwide spreading of new ideas and attitudes are being accentuated. Today, there is still a small cluster of neoclassic economists that hold the belief that nothing more is needed on the explanatory side than changing constraints and opportunity structures (see Becker 1991, Stigler and Becker 1977), but at the other extreme, there is also a hard core of diffusionists who claim that historical and contemporary fertility transitions are occurring under such highly contrasting economic conditions that only the cultural diffusion of new ideas—now also followed by family planning programs—can account for them (e.g., Cleland and Wilson 1987). Obviously such discussions have major policy implications, and the debate has had a lasting life (see the contrasting results on the effects of family planning in Schultz 1997 and in Bongaarts et al. 1990).

In contrast, the frustrations among the mainstream participants in family and population studies stem from the observation that the different explanations live side by side as distinct narratives, as separate ‘good stories.’ Van de Kaa (1996) describes an anchored narrative by the following two characteristics: (a) there must be an easily identifiable central action (such as a detailed statistical account of changing trends or of newly emerging differentials) and (b) there must be a setting or theory that allows for an easy interpretation of that action. A well-anchored narrative consists of subnarratives that can be ordered from the general to the highly detailed. The question is whether the various social science disciplines can achieve a sufficiently high degree of sophistication that lifts them beyond anchored, but still compartmentalized narratives.

A classic recipe for theory integration emerged from the great debate in philosophy of science on the evolution of scientific knowledge as it took place in the late 1960s and much of the 1970s with Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as major protagonists (see Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). The gist of Lakatos’s (1970) strategy of progressive problem shift is that a scientific theory H can be regarded as falsified only if another theory H has been proposed such that:

(a) The counter-evidence to H is corroborating evidence for H ;

(b) H satisfactorily explains all the empirical successes hitherto explained by H (i.e., partial inclusion of H into H ); and

(c) H is also capable of explaining or predicting new facts or facts that were unlikely or impossible according to H (i.e. enlarged content of H ).

If these three principles are applied to the theories and anchored narratives in the broader field of demography, one comes to the following observations (see Lesthaeghe 1998):

(a) Many theories, or substantial parts of them, are not mutually exclusive but merely complementary: H and H explain different aspects or account for different subnarratives;

(b) Mechanisms described in H are often connected to mechanisms identified by H . Theories escape from these connections through ceteris paribus clauses with respect to different but nonetheless highly relevant omitted variables. If put together, however, the respective mechanisms in H and H often produce mutually reinforcing (or neutralizing) consequences or lead to important interaction effects; and

(c) Nonoverlapping parts of H and H that produce opposite predictions have rarely been falsified. Rather, their respective predictions have often come true in different contexts. Hence, a substantial degree of historical path dependency or context specificity emerges. This points in the direction of conditionality on factors not specified in either H or H but to be identified in a broader theory H .

These points will now be illustrated with respect to the changes in family formation and dissolution in industrialized countries since the 1950s.

2. A Comparison Of Three Theories Of The ‘Second Demographic Transition’

The term ‘second demographic transition’ was introduced by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986) to describe the changes in family formation, union dissolution, and patterns of family reconstruction in Western nations during the latter part of the twentieth century. By now, these patterns are also emerging in the former Eastern bloc countries of Europe including Russia. The changes in family formation operate through the postponement of marriage, a rise in single living, prolonged residence in the parental household, increases in incidence and duration of cohabitation (both preand postmarital), a postponement of parenthood leading to overall subreplacement fertility, and an increase in procreation within consensual unions. Patterns of union dissolution are characterized by rising divorce rates occuring at shorter durations of marriage and by high separation rates among cohabitants. These phenomena lead to more single person households and to more female-headed single parent households. More children grow up in nonconventional families. Although countries differ with respect to incidence and timing (e.g. Lesthaeghe 1995), most changes have consistent international trends.

These features of the narrative have been explained in three ways:

(a) by the theory of increased female economic autonomy combined with other ingredients of the neoclassic demand theory in economics (Becker et al. 1977, Becker 1991, Hotz et al. 1997, Bergstrom 1997);

(b) by the theory of relative economic deprivation (Easterlin 1976, Easterlin et al. 1990);

(c) by the theory of ideational shift (Preston 1986, Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986, Thornton and Camburn 1987, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988, Bumpass 1990).

The neoclassic economic theory of the family posits that (a) increasing investment in the quality (e.g., education) of children rather than in their numbers is being made as individuals and societies become wealthier, and (b) that increased female education and the opening up of employment opportunities for women has led to increased female economic autonomy and to increased opportunity costs associated with household tasks and child rearing. Services provided by the market are substituted for such tasks. Economic autonomy also means that women are less dependent on husbands, so that entry costs into marriage have become higher and exit costs lower. From these core propositions one can easily derive the changing position of men in households (sharing of tasks and child rearing activities, the quest for gender symmetry, weakening of male authority, etc.). By the same token, the rules of the game are being altered, especially with respect to intrafamilial exchange: less trust from family members in the family head is exchanged for less altruism from the family head toward the members. All of this leads to an economic disinstitutionalization of the family, and the narrative of the ‘second demographic transition’ describes the demographic outcomes produced by these forces.

The theory of relative economic deprivation provides a number of other key ingredients. The outcomes of this narrative essentially are produced by the tension between the consumption aspirations and employment opportunities of successive male generations. Easterlin originally used the theory to account for the baby boom of the 1960s and the baby bust of the 1970s and thereafter. The generations that produced the marriage and baby boom were raised in periods of less economic growth and had not developed high consumption aspirations during their childhood. These cohorts, however, benefited from expanding economic opportunities during the 1960s, and as a result they could more easily satisfy both consumption aspirations and family formation desires. Subsequent cohorts experienced high levels of consumption in their families of origin and developed high consumption aspirations themselves, but could not as easily fulfill these as a result of less advantageous labor market conditions. All the crucial steps in family formation were, therefore, postponed and new arrangements with a more temporary character, such as prolonged residence in the parental household or cohabitation, emerged as a necessity while waiting for better times. Furthermore, high consumption aspirations in tandem with scarcer opportunities for males fostered the need for an additional partial or full income to be provided by the female partner. From there onwards, the story could easily be completed according to the lines provided by the ‘female economic autonomy’ version of the neoclassic school.

Yet, both the starting point and the mechanism of the narratives are different. Becker et al. (1977) start from the female side, whereas Easterlin et al. (1990) start from the male point of view. Moreover, the Easterlin version has the built-in mechanism of cohort succession and a link to values (concerning consumption) fostered during childhood and adolescence. In the original version, a demographic factor was also given greater prominence: cohort size would acerbate the consumption aspirations–income tension since larger cohorts would face more competition and hence also tougher employment conditions. Higher female education and a larger female labor force supply (see the neoclassic version) would of course result in similar effects.

From the above narratives it is clear that the two economic theories H₁ and H₂ are not mutually exclusive and that their respective mechanisms have, to put it metaphorically, several cog wheels that grip into each others.

The theory of ideational shifts links the features of the second demographic transition to long-term trends, often starting in the nineteenth century, toward greater individual autonomy in the ethical, religious, and political domains. Typical expressions of this trend are the steady rise of secularism in the West over the last two centuries, the growth of emancipation movements operating first in the domain of social stratification, and then in the area of gender relations, the steady rise of postmaterialist political aspirations (see Inglehart 1990) in each successive birth cohort since 1920, the historical alteration of priorities in child socialization values (see Alwin 1990); or more recently the growth of scepticism toward institutions and the weakening of civil morality. In this respect, the baby boom in the original six member countries of the EU corresponded with the arrival at childbearing age of a cohort of parents that had hardly progressed on the postmaterialism scale with respect to political aspirations, whereas the baby bust corresponds with the childbearing of the cohort that made the largest leap of all on the same scale (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Very much the same result emerges with respect to the relative pace of secularization in Europe, and also among American youths, a significant shift away from community orientations and toward a self-centered preoccupation with material riches was observed (Easterlin and Crimmins 1991). On the whole, the rise of secular individualism and the concommittantly diminishing acceptability of institutional regulation in the sphere of the family are part of the same trend. This also implies that individuals are allowed more freedom to opt out of any arrangement if returns are judged to be inadequate and hence, that the cost– benefit calculus, which features so prominently in the neoclassic economic version, has gained legitimacy in most spheres of life.

A distinct feature of the ideational shifts theory is its preoccupation with intergenerational values transmission, the predictive power of value orientations on subsequent choices with respect to patterns of family formation and dissolution (selection effects), and the feed-back effects in the form of value adjustments (affirmation or negation) in function of certain life cycle events. This line of research has made extensive use of panel data in assessing the strength of these effects net of other predictors commonly used in microeconomic empirical analyses (see Thornton and Camburn 1987, Axinn and Thornton 1993, Clarkberg et al. 1995, Barber 1999, Moors 1999). These meticulously designed studies all show that value orientations, even when measured at young ages (including those related to consumption aspirations and labor force commitment), have highly significant independent effects on future life course choices such as cohabitation vs. marriage, parenthood within and outside wedlock, timing and quantum of fertility, separation and divorce. While not refuting predictions derived from economic theory, these studies document the extra predictive power of ideational dimensions.

Finally, it is clear that several ingredients of the ideational theory can be linked directly to those featured by the economic views. For instance, the neoclassic central focus on female economic autonomy leads directly to the changes in gender relations, and these indeed matter in the unfolding of alternative forms of family formation. In addition, both the Easterlin version and the ideational theory pay ample attention to the role of socialization in successive generations and both are essentially cohort theories of social change. Ideational theory, however, traces the trends in causal factors much further back in time, and it does not of course restrict itself to consumption aspirations alone. But in doing so, the ideational shifts theory provides support for the neoclassic economic position by showing how increased legitimacy of individual economic rationality is taking the lead over the forces of institutional normative regulation.

3. Predictions And Contexts: The Example Of Cohabitation

The three theories just discussed offer different mechanisms for explaining the rise of premarital cohabitation in the West since the 1960s. According to the neoclassic theory, the phenomenon results from increased economic independence of women, and expects, therefore, that better educated women with better employment opportunities and higher incomes take the lead. In the relative economic deprivation version, cohabitation is a preliminary stage typically emerging prior to the full establishment of economic self-sufficiency of a new household. Cohabitation is, therefore, more typical for lower income groups with less employment stability, or for subgroups that have not yet matched their incomes to their consumption aspirations. In the ideational version, cohabitation is not so much predicted on the basis of economic constraints or opportunities, but it stems from a set of value orientations already emerging during the ‘formative years.’ As these values are often linked to more advanced education, a positive correlation between education and cohabitation is expected. Furthermore, antecedents in the family of origin (such as parental divorce) also contribute to earlier home leaving and cohabitation (see, for example, Cherlin et al. 1995, Kiernan and Hobcraft 1997), inter alia, via the accentuation of values of ethical autonomy.

The neoclassic economic theory and the ideational theory both draw support from the initial positive correlation between education and cohabitation in a number of countries. At the microlevel, attitudes associated with career commitment and gender symmetry, also tend to be positively related to premarital cohabitation. However, in several contexts (e.g., Scandinavia, Austria), historical patterns of premarital cohabitation had survived in specific subgroups, and the diffusion of premarital cohabitation did not originate from the college educated or in large urban areas, but rather in the working class and more remote areas (e.g., northern Sweden, Alpine valleys). In addition, in most other Western countries, younger generations from working-class backgrounds and with less education adopted the pattern of cohabitation very quickly, so that the initial positive correlation with education vanished or even reversed. The predictive power of specific value orientations is also weakening as cohabitation has ceased to be an expression of protest among the highly unconventional (for these trends see Villeneuve-Gokalp 1990, Oppenheimer and Lew 1995, Boulanger et al. 1997, Bracher and Santow 1998, Kravdal 1999).

To sum up, cohabitation has become widespread among very different socioeconomic strata, suggesting (a) the existence of particular diffusion patterns in various national contexts, and (b) a rapid differentiation of motivations behind the choice. This form of family formation can be initiated for reasons suggested by all three theories. As a result, a particular theory may have higher or lower predictive power depending on the phase of the process of diffusion and on national or historical contexts.

4. Conclusion

The scientific traditions in the different social science disciplines leave an important imprint on both the theoretical conceptualization and the research agenda. Neoclassical economists have a strongly deductive approach and typically start with theory construction and the specification of the corresponding equations. Often they stop short of adequate operationalizations of basic concepts or fail to incorporate noneconomic variables in tandem with economic proxies (Robinson 1997). Demographers, sociologists, and statisticians use both deductive and inductive strategies, and they are engaged continuously in concept operationalizations and statistical testing or exploration. The latter group is, therefore, more likely to report ‘mixed results’ than the former. Empirical scrutinity of associations derived from theory invariably points in the direction of theoretical incompleteness. As shown by the example above, the separate narratives are seldom mutually exclusive, they complement each other in more than one way, and they produce predictions that are restricted to context, time, or social group. All three theories are, therefore, candidates for inclusion into a larger theoretical framework.

Finally, there are two particularly fruitful ways of advancing empirical research. First, the use of panel data, with measurements of both socioeconomic and attitudinal variables at each wave, is ideally suited to check predictions deduced from various theories. And second, much can be learned from comparisons across contexts if attempts are made to specify and to test the presumed contextual causes at work.

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