Political Cross-Pressures Research Paper

As originally formulated, cross-pressure theory predicted three effects on voting behavior: (a) vacillation; (b) delay; and (c) withdrawal. In other words, the cross pressured voter (a) will shift back and forth in his her voting choice; (b) will delay making a decision; and (c) will completely avoid making a decision and withdraw from participating in the election altogether.

The predictions of cross-pressure theory derive from three basic propositions:

(a) Cross-pressures (motivational inconsistencies), as all conflicts, give rise to psychic tension.

(b) High tension levels and tension increases are experienced as painful and low tension levels and decreases in tension are experienced as pleasurable.

(c) All living organisms (including humans) prefer pleasure to pain. They will act so as to keep tension low, by trying to prevent conflicts from arising. They will also act so as to reduce high levels of tension, by trying to resolve, remove, or disclaim conflicts (including cross-pressures).

These three prepositions, in one form or another, are part of practically all anti-conflict theories, including cross-pressure theory. (For a discussion of the anti-conflict nature of cross-pressure theory, see Sperlich 1971, pp. 179–221.) Unfortunately, propositions (b) and (c) are factually incorrect.

Proposition (b) embraces as axiomatic that high tension levels and tension increases will necessarily be painful. It ignores first, that adequate proof in support of this proposition has not been developed, and second, that there is considerable evidence to the contrary, to be found in various forms of deliberate stimulus and adventure seeking, voluntary risk-taking and exploratory behavior, as well as in the frequently unpleasant nature of low tension states (stimulus deprivation). For an extended review, see Sperlich 1971, pp. 52–9.

Proposition (c) takes unconstrained hedonism as axiomatic. It lacks any recognition that—however important pleasure may be—it is not the only goal that human beings can, or do pursue. It altogether ignores the vast compendium of philosophical and empirical inquiries into the complexity and multiplicity of human motivations. As examples can serve the various studies of gratification delay, of demonstrations of (costly) loyalty, of the keeping of (burdensome) promises, and of altruistic behavior—all of which involve choosing lower pleasure and/or greater pain (Sperlich 1971, pp. 85–9).

1.2 Externally And Internally Generated Cross-Pressures

Several different types and constellations of factors are said to produce cross-pressures in persons, including demographic, social, and cognitive (psychic) variables. The first two of these are experienced as external pressures brought to bear on the deciding person; the third factor is internal. Examples of demographic factors are occupation, education, religion, age, and ethnicity. Examples of social factors are memberships in family and friendship groups. (The crucial distinction here is comprehensive personal interaction, lacking for members of social groups.) The internal factors include preferences, attitudes, beliefs, and informational elements.

In respect to the external factors, traditional cross-pressure theory simply assumes what can neither be proven nor automatically granted: that the norms and preferences of the demographic and social aggregates to which the person belongs will generally be subjectively real. But to produce cross-pressures, these orientations first must be perceived, and second must become active elements in the person’s decision-making processes. If a given voter belongs to religion A (the norm of which is to vote for party X) and also belongs to ethnic group B (the norm of which is to vote for party Y), he she must first of all perceive the existence of the groups’ majority preferences, and second must incorporate these positions into his her own decision-making activities. Lack of information about group norms, as well as indifference to these norms, may invalidate the three cross-pressure predictions noted earlier. Traditional cross-pressure theory has neglected to take these matters into account, as it has failed to take into account the issue of causal ambiguity prominent in cross-pressure analyses (compare Lipset 1954, pp. 584–98, vs. Campbell et al. 1960, p. 83)—which is one of the explanations of its predictive failures.

Internal cross-pressures constitute a clearer causal case. It is not a vast conceptual leap to infer the presence of cross-pressures, if the voter states that he she prefers the economic policies of candidate A, but the foreign policies of candidate B. Yet, other matters should be taken into account. For example, fluctuation, avoidance, and withdrawal are not likely to occur if, in the present example, the voter only cares about economic policies and is wholly uninterested in foreign policy matters. Again, traditional cross-pressure theory ignores the question of the relative strength of the elements in conflict—one more explanation of its predictive failures.

1.3 Cross-Pressure Valences

Cross-pressures can have different valences, that is, different evaluative directions. The economic vs. foreign policy dissonance is an example of approach/approach (+/+) conflicts. Of course, it is also possible that the voter dislikes candidate A for one reason and candidate B for another—an example of avoidance/avoidance (-/-) conflicts. However, few voters will perceive only positive or only negative qualities in candidates or parties. The most realistic explication of cross-pressures is the double approach avoidance (+-/+-) scenario, where the voter likes certain aspects and dislikes other aspects of each candidate or party. Or to state the matter in motivational language:

(a) Approach–approach conflict: the conflicting motivations simultaneously push the individual toward (make the individual desire) two incompatible choices, e.g., favoring two candidates, but being able to only vote for one of them.

(b) Avoidance–avoidance conflict: the conflicting motivations simultaneously push the individual away from (make the individual disdain) all available choices, one of which, however, must be chosen, e.g., disliking both candidates, but being obligated to cast one’s vote for one of them.

(c) Double approach–avoidance conflict: the conflicting motivations simultaneous push toward, and push away from both candidates, e.g., when the voter is aware of negative as well as positive aspects of each candidate.

It is quite obvious that each of these three types of conflict is likely to be experienced differently and to have different consequences. The avoidance avoidance conflict, for example, is likely to be more unpleasant—and more likely to produce withdrawal—than the approach approach conflict. Traditional cross-pressure theory ignores the question of the qualitative nature of the conflict—yet another explanation for its predictive failures.

The potential costs of the errors of cross-pressure theory are not limited to the effects on political science and other academic disciplines. Cross-pressure theory is concerned only with reducing tensions, maintaining low tension states, ‘and thereby maximizing pleasure—to be accomplished by eliminating conflicts, disagreements, and inconsistencies. The theory fails to acknowledge higher-level human functions and concerns. It is a partial and rather primitive conception of human nature. Necessarily, the theory is unable to understand and predict actual human behavior. In effect, the theory supports and encourages policies of cultural conformity. It tends to view differences between the individual and the community as problems of individual mental health, to be managed by personal adjustment, and even forcefully corrected by behavioral therapies or similar frights.

Politics and conflict are closely related. Politics is the conflicts and tensions between the various groups and their interests, as well as the efforts to find workable compromises. The concept of freedom makes little sense unless one has the ability and right to differ. Cross-pressure theory, however, regards diversity and its conflicts as societal dysfunctions. The implicit preference is for a conflict-free and harmonious system. What the theory fails to understand is that complete harmony and uniformity can only be achieved (if at all) by force and oppression.

2 History Of Cross-Pressure Analysis

Cross-pressure theory entered political science via the analysis of voting behavior at Columbia University (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948, Berelson et al. 1954) and the University of Michigan (Campbell et al. 1954, Camp-bell et al. 1960). The basic notion of cross-pressures, however, is considerably older. The idea that persons and other living entities, who are pushed (or pulled) in two (or more) directions at once, and hence are burdened by special cognitive and behavioral difficulties, is ancient. It can be found, for example, in Aesop’s fable of the donkey starving to death between two equidistant piles of hay. In the more recent academic literature, the concept of cross-pressures can be traced to the writings of Georg Simmel. Simmel (e.g., 1921), however, did not employ the German equivalent of ‘cross-pressures.’ He used ‘Kreuzung sozialer Kreise,’ which strictly translated means ‘the crossing of social circles.’ It was Bendix (in Simmel 1955), who translated Simmel’s phrase into ‘cross-pressures.’

The general idea of conflicting pressures received systematic attention almost simultaneously in political science and sociology, as well as in psychology and social psychology. In sociology the theory was stated mostly in terms of ‘status equilibrium’ and ‘status crystallization’ (Lenski 1961, 1964). The psychological fields generated the concept and theory of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger et al. 1956, Festinger 1957. Cognitive dissonance theory has had a more illustrious career than its political-science and sociological equivalents. Indeed, the concept of cognitive dissonance has entered popular speech, even political campaigns. There has been serious and significant work in respect to cognitive dissonance, including sustained attention to systematic testing, improved measurement, and theoretical refinement of the propositions of cognitive dissonance (Davis 1993, Rabin 1991, Shultz and Lepper 1996). Such efforts are largely lacking in respect to cross-pressures. Only a single monograph exists exploring the nature, accuracy, and utility of cross-pressure theory (Sperlich 1971).

After an initial flurry of interest in studies of voting behavior—where it generally failed to produce con-firmed predictions and useful explanations (see Sperlich 1971, pp. 9–26)—cross-pressure theory has fallen into almost universal disuse, even in voting behavior studies. Benney (1956), for example, provided a detailed analysis of social class voting, of multiple influences on voting choice, and of those who changed their voting intention during the campaign. He also used the term ‘group pressure’—not, however, any real cross-pressure analysis. Similarly, Butler and Stokes (1974) spoke occasionally about ‘cleavages [that] cut across the electorate,’ but did not engage in actual cross-pressure analysis in their study of British voting behavior. Books dealing explicitly with conflict show a similar neglect (for example, Lipset 1985, Porter and Taplin 1987, Reilley and Sigall 1976), as do works in most other sub-fields. Kourvetaris (1997), for example, presents a conflict model of political sociology, but makes no use of cross-pressures concepts; psychologically oriented examples include; Freedman and Freedman 1975, Renshon 1974, Stone 1974, Moran 1985), rejects what he calls a ‘civility model’ and develops a ‘conflict model’ instead, dealing extensively with social cleavages, such as those associated with class, religion, race, and nationality.

Moran’s book seemed well suited for the use of the idea of cross-pressures—but it did not make any such use. Similarly, Mayer (1977) included discussions of class conflict, cognitive dissonance, and cross-cutting vs. segmental cleavages, but not of cross-pressures (for other examples see: Almond and Verba 1963, Duverger 1972, and Meny and Knapp 1998). Rokkan (1970) developed a ‘cleavage model’ of politics without the use of cross-pressures. Numerous general discussions of politics, political systems, and political behavior entirely, or largely, omit discussions of cross-pressures (e.g., Alker 1973, Bellamy 1993, Delury 1987, Eulau 1996, Needler 1996, and Polsby et al. 1963).

3. Disuse And Problems

Upon closer inspection, the extensive non-use of cross-pressure theory is not surprising. It is theoretic-ally inadequate. Two of its three basic propositions are in error. It ignores the problems of causal directionality and subjective reality when dealing with external cross-pressure factors. It has developed no measurement of the relative strength of a cross-pressure conditions, only recognizing a dichotomized presence or absence of cross-pressures. Further, it has paid no attention to the valence of the conflicts.

Proposition (b) is in error when it assumes that high tension and tension increases are invariably unpleasant. (Though, of course, some high-tension situations in respect to voting may indeed be experienced as unpleasant, particularly if the person is already subject to high tension levels in other aspects of his her existence, and if the conflict is of the -/- variety.) Proposition 2 needs to be revised as follows:

(a) A given tension level may be experienced as comfort or discomfort, depending on the tension requirement of the organism at the time; appropriate tension magnitudes will be experienced as comfort-able, inappropriate ones (not enough, as well as too much tension) as discomfort.

(b) A change (increase or decrease) in the tension level may be experienced as pleasure or pain, depending on the direction of the change in respect to the tension requirements of the organism at the time; changes in the direction of the appropriate tension magnitude will be experienced as pleasurable, changes away from that magnitude as painful.

Proposition (c) is in error when it assumes that hedonism (maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain) is the only existing human motivation. It needs to be revised as follows:

(a) Human beings aim at a large variety of goal states and their actions are guided by a multiplicity of motives. Maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain are important, but are not the sole aims of human striving. There are acts to which the pleasure pain calculus is irrelevant.

(b) The more dominant in any given situation the aims and motives associated with ego and conscience, the less will behavior be guided by organismic (id) demands for pleasure and gratification, such as ex-pressed in attempts to resolve all conflict.

Research has shown that as long as the theory fails to take into account causal directionality, subjective reality, the strength of the cross-pressure conditions, and the valence of the conflicts, it cannot generate correct predictions of human behavior (Sperlich 1971, pp. 9–26) The introduction of better measures and the adoption of the necessary theoretical revisions, how-ever, have been shown to yield highly successful predictions (Sperlich 1971, pp. 90–168).

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