Internal Warfare Research Paper

1. Conceptual Issues Regarding The Causes And Frequency Of Internal Conflict

Early scholarship focusing on internal conflict proposed that there are at least three categories—or levels—of conflict, and that each might be thought of as having unique precipitating conditions. The three categories are (a) political turmoil, (b) organized conspiracy, and (c) internal warfare (Gurr 1970). Political turmoil reflects conditions of spontaneous and unstructured conflict. Food riots might be one example. Such turmoil, however, holds the potential to expand into more organized violence. Organized conspiracies are those conflicts in which opposition groups have some form of structure, but the level of violence remains rather contained. A conflict generally is considered an internal war once the level of fatalities exceeds a certain threshold—most often considered 1,000 battle deaths per year (Small and Singer 1982).

Internal conflicts tend to result from disputes over current or anticipated access to resources. In many instances those controlling the distribution of the resources—usually the state—largely comprise a culturally homogeneous group that discriminates against another (or several) homogeneous groups. For example, in the Rwandan upheaval of 1994 the politically dominant Hutus engaged in the genocidal slaughter of the Tutsi. Although the two groups lived together for centuries, albeit not always peacefully, a power-sharing arrangement between them appears to have altered expectations of the future distribution of resources such that the Hutus chose conflict over accommodation. The main exception to cultural homogeneity forming the organizational lines between the groups in conflict can be found in ideological conflicts. In ideological conflicts the groups form along class lines which can breech cultural distinctions. If one thinks of conflict organized along cultural lines as incorporating two nations within one state, with the conflict waged over control of the state or the distribution of resources from it, then ideological conflict can be thought of as fighting within one nation over two ideologically opposed ideas about how the state should distribute resources.

There are several competing explanations for the causes of internal conflicts. Gurr (1993) has under-taken an extensive examination of the make-up and character of minority groups at risk, identifying 233 politically mobilized groups. The core of his explanation for internal conflict turns on issues of resource distribution, though this is not the only way to think about the etiology of internal warfare. Some propose what is called the ‘contact hypothesis’ which argues that increased contact between different cultural groups increases the opportunity for and frequency of violent conflict among them (Forbes 1997). Counter arguments point to multiethnic countries like the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to demonstrate that cross-cultural contact is not sufficient to cause conflict. They argue that in highly multiethnic societies the propensity for conflict is diminished. Others argue that conflict results from relative or absolute deprivation (e.g., Gurr 1970, Davies 1962). Relative deprivation reflects judgments about individual or group resources relative to group expectations, what Gurr called value aspirations vs. actual capabilities. Absolute deprivation largely reflects a condition of poverty, and would generally show up as a result of low levels of economic development and/or a skewed distribution of resources (e.g., Muller and Seligson 1987). In spite of the logical robustness of deprivation-based arguments, a cursory examination of conditions in countries around the world reveals that there are large numbers of people living under conditions of relative or absolute deprivation who do not revolt against their government. Clearly being deprived is not a sufficient condition for internal conflict. One way to think about a necessary condition is that the masses will rise up only when expected gains from violent political action outweigh the likely costs. Future expectations form a core component in thinking about the onset of internal violence from this perspective (Fearon 1998). If people hold dire expectations about their prospects for access to resources in the future they will be more likely to engage in violent political action now. Under these conditions—where people react to costs and expected benefits—the ability of the state to repress opposition movements is critical. Convergence around the conditions most associated with internal conflict demonstrates that political regime types play a considerable role in the likelihood of internal unrest (e.g., Henderson and Singer 2000). As countries become partially democratic the people begin to hold increased expectations and make increased demands on the state, yet the state apparatus lacks sufficient institutional capacity to cater to or channel these demands. Some see these internal conflicts as part of the processes contributing to state building (Cohen et al. 1981).

Empirically we know that there have been about 150 violent internal conflicts beyond simple political turmoil since the end of World War II (Regan 2000). According to the Correlates of War data between 1946 and 1992 there have been 53 of conflicts that could be categorized as an internal war (Singer and Small 1994). These conflicts range from rather small and short-lived events like Gambia (1981) to long-running and extremely violent conflicts such as Rwanda (1994), Somalia (throughout the 1990s), or El Salvador (in the 1980s). Internal conflicts are not confined to the less developed part of the world. Great Britain has been fighting an internal conflict against the IRA since the mid-1970s; the Spanish have a conflict over the Basque region, and Turkey has experienced a quite violent conflict with members of its Kurdish population. Each country is a member of the NATO alliance. Russia, furthermore, has been involved in a very aggressive conflict in its republic of Chechnia.

Recent empirical evidence on postcolonial civil wars suggests that the most important factors associated with their onset are: (a) the regime-type of the state, falling somewhere between a full democracy and a complete autocracy, (b) the level of economic development, and (c) the level of military spending by the state. Interestingly, this research does not support the idea that cultural polarization is related significantly to the onset of civil war in the post colonial period (Henderson and Singer 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Hegre et al. in press). Other recent research has attempted to develop empirical models to forecast the onset of internal rebellion (Gurr and Moore 1998, Gurr 1998). Although the forecasting capabilities of these models are not perfect, they do provide rigorous and generalizable mechanisms to evaluate the risk of internal conflict in specific settings.

The role of parties outside internal conflicts is also of central importance. Even though one could consider third party interventions as one form of conflict management, there is some evidence to suggest that outside interveners tend to increase the duration of internal conflicts (Regan 2000, in press). The internationalization of internal conflicts has become an increasingly important area of research, with emphasis placed on the role of third parties, the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces, and the conditions for negotiated settlements (see Lake and Rothchild 1998, Brown 1996, Regan 2000, Diehl 1993, Walter 2000). This has taken on central importance in international organizations such as the World Bank, which has organized a research group to study the onset and management of internal conflicts (Ibalwaldi and Sambanis 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2000, web site can be accessed at: www.worldbank.org).

2. Conflict Management In Internal Conflicts

One can think of the resolution of internal wars like wars in general as being most likely when the costs of continued fighting exceeds expectations for future gains. If the probability of victory is low and/or the expected payoff from victory is insufficient, then one would anticipate that the parties would prefer a negotiated settlement. Resolving internal conflicts, then, requires generating the conditions whereby continued fighting is the least attractive course of action. Internal conflicts, however, pose different types of problems when thinking about conflict management than international wars. First, international convention inhibits outside parties from intervening on behalf of at least one side (the nongovernmental actors) in such conflicts. Although third parties do intervene on behalf of antigovernment forces, such interventions tend to violate at least the spirit of the UN charter. Second, there is little incentive for the parties involved in the conflict to demobilize if and when a settlement is reached (Walter 2000). Since difficulties with enforcement leads to a built-in incentive to violate a peace accord, such as by failing to demobilize, fully implemented peace agreements are difficult to achieve without some form of outside intervention. International management of internal conflicts requires outside actors to intervene in a manner that contributes to the conditions where conflict is too costly, the benefits from resolution are reasonably high, and all sides to the conflict hold similar expectations about implementation. The most pressing question is how outside parties can generate the conditions that lead to a stable and fully implemented peace agreement. Although the amount of empirical evidence is rather meagre there are a few studies that point toward effective mechanisms.

Using data on 139 internal conflicts between 1944–94 Regan (2000) identified a set of conditions that increase the likelihood of successful third party interventions in internal conflicts. Success was defined as stopping the fighting for a period of at least 6 months, and, therefore, reflects a short-term interest in the settlement of conflicts rather than a long-term resolution. The results of the analysis suggests that intense conflicts are more likely to be settled by outside interventions than are those with lower levels of hostilities, and that the most important predictor of successful interventions involves the interveners strategy. Walter has also shown that internal wars rarely are resolved without power sharing arrangements and security guarantees by outside parties (Walter 2000). In effect, there is little chance of the parties to an internal war resolving their conflict without the involvement of outside parties. These parties might take on the role of a supporter of one of the antagonists (in an attempt to alter the balance of capabilities), a unilateral observer of the terms of an agreement, or multilateral supervisor of an interim agreement (Walter 2000, Diehl 1993, Regan 2000). There is some empirical evidence, however, that when a third party intervenes in support of one side of an internal conflict it is likely that the conflict will have a longer expected duration than a similar conflict without an outside intervention (Regan in press). The role of unilateral interventions, therefore, may have a very narrow role as a tool of conflict management.

3. Summary

Since the end of World War II internal conflicts have been much more frequent than interstate wars. In fact, some estimate that the number of deaths attributable to internal conflicts far exceed those of all interstate wars of the twentieth century. The causes of internal conflicts are rather complex, though empirical evidence and theoretical logic point toward competing access to limited resources. When resources are limited and people make demands for them, the ability effectively to channel or repress these demands determines the likelihood of violent conflict. Because of the unique aspects of territorial sovereignty and nonstate actors, the resolution of these conflicts poses problems for the international community. Peacekeeping troops under the auspices of the UN or other multinational organizations have become an increasingly visible mechanism to control internal conflict (see Diehl 1993).

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