Political Aspects of Globalization Research Paper

1. The Term ‘Globalization’

The term ‘globalization’ came into common usage in the early 1990s. The decline of Marxism, the end of the Cold War, and finally the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that there was no longer any formidable ideological and political competitor to liberal democracy and the free market. The end of the socialist or Second World meant that the capitalist or First World could expand into the entire world or globe, hence ‘globalization.’ Also in the 1990s, new information technologies reached the critical mass where they became an entire information economy. The conjunction of computers, telecommunications, the internet, and the worldwide web greatly facilitated and expanded the exchange of goods, capital, and services on a global scale.

Globalization is often described as a process: steadily progressing over time, pervasively spreading over space, and clearly inevitable in its development. In this conception, the economics of globalization are allimportant; the politics of globalization are practically nonexistent. But globalization can also be seen as a revolution, one of the most profound revolutions the world has ever known. (It is certainly more of a world revolution than communism ever was.) Revolutions produce reactions, however, and the interactions between revolutionaries and reactionaries produce a particular kind of politics. The first decades of the twenty-first century are likely to be dominated by the politics of globalization, so much so that they could give the name to the era, in the same way that the first half of the twentieth century was known as the era of the World Wars and the second half was known as the era of the Cold War.

2. Previous Eras Of Globalization

The contemporary period is not necessarily the first era of globalization; in some ways it can be seen as the third. There have been at least two previous periods when there was a rapid and massive expansion in economic exchange on a world, even global scale. Consideration of these earlier eras may help in understanding the current one.

The first era of globalization was in the sixteenth century, at the time of the commercial revolution and when European powers opened up the Americas, Africa, and Asia to new or greatly expanded trade. Facilitated by new technologies in shipbuilding and navigation, a vast system of seaborne commerce in goods, capital, and slaves came into being, connecting five continents. This first global economy did not come into being by the spontaneous operations of the free market, however. It had to be promoted and protected by a great political and military power, one that was worldwide in scope. This global hegemon was the Habsburg empire, whose centers were Spain and Austria but which ruled large territories on or near the five continents (Wallerstein 1974, 1980).

The first wave of globalization washed over many old and traditional political authorities. Many feudal and local entities were diminished or disappeared entirely, but others reinvented themselves to become absolutist monarchies and national states. The process was not steady and gradual, but disruptive and violent. It contributed to the Wars of Religion and culminated in the catastrophe of the Thirty Years War (1618–48). At the end of that war and with the Peace of Westphalia, the major surviving powers created an entirely new political order, one composed of sovereign and independent states. Most of these states now developed systematic policies (known as mercantilism) to protect local interests from foreign imports. Thus, the first era of globalization ended in what can be seen as a new era of localization.

The second era of globalization was in the nineteenth century, at the time of the industrial revolution and when European powers and the USA opened-up even larger (now inland as well as coastal) areas of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australia to new or greatly expanded trade. Facilitated by the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph, a vast system of seaborne and overland commerce in goods, capital, and immigrant labor connected six continents. This second global economy also did not come into being by the spontaneous operations of a free market (although the economic theories of the time often assumed that it had). It had to be promoted and protected by a great political and military power that was worldwide in scope. This global hegemon was the British Empire, which in the late nineteenth century ruled one-fourth of the land surface of the globe and which was the supreme naval power in every ocean (Polanyi 1944).

The second wave of globalization also washed over many old and traditional political authorities. Again, many local entities were diminished or disappeared entirely (particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia), but others reinvented themselves to become strong national states (particularly in Europe but also Japan). The process was not steady and gradual, but disruptive and violent. It contributed to a series of nationalist wars and culminated in the catastrophic World War I and II, which some historians have called a second thirty years war (1914–45).

At the end of that war and with the onset of the Cold War, a bipolar system was created, composed of the USA (liberal–democratic in its politics and free market in its economics) and the Soviet Union (authoritarian in its politics and statist in its economics). The Americans promoted free markets and open economies in their alliance system (the Free or First World); the Soviets promoted command and closed economies in theirs (the Socialist or Second World). The existence of the Soviet Union and the Second World acted to contain the spread of the free market policies of the USA, even within the First World itself. Thus, the second era of globalization ended in another era of economies that were closed or protected in important ways.

3. The USA As The Leader Of Globalization

We are now in the third era of globalization. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA could pursue its grand project of promoting and protecting free markets throughout the globe, unconstrained and uncontained by any comparable power or ‘peer competitor’; it has been the leader and the energizer of the process of globalization. It serves as the new global hegemon, the successor to the Habsburg and the British Empires. Acclaimed as ‘the sole superpower,’ the ‘high-technology economy,’ and ‘the universal nation,’ the USA has vigorously and consistently supported this great transformation by systematically pressing to remove any national barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, and services. Its leadership is facilitated and legitimated by the three great international, now global economic institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

US leadership in globalization is also facilitated and legitimated by the particular American worldview or ideology. Americans have long advocated liberal democracy and free markets as political and economic ideals. In foreign affairs, this ideology has been known as liberal internationalism, and its most prominent proponents were Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt (T. Smith 1994). This familiar ideology has been revised in the era of globalization into a new American ideology which promotes human rights and the open society. This is a version of liberal internationalism, one that is more accurately termed liberal globalism; its most prominent proponents in the 1990s were President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, but it is held by most American political, economic, and intellectual elites. The ideology of human rights and the open society advocates the limitation of state sovereignty and the weakening of the nation state. As such, it poses a fundamental challenge to traditional conceptions of international relations.

This ideology of human rights and the open society—liberal globalism—also provides the justification for a new kind of US military operation. This is humanitarian intervention, as in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia; the culmination of this development was the US-led NATO war against Serbia over Kosovo. Intervention in support of human rights is not supported by all parts of the American public; it is primarily advocated by political and intellectual elites, especially those in the media and in academia. Political opposition to humanitarian interventions and more generally to globalization comes from other American groups and interests, especially those who see themselves as losers in the global economy (e.g., labor unions and domestic industries). But the major sources of political opposition to globalization are found outside the USA.

4. The Resistance To Globalization

The US-led revolution of globalization has generated resistance and reaction. Immediately after the collapse of Soviet communism, the principal sources of resistance seemed to be major nation states, especially Japan, France, and reunited Germany. However, by the end of the 1990s these nations offered little resistance to globalization; one reason was the stagnation of their economies, compared with that of the USA.

With the paralysis of the major nation states, the principal sources of resistance to globalization have become several of the great religions. Some of these have undergone a revival and transformation into a political religion. Especially strong in their resistance have been revivalist Islam and neo-Confucianism (sometimes referred to as ‘Asian values’). Also resistant have been revivalist Hinduism and Eastern Orthodoxy. The great religions see the globalization led by the USA to be closely connected with secularization and therefore a threat to themselves. These four sources of religious opposition correspond to four large countries or areas. Two of these, Russia and the Middle East, have been losers in the new global economy, and two, China and India, have been winners.

Russia and, more generally, most countries with an Eastern Orthodox religious tradition, for a variety of reasons have been unsuccessful in making the transition from a communist regime to a liberal democracy and market economy, which are able to adapt well to an open society and global economy (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia). Conversely, most countries with a Roman Catholic or Protestant tradition have been successful in making this transition. This contrast among excommunist countries, between the more western and the more eastern, between the Roman Catholic or Protestant and the Eastern Orthodox, means that the political and economic developments of the 1990s revived and reinforced an historic divide, one that corresponds to the great schism between Western Christianity and Eastern Christianity and even to the ancient division between the Latin and the Greek halves of the Roman Empire.

With their condition of political and economic weakness, the governments of Russia and the other Orthodox countries cannot mount an effective and sustained opposition to globalization. But among the populations of these countries, there is now substantial resentment and resistance directed at the USA and its global project. The Middle East and, more generally, most countries with an Islamic religious tradition have also been unsuccessful in establishing a viable liberal democracy and market economy, which are able to adapt well to an open society and global economy. For those that experienced the heady years from 1973 to 1985, when OPEC seemed to be a world power, a long decline in oil prices deepened their sense of failure and their alienation from globalization. Here, too, the governments are not willing and able to mount opposition that is effective and sustained. But among their populations there is widespread resentment and resistance, whose most obvious representatives are militant organizations based upon Islamic revivalism. Conversely, there is growing opposition even from some of the winners in the global economy. These include China and, more generally, most countries with a Confucian tradition. Most Chinese, both in China itself and among the ‘overseas Chinese,’ see their economic success as resulting from their own culture or ‘Asian values,’ from engaging in the global economy in their own way. This conception has been reinforced by their interpretation of the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. The countries with the most open currency markets (South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia) suffered the greatest disruptions and declines. Those whose currency markets were most regulated (China and, ironically, Taiwan) experienced little disruption and continued their economic growth.

The entry of India into the global economy has been more recent, and its benefits have been unevenly distributed. It has occurred, however, at the same time as the growth of Hindu nationalism, the development of Indian nuclear weapons, and an increased confidence in rejecting certain Western ways. The sources of opposition to globalization led by the USA are thus very disparate. But together these sources of opposition comprise a vast region, really all of Eurasia and more, which stretches from Russia and Eastern Europe, through the Middle East, through South Asia, to China and East Asia. In this vast region are found the four great civilizations that Samuel Huntington has identified as most likely to oppose the West in ‘the clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1996). These are, in his terms, ‘Slavic–Orthodox,’ Islamic, Hindu, and ‘Sinic–Confucian’ civilizations. In this region, too, are four nuclear powers, Russia, Pakistan, India, and China, each of them seeing themselves as the center of their civilization. Singly or collectively, they may develop the capacity and will to disrupt and contain globalization. If so, it will take American leadership of the highest ability to insure that the third era of globalization does not end with a clash of civilizations which culminates in a third thirty years war.

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