Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Research Paper

After the Battle of Jena, Hegel, having no income, took over as editor of a newspaper in Bamberg in 1807 and one year later he became principal of a secondary school in Nuremberg. There, Hegel married Marie von Tucher with whom he had two sons. During the Nuremberg period, Hegel published his Science of Logic in three volumes (1812, 1813, and 1816), the first of which, the Doctrine of Being, reappeared in heavily revised edition in 1832. In 1816, Hegel was finally granted the privilege of earning a secured income as a full professor in Heidelberg. In 1818, owing to the personal intervention of Minister Altenstein, he became Fichte’s successor in Berlin.

From 1816 on, Hegel published—apart from several minor writings—the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science (1817 in Heidelberg, and in two greatly enlarged editions 1827 and 1830) as well as his Elements on the Philosophy of Right (1821). His lectures on Esthetics, the History of Philosophy, and the Philosophy of History and Religion were not only attended by students but also by members of the Berlin society hungry for education. Until the mid-1940s, Philosophy in Germany could not be exercised without taking a position on Hegel’s philosophy. Moreover, his philosophy influenced the formation of those special sciences, which Dilthey later called ‘Geisteswissenschaften.’ Soon after Hegel’s unexpected death, his school split into different wings as a consequence of philosophical disputes on religion. In 1837, David Friedrich Strauss classified this splitting into the left (e.g., Karl Marx), the right (e.g., Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs), and the central (e.g., Karl Rosenkranz).

2. Aspects Of His Philosophy

2.1 Interests Of The Young Hegel

The young Hegel studied the ancient authors, the literature of the Enlightenment and above all Kant’s critical philosophy, Rousseau’s works on cultural criticism and theory of politics as well as the dispute on Spinoza, which had been initiated by F. H. Jacobi. Furthermore, he enthusiastically paid close attention to the course of the French Revolution. At that time, he mainly worked on three questions. Firstly, how must a national religious education be conceived for it to strengthen the motivation for ethical and political action? This question had strongly suggested itself after Rousseau had failed to come to a convincing result concerning the question: which type of religion can be legitimated from the political point of view of a rational community? In his works on religion and ethics, Kant had then shown that a conflict is avoidable between religious and ethical duties on the one hand and religious and political duties on the other. Therefore, what mattered was to translate the idea of such a union of all those duties into an educational program.

Hegel, Hoelderlin and Schelling devoted themselves to finding a corresponding way of life, which they called ‘invisible church.’ Related to these interests is the second, historical question: what explains the fact that Christian faith developed into a ‘positive,’ authoritarian religion, which became a tool for despotism to misuse? It was the strategic behavior of the scientific community that gave rise to the third question. In the mid-1990s, the theological Orthodoxy of Tubingen began to misuse Kantian philosophy in an attempt to justify anti-liberal church dogmas in a new manner. This led to the question: how can Kant’s critical philosophy be protected argumentatively from such a dogmatic misuse? From his penetrating critique, first of Kant’s doctrine of postulates, emerged a system of philosophy in the end whose position may be called ‘speculative idealism.’ But it did not replace his original interests. Indeed, this system was to provide for their answers.

2.2 Phenomenology Of Spirit

The Phenomenology of Spirit (PS) exhibits the ‘way of despair’ which ‘natural consciousness’ has to go in order to justify its knowledge under the conditions set forth by the conscious contrast constitutive of itself: its own subjectivity—made into a first principle—in opposition to the objectivity not reducible to it. On the way, it becomes clear that the knowledge intended by various shapes of consciousness does not satisfy its own, immanent truth criteria. For example, it is regarded as impossible to guarantee the intended immediate knowledge of perceptual data by means of indexical references alone (‘sense-certainty’). This self-examination is the first step of the procedure. In a second step, ‘we,’ who contemplate consciousness philosophically, have to identify this negative result—taken positively—with a new shape of consciousness. The self-examination is not complete until the contrast of subject and object has been overcome and the contents of the consciousness fulfill its truth criteria. Hegel calls this ultimate shape of consciousness ‘absolute knowing,’ which is at the same time an undeveloped knowing of the Absolute.

Apart from the much discussed chapter ‘Lordship and Bondage’—which exhibits how two people self-consciously struggling for recognition end up developing the specific shape of intersubjectivity of lordship and bondage—the chapters on practical reason, spirit, and religion of the PS should be of some interest to the social scientist. The chapter on Reason exhibits that any effort of self-actualization—i.e., gaining pleasure, making inner laws universally valid, and spreading virtue—must necessarily fail. Even a self-conscious practical reason cannot reach its goal of self-actualization if it merely advances the concealed Good of the world instead of rearranging the world in the first place.

The chapter on Spirit contains the doctrine of the basic convictions of a society concerning the purpose of society or its central elements. The internal problems of occidental societies—exhibited in their historical order—transformed them into one another, so that—in them—the Spirit reached new basic convictions about itself. The relevant problems, however, are not those which an objective observer of a later stage in history can discover, but those which the members of the societies in question could experience themselves.

In the chapter on Religion, Hegel carries out a similar analysis for the religions in history. As Max Weber after him, Hegel believed that the religions above all—qua their internally developed convictions—promoted a process of rationalization in world history, a process which Hegel comprehended as an advance in the consciousness of freedom. For him, Christianity was the religion, which first gave effect to the principle of subjectivity and thereby pushed through the consciousness that all men as men are free. At the end of the PS it is supposedly possible to expose a concept of cognition based on the historical experiences which natural consciousness has made in the course of history of occidental societies and religions. This concept, which Hegel called ‘absolute knowledge,’ has the process of these experiences as its contents and the type of rules concerning the transformation of the shapes of consciousness as its form. It is the purpose of this knowledge to promote humanity, which, in turn, Hegel determines to be the process ‘to press onward to agreement with others’ at the end of the preface to the PS. The knowledge arrived at in the PS, however, so far only concerns the historical genesis of the present as an epoch which has to bring out humanity. In order to satisfy this demand, knowledge of what emphatically is has to be acquired, too. (Preface to the Philosophy of Right.) Since the PS has shown that certain fundamental concepts are the central constituents of each shape of consciousness, Hegel conceives of a doctrine of such ‘determinations of thinking’ in his Science of Logic: It has to examine whether these determinations are true for themselves.

2.3 Science Of Logic

To logically unfold the absolute knowledge developed in the PS is what Hegel declared to be ‘proper metaphysics.’ It is its task to settle an adequate concept of philosophical recognition and thereby of itself (‘absolute Idea’). To fulfill this task it primarily criticizes the aims at knowledge of pre-Kantian metaphysics and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In the Science of Logic (SL), which is this metaphysics, the traditional concepts of Metaphysics and Logic incapable of defining a concept of the Absolute are improved in an iterated process: abstract understanding begins with determining the traditional concepts in a way that makes them as distinct as possible from other concepts and hence suitable to define the Absolute. In a second step, dialectical reasoning demonstrates that no concept, however well determined by understanding, can be distinguished even from its opposite, and demands to skeptically suspend any judgment in the face of this negative result. But then, speculative reason identifies this negative result with a new term of the history of philosophy, which the understanding tries to determine again (see Sect. 2.4). Since the results of the first two steps are included in the new concept, the concepts of the SL become richer in content in the process. Once dialectical reason cannot find an opposite concept anymore, the process reaches its end. Hegel calls the ultimate concept ‘absolute idea,’ which is at the same time the concept of the philosophical recognition carried out in the SL (Fulda 1991).

In the final step, this concept is arrived at by overcoming the dualism of our theoretical epistemic attitudes (‘Idea of Truth’) and our practical ones (‘Idea of the Good’). In these attitudes of finite recognition—paradigmatically conceived of by Kant as theoretical and practical reason—we regard the world as being a well-structured touchstone of our knowledge, but also as insignificant and worthless in the face of the Good which lies only in the will of the perceiver. The concept of the absolute idea is intended to deliver us from this conflict between our references to the world. But in order not to give rise to a new conflict between the finite knowledge (prescientific and of the special sciences) and philosophical recognition, Hegel required translation rules mediating between both types of attitudes (see Sect. 2.4) and obliged philosophical recognition of the Real to demonstrate the correspondence of its results to ‘empirical appearances’ (see Sect. 2.4). According to Hegel, a philosophy of the Real also depends on integrating new expressions from other sciences to denote the developed concepts. To that extent recognizing the Real is underdetermined by the SL, and a philosophy of the Real as well as Logic itself depends on the status quo of human knowledge.

2.4 Philosophy Of The Real

The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science in Outline was meant to instruct the students who attended Hegel’s lectures, and therefore only contains the rudiments and basic concepts of all philosophical sciences. The logic outlined above makes up the first part of the Encyclopedia, the second and third parts being the philosophy of Nature and Spirit. It is primarily through these two parts that we have access to Hegel’s philosophy of the Real.

2.4.1 Philosophy Of Nature. In his philosophy of Nature Hegel tries to answer the question of how we can overcome the duality of our theoretical and practical interests concerning Nature and thereby satisfy our needs without turning Nature—and thereby aspects of ourselves—into the Other per se, which would merely become controlled by technology. This philosophy looks for a third way between the modern objectification and quantification of phenomena in the natural sciences on the one hand and a romantic subjectification of Nature on the other. In doing so it does not, however, regard itself as competing with the natural sciences, but rather tries—on the basis of the results of scientific research—to conceive of Nature as an idea in which we can finally recognize ourselves.

2.4.2 Philosophy Of Spirit. In so far as Hegel gains his concept of Spirit from his doctrine of living natural beings, which contrasts the sphere of Spirit from that of Nature, he tries to overcome Descartes’ dualism between res cogitans and res extensa in his whole Philosophy of Spirit, without, however, reducing the phenomena of one sphere to those of the other.

In particular, Hegel teaches in his Doctrine of the Subjecti e Spirit how the subjective spirit of individuals rises step-by-step from its embodiment (Anthropology) and its object-boundedness (Phenomenology) towards higher cognitive and voluntative competencies which culminate in the knowledge of and will to its own freedom (Psychology). In the first part, the Anthropology, the phenomena to be comprehended are e.g., dreaming, habits, aging, gestures, and mental disorders, while the Phenomenology treats the different levels of consciousness of objects. Sensory consciousness, perceptual consciousness, and comprehending consciousness are all subsumed under the heading ‘consciousness,’ since these forms of consciousness do not imply any knowledge the subject has of itself. Under the heading ‘self-consciousness’ are reviewed those forms into which some knowledge of the subject of consciousness of itself necessarily enters (desire, social approval). Finally, ‘Reason’ is the consciousness of objects, in which it is comprehended that knowledge of general objects is only possible when the subject understands that the functions of his subjectivity constitute these objects in the first place. In conclusion, the higher cognitive performances (intuition, recollection, imagination, memory, and thinking) and voluntative ones (practical emotions, instincts, arbitrary acts, and striving for happiness) are discussed in Psychology. Within the ‘free spirit,’ the highest form of the subjective spirit, the attitude is reached and comprehended in which an individual knows of itself that it is only free and can only realize its freedom when it has overcome the dualism of interests which are merely of a theoretical or practical nature.

The Doctrine of the Objecti e Spirit, which Hegel has also worked out as Elements of the Philosophy of Right (PR), comprehends the objective institutions in themselves, which men who know of their freedom give themselves—right in a narrower sense (property, contract, punishment of felonies), moral norms of acting individuals who strive towards the individual or collective Good (‘Moralitat’), and the forms of social life in family, civil society, state, communities of states, and world history (‘Sittlichkeit’). In order to accomplish this project, Hegel did not try to set up as large a set of consistent principles as possible, but instead conceived of concepts adequate to the subjects in question. The adequacy of the concepts is to be achieved by penetrating the fundamental conceptual material of effective norms and existing convictions of common sense and thus correcting the concepts.

Hegel’s analysis of civil society has been especially influential. According to this analysis, modern society tends to accumulate great wealth in the hands of a few, alienate workers in the working processes from their products and from themselves, press large parts of the population below the subsistence level, undergo times of overand underproduction, form global markets, and colonize other countries (Elements of Philosophy of Right (PR)). But at the same time, civil society implements institutions to administer justice, provide for the common welfare, and unite people in trade associations and municipalities. These institutions of society and others of the state make comprehensible how civil societies can develop and stabilize themselves in spite of their inherent tendency to crises. In his doctrine of state, Hegel tried to comprehend institutions which represent the general interests of a rational community and enforce them in the face of the special needs of estates and individuals of the civil society. So the state becomes the authority which alone can guarantee the ‘concrete freedom’ of the individual of self-determination.

According to Hegel, world history, the doctrine of which makes up the final part of the PR, is constituted by the state. The principle organizing world history is the ‘world-spirit,’ the process of the developing consciousness that all men are free. In this history, several states have made—to Hegel’s mind—decisive contributions to this progress at certain times. In these Periods, Hegel thought, they have the right—and indeed, the power—to politically and organizationally establish and expand a new principle. France was an example of Hegel’s time: a country which had carried out a progress in the consciousness of freedom in its Revolution and had expanded this new order through the Napoleonic Wars in great parts of Europe. Since the doctrine of the objective Spirit did not reach the highest form conceivable of freedom, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit does not end with it, but rather with the doctrine of the absolute spirit.

Hegel’s Doctrine of the Absolute Spirit is a doctrine of the three leading forms of culture in which men have at all times tried to understand what is significantly true and who they are within the whole of actuality that depends on such a ‘Truth.’ According to Hegel, these forms are art, religion, and philosophy. However, they have not always had the same importance since the time they came into being. Each form rather has its particular period in which it becomes the model form to exhibit the Truth. Hegel believed that for the ancient Greeks, art was the medium through which they best understood themselves and were able to express what they cherished most. For the Christians, religion was the best form for men to represent their relation to the Truth and the Truth itself. Both forms, however, have the drawback that their means of explication are at most somewhat discursive—or, indeed, not at all. It is the purpose of philosophy as a science to conceive the content of Christianity’s true representations in an argumentative discourse and thereby to gain insight into the deepest reasons for which men come to agreement with each other and afford a stable basis for their life with each other. Therefore, Sect. 2.4 closes with a concept of philosophy, which is also to justify in retrospect the recognition carried out in the system of the philosophical sciences.

3. Some Lines Of Reception In The Social Sciences

Karl Marx is the most prominent recipient of Hegel’s philosophy in the domain of the social sciences.

3.1 Lorenz On Stein (1815–1890)

Lorenz von Stein was one of the most politically influential Hegelians among the theoreticians of society in the nineteenth century. With his diverse writings on modern society, he influenced central economic terms of Marx’ theory (e.g., surplus value, and accumulation) on the one hand, and considerably influenced Bismarck’s social policy on the other. In the sciences, however, he was almost forgotten when Positivism became dominant. It was not until the 1920s that he was studied by theorists of public and constitutional law (Rudolf Smend and Carl Schmitt), a discussion that was continued in the German debates on the principle of the welfare state after the second World War (Stein 1972). Stein took up the question posed in Hegel’s doctrine of ‘Sittlichkeit’: how must a state be structured for the principles of the French Revolution to be realized considering the conditions of the industrializing society? He regarded the political constellation of his times as an unavoidable antagonism between the civil society based on the satisfaction of individual needs and the state aiming at general freedom. To his mind, this antagonism leads the propertied to try to occupy all state functions through unequal elections, in order to prevent the socioeconomical rise of the nonpropertied. Therefore, Stein thinks it to be the duty of a legitimate state and his institutions (monarch, officials, army) to implement social reforms resulting in a rise of the nonpropertied to the economical level necessary for them to participate in the process of forming a public will. In addition to this, the state should counteract the inequalities of the civil society by introducing universal and equal suffrage and guaranteeing basic rights. To this extent, Stein’s doctrine of the state—like Hegel’s—aims at more than just the guarantees of the liberal constitutional state, because it does not confine itself to the task of protecting the freedom of the individual from the state, but instead goes further to protecting the political freedom of the individual against the inequalities of the civil society through the state.

3.2 St. Louis Hegelians

This American philosophical school was founded by William Torrey Harris (1835–1909) and Hans Conrad Brokmeyer (1828–1906). After the Civil War, this school was institutionalized by the foundation of the St. Louis Philosophical Society (1866) and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867), the first philosophical journal in the USA. In contrast to the Transcendentalists at Yale and many of the German intellectuals, questions concerning religion did not play an important role for the St. Louis Hegelians. Instead, questions concerning social justice in a modern society were central for them. In addition to this, another one of Hegel’s basic interests became important again, on which, however, Hegel had only remarked in passing in his systematic works: how must a pedagogy be in order to make the individuals growing up able to competently participate in forming modern society? Besides being influenced by Hegel, Denton Snider (1841–1925) and Thomas Davidson (1840–1900), two St. Louis Hegelians, were also influenced by the pedagogy of the German Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852) when they realized several educational projects: the Communal University in Chicago, the Chicago Kindergarten College, the Goethe School in Milwaukee, and the Breadwinner’s College in New York City, which was devoted to the education of the working class. In 1889, Harris became the United States Commissioner of Education. Brokmeyer played a key role in the Constitutional Convention of Missouri in 1875, which guaranteed the right to education for all aged six to 20. Besides these important roles of the St. Louis Hegelians in the formation of the modern educational system of the USA, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy offered a platform for the publications of important American philosophers such as John Dewey, William James, Charles S. Peirce, and Josiah Royce. Beyond offering this platform, they successfully animated the study of Hegel’s philosophy (Flower and Murphy 1977).

3.3 Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920)

Wundt is commonly regarded as the founding father of Psychology, which established itself as a science around the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1879, Wundt founded the first psychological laboratory of the world in Leipzig, Germany, where he mainly studied sensations and feelings by employing experimental methods. This foundation also became influential outside Germany due to the many visits of foreigners—especially American students and scientists. Although Wundt often mocks at the methodology of Hegel’s philosophy, he explicitly praises Hegel’s achievement of ‘granting the right to exist to all ‘things in themselves,’ whether they are to count as metaphysical borderline concepts or as practical postulates’ (Wundt 1911, p. 736). Without this basis, it would have been impossible for Wundt to pursue Psychology as an empirical special science, because the soul would have been withdrawn from the applicability of methods borrowed from the natural sciences, as long as it were conceived of as an independent substance removable from the body (Descartes) or were postulated as such on practical grounds (Kant). Hegel, on the other hand, ‘has regarded the individual soul as the immediate relationship of the experiences of the soul, as a piece of that infinite reality of the world spirit, which still draws only on its very own actual reality to obtain all that it means’ (Wundt 1911, p. 736). So Wundt arrives at the conclusion that Hegel ‘had also declared the liberty of Psychology when it proclaimed for all that all mental coming into being—and, therefore, all happening in the soul as well—is actuality, is immediate experienced reality, and that essence and appearance of the Spirit are one and the same, and only mean something different in so far as we comprehend the essence as the relationship of the appearances which is correctly recognized’ (Wundt 1911, p. 737; own translations).

3.4 George Herbert Mead (1863–1931)

The posthumously published book Philosophy of the Present (1959) primarily promoted an interpretation of Mead’s thinking that considers the last phase of it as on the way towards a speculative metaphysics of Hegel’s kind. This is surely exaggerated. It is nevertheless possible to prove that Mead named Hegel as an inspirer of his own thoughts throughout his working period. Hegel’s philosophy especially stimulated the scientific program of the young Mead. His early outline of a program of philosophical disciplines puts forward two main tasks of Psychology, one of which was inspired by Hegel’s PS: Psychology is to give ‘an analysis of the objective world in terms of the consciousness of the objective individual’ (Mead 1900, p. 12). In pursuing this task, Hegel—according to Mead’s view—e.g., proved that the organization of different characters, which constitute ‘social objects,’ comes from ‘our mutual relations’ (Mead 1903, p. 106). In contrast to the explaining and describing Psychology, Logic is a normative science (Mead 1903, p. 107), into which ‘the general theory of the intelligent act as a whole would fall,’ and which is as such of Hegel’s kind (Mead 1900, p. 2). However, apart from this praise, Mead also continued to criticize Hegel’s doctrines throughout his life: e.g., he falsely subsumed Hegel under the philosophy of romanticism, which, to his mind, only discussed the rationalization of bygone attitudes—quite contrary to the orientation towards the future of the American society and philosophy. Nevertheless, Mead praises Hegel’s philosophy of history as ‘[t]he most grandiose attempt to combine the three great motives of speculation (that of Greek contemplation, that of the church’s plan of salvation, and that of experimental science)’ (Mead 1964, p. 505).

3.5 Juergen Habermas (1929–)

In his essay Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity? (Habermas 1976), which Habermas chose as the basis of his speech on the occasion of accepting the Hegel Award of the city of Stuttgart, Germany in 1974, he explicitly classifies his proposal as standing in the tradition of Hegel’s and Marx’ thinking ( p. 118). Although his interpretation of Hegel’s answer to the question posed in the title of his essay is affirmative in many points, Habermas mainly criticizes—firstly— that for Hegel, ‘only the idea of freedom’ is to be conceived as a constituent of modern consciousness. In addition to this, ‘the unrestricted objectifying thinking and a radical orientation towards the future’ are also constitutive for it (p. 105). Therefore, Hegel did not succeed in abolishing the threefold division between the modern subjectivity and external nature, society, and inner nature ( p. 102) in all respects. Habermas objects, second, that modern society did not gain its rational identity in the constitutional state; and he objects, third, that philosophy is unable to exhibit this identity as rational for all individuals—as religion has done in the past ( p. 106 ff.). It is Habermas’ opinion instead that modern societies could gain their rational identity in ‘the consciousness of the general and equal opportunities of participation in leaning processes of forming values and norms’ ( p. 119) by realizing communicative structures ‘by themselves,’ in whose ‘autonomy’ alone a new collective identity can crystallize ‘today’ ( p. 120; own translations). Critical remembrance of tradition, science, philosophy, and art propose rival identity projections ( p. 121). However, Habermas seems to have partially taken back his criticism of Hegel with his concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas 1990). In addition to this, his interpretation of the rational function of Right to deliver moral discourse (Habermas 1996) can be understood as a continuation of Hegel’s thoughts on the relationship of ‘Moralitat’ and ‘Sittlichkeit.’

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