Community Aesthetics Research Paper

Aesthetics implies an impulse to live that cannot but offend fixed minds, which are only able to witness and analyze average thoughts and average ways of life. But aesthetics reminds us that our being is an event, or even advent. To return to the opposition between modernity and postmodernity, one can say that in the case of the former, history follows its course, whereas in the case of the latter, the event emerges. It intrudes. It forces its way and it does violence. Hence its irrevocably brutal, unexpected, and constantly astonishing characteristics. Here again, one is con-fronted by the difference between the tonality of drama or dialectic which postulate a possible solution or synthesis, and the tonality of the tragic that is intrinsically aporic.

The advent is singular. But its singularity is rooted in an archaic timeless substratum. The ‘archaisms’ in question are, of course, rethought according to the present, they are experienced in a specific way, but with the origins always kept in mind. Event–advent? For sure, what is qualitatively, intensely experienced, works to bring out what has always been present within our being, be it individual or collective. We can refer to Heidegger on this point, and to the attention he paid to a post-metaphysical thought, applying himself to bringing out the most ‘simple’ that serves as a substratum to human existence. But we can also refer to Leibnitz who, in his ‘principle of indiscernible,’ works to find a balance between absolute difference and repetitive identity (Vattimo 1990, p. 21). Between the two, the romanticism or the philosophy of life enhances the tragic aspect of the present, along with its demand, its impulse to live, and the sense of urgency it exudes.

Is this not characteristic of the astonishing con-temporary attitudes, based on aesthetics, caring little or not at all about the consequences of their acts? Plural families, and successive and transient love affairs are proof of such behavior in the domain of emotion. Political changeability or ideological variations exemplify it as far as public life is concerned; the acceptance of the anarchical laws of production and, at the same time, the extraordinary suspicion towards them, attest to it in what can be called the economical disorder. An atmosphere of unconcern pervades the whole thing, not furthering the worry about the future but, on the contrary, an urge to live in the present according to a way of being that, during the ages, has developed progressively.

If we try to define this kind of aesthetic environment, we can compare it to an eternal paganism. A paganism that works to grab hold of life, grasps what it offers, anything that turns up. A pagan exuberance devoting itself to using the delights of the present, leading a daring, bold life; a life penetrated by the freshness of the fleeting, precarious, and, therefore, intense instant. In his analysis of Machiavelli’s opposition to Christianity, Fichte speaks of his ‘general impiety’ Fichte 1981, p. 48). It seems that we can extrapolate what he says from his paganism. For it is clearly the essence of Christianity that we find again in the political sphere, in the economical conception of existence, or in the quest for security that the various social institutions offer.

It is precisely this type of ‘Christianity’ against which the contemporary impiety rebels. The youthful aspect of its agitation, the ‘freshness’ of its rebellions, its exacerbated search for intense pleasure, multiform, in the present, all combine to make it view the ‘ancient world’ as its original homeland. ‘Ancient world’ should, of course, be understood in a metaphorical sense; that is to say, as anything that contravenes the various ‘categorical imperatives’ formulated by modern moralism, be they of a sexual, economical, or ideological nature. This return to the ancient—to the archaic—is a feature of postmodernity. As if, beyond a mere parenthesis, for better or worse, in the everyday life or in paroxysm, in a subdued way or, on the contrary, in destructive excesses, we are rediscovering the sublime quality of the beauty of the world. Only this beauty matters, so we may as well delight in it for what it is, even at the cost of submitting to its terrible, formidable laws that we have to accept anyway, which cannot but evoke the theme of amor fati, the important consequences of which can be estimated in a Nietzschean spirit.

It is as they wake up from the Promethean dream that more and more people choose to behave in a Stoic spirit. A generalized stoicism according to which that upon which we have no power becomes indifferent. And thus the amor fati, thanks to which our fate is not only predetermined but also accepted, even appreciated as such. That attitude generated a certain form of serenity that can seem paradoxical, but which is actually at the basis of various and numerous demonstrations of generosity, mutual aid, voluntary help, and humanitarian actions that stem from social life, and that even tend to multiply. For the acceptance of that which can go hand-in-hand with the concern to take part in that which is: not to bring it under control, but to accompany a given so that, possibly, one makes it give the best of itself. This is the aesthetic logic, described briefly. Thus, realization of the self or of the world no longer consists in a simple economical action, but blossoms in ecological interaction. That may be the way to switch from the Hegelian and Marxist control that is a feature of modernity, to what Bataille calls ‘sovereignty,’ a sovereignty working on structural reversibility and this is, more than anything else, the sign of pre-and postmodern eras.

If we apply it to the contemporary world, such ‘proclivity’ does not fail to secrete an undeniable wisdom. A wisdom that is nonactive without being passive, bringing out the tendency that, at a certain point, is inscribed in the reality in question. Thus, to use an idea (Maffesoli 1996b), moralism and necessity are replaced by a ‘deontology’ that takes situations earnestly and behaves consequently. Moralism rests on the injunction to be this or that. The individual has to submit themself to the plan that has been decreed a priori; society is also compelled to become what the intellectual, the politician, the expert thinks it has to be. Quite different is the deontology that adapts to a general tendency, that is heedful of the (spirit of the moment); in short that is in keeping with the opportunities of the present.

Only situations matter. Such immanentism does not imply indifference but, on the contrary, a constant conscience, an awareness of what is: the world, the other, the social. In short, we could talk about a ‘co-presence’ towards otherness under its various modulations. A variable intensity of ‘co-presence,’ but integrating the entirety of being, and no longer only this or that part or characteristic.

To reconsider a famous theme already brought up to date by Dodds, we can recall the role of the daımon in the Greek tradition. Of course, Socrates put forth his own daımon, and we can consider that it was a generalized belief that no one could ignore. But the interesting point we want to underline within the scope of this discussion is the tight link that exists between the daımon and necessity, the role of which is so important within the science of ancient culture. In a word, we can say that a much greater number of things depend on necessity than the individual’s own nature. It is that very fact that is expressed in various ways in tragedies: we are more acted upon than we really act ourselves. Fate is there—omnipotent, merciless— directing the individuals in spite of their own will in the direction of what has been written down. Here again, it is a matter of a certain form of predestination. To quote just one example out of many, the whole myth of Oedipus is based on such a ‘necessity,’ with the extreme consequences we know of.

Indeed, community aesthetics only encourages the rise of the impersonal. What is at stake in such a repetition of fate is the very negation of the philosophical foundation of the modern Western world: free will, the decision of the individual or social groups acting together to make History. The great fantasy of universality is the natural consequence of this. Op-posed to that, the assertion or reassertion of cyclical systems invalidates such a free will (Dodds 1959, p. 51). The various mythical ‘orients’ that intrude into postmodernity take up with the impersonal powers again, and the inescapable aspect of action. Be it the various philosophies, or more simply the Buddhist, Hindu, or Taoist techniques, or African clairvoyance, directly confronting the telluric forces, or the Afro– Brazilian cults of possession, without forgetting the multiple New-Age practices, or quite simply the fascination astrology holds over people. All of this emphasizes the fact the individual is, at worst, only the plaything, and at best, the partner of forces that exceed him, and to which he knows he must adapt.

Expressions of this contemporary mythology can be seen in science fiction films, pop videos, sometimes even in advertisements. These expressions reveal the relativization of the free will by the supra-individual ‘force.’ Of course, strong minds laugh at this, but the resonance is undeniable. It taps into the social imagination, ensures the success of folklore shows and historical reconstructions, inspires crowds to visit places of pilgrimage, and makes best sellers of rites-of-passage novels. We can call this the ‘ethics of the aesthetic,’ another way of asking the question posed by medieval alchemists who wondered about the glutinum mundi, the glue of the world that ensured that whatever the case, there was something rather than nothing, and that this something was coherent. The ‘glue of the world’ is, therefore, an impersonal force, a vital flux, in which everything participates in a mysterious attractive correspondence.

There are numerous poets, artists, and utopians who have celebrated such an attraction. It is possible to make a social anthropological reading of it. This is suggested through the term ‘orgy,’ that is to say, shared passion, social empathy. Or even, by distorting the expression of Durkheim, one could speak of an ‘organic solidarity,’ meaning that, whether willingly or not, everyone is, essentially, part of a whole that makes one what one is. In short, we only exist because the other, my close relation, or the Other, the social, gives me my existence. I am as I am because the other recognizes me as such. Such an assertion might seem shocking, but is this not, empirically, how, from the smallest to the largest, societies function. Such an ‘effect of structure’ is well described by Marie Douglas, in her book How Institutions Think, (Douglas 1992, p. 12). It enables us to understand that whoever does not submit to such recognition is rejected, stigmatized, or marginalized. Their exclusion is due to the fact that they don’t have ‘the smell of the clan,’ or don’t want to acquire it.

Thus, above and beyond individualism, whether theoretical or methodological, empirical social life is only the expression of successive sentiments of be-longing. You are a member, part of, you integrate, participate or, in common parlance, ‘you belong.’ Even if during the good periods of modernity there was autonomy, distinctness, affirmation of an individual identity or class, today all that is only a deception, illusion, simulacrum. Sociology of the orgy (Maffesoli 1991), that is, order of the fusion, even the confusion that determines that everyone exists ac-cording to a principle of heteronomy.

With this in mind we can understand the return in force and resonance of the emblematic figures and other daily archetypes that exist in contemporary society. The phenomenon of ‘fan’ groups among the young generation is only one of the extreme forms of these multiple memberships, which they are not aware of. Thus one ‘participates’ magically with such and such a rock singer, sporting idol, religious or intellectual guru, or political leader. A participation that generates a quasi-mystical communion, a common feeling of belonging. Gilbert Durand, commenting upon the major tragic figures, like Don Giovanni, emphasizes that they become pure ‘objects.’ More objects than subjects as they only exist in the mind of others, they become an ‘ideal type’ (Durand 1982, p. 207).

We can pursue this analysis by noting that these ‘major abstractions,’ these archetypes, tend to multiply, even to democratize themselves. Increasingly there are small major figures. Ultimately, each post-modern tribe has its emblematic figure just as each tribe, strictly speaking, possessed, and was possessed, by its totem. In both cases identity, free will, individual decision, or choice can be asserted or demanded, but they are dependent on the identities, decisions, and choices of the group. Note, moreover, that these archetypes regain force and vigor at the same time as the tragic atmosphere of the moment is affirmed. There is a correlation here that deserves consideration. Instead of being opposed, irreducibly, instead of being exceeded, according to a dialectic and dramatic mechanism, in a soothing synthesis, freedom and necessity are, at certain moments, experienced in a ‘contradictory’ tension, which is what is called a conflicting harmony. This, of course, recalls the mystic tradition, or the philosophy of Hinduism, but, also, the process of individuation, as described by Jung (1980), in which the ‘I’ is used and experienced as an object of the Subject that encompasses it. This is an experience of the self that does not destroy the empirical individual, the ‘I,’ but which, on the contrary, raises it; that is to say, takes it up into a larger whole. Hence the intensity and jubilation of the tragic situation, of the Nietzschean amor fati: to be free in a necessity full of love (Aurigemma 1992, p. 250). In short, a form of dependence full of tranquillity in which the individual becomes fulfilled in a state of ‘being more’ in which he is revealed to himself.

We can see what these situations of ‘being more’ could be in contemporary society. Great gatherings, all kinds of crowds, multiple trances, mass sporting celebrations, musical excitements, religious or cultural effervescence. All these things raise the individual to a form of plenitude that has none of the colorlessness of economic or political functionality. In each one of these phenomena there is a sort of magic participation in the strange, strangeness, in a global nature that exceeds individual particularity. A global nature which is sacred, and in which each person receives communion. Is this an irony of the tragic, or ‘ruse’ of the collective imagination, returning this numinous dimension to the social circuit that modernity believed it had evacuated from social life? Re-enchantment of the world? Yes, in so far as one assists, undeniably, in the surpassing of simple utility, even instrumentality, whether this is individual or social.

In such a perspective, the world and the individual do not become, progressively, what they have to be according to a programmed finality, but, one could say, the ‘befall’ (adviennent) to what they are. The archetype, is as it were, only an aide in this revelation, something that serves as developer, used to bring out what is already there. It is in this sense that there exists a strict relationship between the tragic dimension of the archetype and the accentuation of a cyclical conception of time.

This structural proximity between the archetypal procedure, the collective unconscious and the cycle stems from the fact that, to use a formula of Jung, all ‘vital processes follow their own inner laws.’ To take the example of the unconscious, you cannot make progress by forced marches, it comes ‘in its own time.’ Like a spring which trickles, gushes forth or dries up according to its own rhythm, the emergence of the unconscious flow can never be predicted with complete certainty.

We could also establish a connection between this and the fact that, like in alchemical thought and in the dynamic of the unconscious, there is something circular, better, spiralesque in the production of images. They do not obey the mechanic linearity of simple reason, but follow a series of convolutions, which particularly complicate interpretation. Indeed, there is a labyrinthine structure that exists in both the un-conscious and the world of images. And if the former has been invested predominately by intellectual interpretation, this is not the case for the latter, which is still ignored, looked down upon, or marginalized by thinkers, at least by those that defend a strictly nationalist point of view.

It is certain that the convolutions or even, if we refer to a Jungian theory, the ‘circumambulations,’ describe the slow circular work that everyone makes in order to achieve, bit by bit, the realisation of what can be called ‘greater being,’ which is the work of a whole lifetime (Jung 1980, p. 145). The Tibetan mandala is a good illustration of this for the Oriental tradition, just as the myth of the quest for the holy grail expresses it in the Western tradition. In both cases there is repetition, cyclical movement and a tragic conception of life. The archetypal figures always proceed by recurrences, they always refer to a mythical time that is nondatable, the time of our stories and legends: ‘at this time,’ l’illud tempus.

This is striking in the case of mythical illustrations strictly speaking, of which there are many examples to be found in literature, cinema, theater, or song. But this phenomenon of timelessness, of cyclical or tragic accentuation is noticeable, also, in the daily or, a fortiori, show-like performance of contemporary stars. The puer aeternus that Michael Jackson, for example, represents; the depraved repentant that Madonna represents; or more prosaically, the divine rogue illustrated by the contemporary ‘trader’; without forgetting the aggressive heroes of the sports world; all of these emerge from a re-enchantment of the world that has a strong repercussion in the collective un-conscious. These figures don’t create anything specific, they only repeat anthropologically rooted characters or ways of being. It is this cyclical aspect which means, moreover, that they are raised on a pedestal. And it is by communing in these redundant productions, by identifying in them, that everybody, at the end of a long initiation, which most of the time is nonconscious, exceeds oneself, ‘has a ball,’ in an aesthetic manner, in something surpassing confinement, or the shrinking, in the small individual ‘I.’

Whether in empirical expressions of contemporary art or, and they are not necessarily very far removed, mythical contradictions, it is important to reveal a fundamental recurrence. Levi-Strauss and Gilbert Durand have greatly insisted on this aspect: repetition, and the ‘do-it-yourself’ correlative to it, is at work in the great spiritual works of humanity (Durand 1980, p. 130). To a certain extent this repetitive aspect, whether a Nietzschean ‘eternal return,’ a writer’s obsessive idea, a musician’s typical musical phrase, a painter’s ‘touch,’ the never-ending theoretical digression of a thinker, even the recognizable ritornello of a singer, all of these things underline the presence of the timeless in history, a sort of immobility in movement. It is having in mind the redundancy of myth and the repetition in daily creations, without forgetting, of course, that which is at work in everyday life, that we can understand the part of intimate emotion secreted by the familiarity of phenomena, situations, ideas etc … which return with regularity.

It is this that characterizes community aesthetics. ‘L’habitus as analyzed by Thomas of Aquinas insists on the structuring aspect of the established custom. The metaphor of the ‘fold’ that Deleuze offered to reflection is a way of bringing the resonance of habit up to date. All these things show that individual or collective improvement is not necessarily progress without end, as modern pedagogy has postulated, but can, at certain moments, be carried out with an awareness of what is recurrent: customs, myths, and rites, the habits of a given society. This is exactly what a premodern society offered, and it is possible that in postmodernity it has regained importance once more.

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