Phenomenology Research Paper

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Phenomenology has been one of the most influential twentieth century philosophical traditions. It began with the appearance of Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1900–01 and of Pfander’s Phenomenology of Willing: A Psychological Analysis in 1900, and continued with the work of philosophers such as Johannes Daubert, Adolph Reinach, Moritz Geiger, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, Roman Ingarden, and Wilhelm Schapp. These phenomenologists were active in Munich and Gottingen and the movement to which they belonged is often called ‘realist phenomenology.’ Throughout the century phenomenology has been the object of a variety of increasingly far-reaching transformations: by Husserl himself, whose ideas in 1913 marked a turn towards an idealist and transcendental form of phenomenology and then by Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida, among many others. Among phenomenologists who remained faithful to realist phenomenology were Ortega y Gasset, in Spain, and Felix Kaufmann and Alfred Schutz in Vienna, where Brentano’s teaching at the end of the nineteenth century had launched the project of an exact descriptive psychology and caught the imagination of Austrian philosophers such as Meinong, Ehrenfels, Twardowski, and Husserl. In all its forms phenomenology has continued to influence sociology and the philosophy of the social world.

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Phenomenology was initially conceived of as the careful description of the mind—act phenomenology—and its objects—object phenomenology. Successful description, it was thought, would lead to an account of the main types of mental phenomena, the main types of their objects, and of the necessary and often a priori interconnections between these. In Husserl’s Logical Investigations knowledge, verification and logical structures are described as though they could in principle be instantiated by a solitary subject or even by solitary mental acts. But phenomenologists quickly began to describe the social aspects of mental phenomena and to analyze the nature of social objects.

Among the most important results of the early phenomenologists are their accounts of awareness and understanding of other minds, motives, social acts, collective intentionality, the main forms of social life, and the nature of social objects. These contributions to the phenomenology of social phenomena were also employed in discussions of social and political philosophy and in the creation by Scheler of the sociology of knowledge (for partial overviews see Toulemont 1962, Theunissen 1977).




1. Empathy, Understanding, And Motivation

In what does Mary’s awareness of Sam’s sadness consist? Phenomenologists of nearly all stripes attempted to defend two claims about such awareness— sometimes called ‘Einfuhlung’ or ‘empathy’—which also, they thought, hold of awareness of physical objects. Awareness of other minds can be, and often is, direct and perceptual. Together the two theories constitute direct realism about other minds. Critical realism about our awareness of physical objects is the claim that we do not directly see things but infer from sensory data to their existence. Similarly, critical realism about other minds is the theory that we are not directly aware of other people or their mental states but infer to these on the basis of sensory data. On the phenomenological view, Mary can directly see Sam and his sadness and her perception need involve no judgement or conceptualization and thus no inference. This view rests on the arguments given by early phenomenologists to show—against Kant and Helmholtz—that visual perception of things and events need involve neither inference nor concepts.

Traditionally the most popular variant of critical realism about other minds has appealed to reasoning from analogy. On the basis of observed analogies between her own behavior and mental states and observation of Sam, Mary is capable of attributing sadness to Sam. The locus classicus for criticisms of accounts of this kind is Scheler’s 1913 appendix to his On the Phenomenology and Theory of Feelings of Sympathy, ‘On the other I.?’ Scheler’s own view contains the claim that Mary’s awareness of Sam’s sadness is as direct and as subject to error as her awareness of her own mental states (see on this Schutz’s papers on Scheler in Schutz 1970, 1973). Less ambitious and more sober defenses of direct realism were provided by Edith Stein (1917 1980), who gives a subtle account of the relation of expression between mental states, on the one hand, and behavior and gestures, on the other hand; by Husserl (1973), who argues that Mary sees Sam’s body as similar to her own body without judging this and thus without any reasoning from analogy; and by Schutz (1932). Phenomenological accounts of empathy also discuss the claim that some types of awareness of the feelings of another person involve make-believe feelings. Of the Gestalt psychologists influenced by phenomenology, Kohler (1947, Chap. 8) and Koffka (1946, Chap. 1) retain the claim that awareness of other minds need involve no judgement or inference but endorse critical realism. Buhler (1927, §9) defends both parts of the direct realism of the phenomenologists but within a naturalist and biological perspective that takes into account the dynamics of understanding other minds and the role of both steering mechanisms and criteria in bringing about ‘mental contact.’

No account of empathy is complete without an account of what it is to understand other people. From the beginning, phenomenology was concerned with the analysis of the nature of motives and motivation and understanding thereof. In particular, the task was seen to be to provide an account of the relation between the internal causation of mental states and behavior, on the one hand, and motivation, on the other hand. The relation of motivation or justification was held to involve a number of distinct possible moments: the optimal case, where a mental state or disposition such as an intention, does indeed justify an action; conflict among motivations; the case where a mental state, for example, an emotion, is not justified by the subject’s beliefs or perceptions. Many views were discussed and endorsed by different phenomenologists: what motivates and what is motivated are never the possible terms of a causal relation, for example, because they are ideal propositional contents; what motivates and what is motivated can be the terms of a causal relation because they are concrete instantiations of ideal contents; the relations of causality and of motivation are always distinct but may have the same terms; there is a relation of superposition between motivation and causal relations; relations of motivation are causal relations but mental causality differs from physical causality. Finally, it was argued that motivational justification differs from both inductive and deductive justification, in particular because it often connects terms that cannot stand in the last two relations. Husserl himself thought that it was a ‘basic law’ of all psychological phenomena that they could stand in relations of motivation (Pfander 1900, Husserl 1913/1969, Stein 1917, 1980). In his 1932 Der sinnhafte Ausbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die erstehende Soziologie [The Phenomenology of the Social World. An Introduction to ‘verstehende’ Sociology], Alfred Schutz made use of the phenomenology of temporal experience in his analysis of motivation and understanding. ‘In-order-to motives’ explain how actions come about, genuine ‘because-motives’ explain by reference to preceding experiences how a practical project comes about. The present in which Sam is aware of his own motives, projects, and the states of affairs which are the objects of projects, provides him with a temporal perspective which is not available to Mary. This does not, Schutz thinks, amount to a denial that Sam’s motivation can be grasped by Mary, only to the claim that her temporal perspective on his motivation and behavior must be segmented and discontinuous (Schutz 1932/1974, see also Grathoff 1995).

A further step towards accounting for the connection between understanding and temporal perspectives was taken by Wilhelm Schapp in his 1953 1976 book In Geschichten verstrickt (Entangled in Stories) in which such traditional phenomenological categories as action, its horizons, intentionality, and states of affairs are reworked in narratological terms.

2. Social Acts

Promises, Hume said, are the cement of society. But what is a promise? Reinach’s 1913 1989 reply to this question is the most impressive piece of philosophical analysis ever penned by a phenomenologist (see Mulligan 1987). Like orders, requests, questions, and answers, promises are social acts. Such acts are typically addressed to someone, grasped by another person and are performed in the very act of speaking. They bring about changes. Thus a promise creates both an obligation and a claim. Actions of different sorts bring about states of affairs that satisfy or fulfil social acts; execution of the behavior commanded satisfies a command. Reinach warns against possible misunderstandings of the category of social acts due to dragging in the ideas to which we are accustomed. A command is neither a purely external action, nor is it a purely inner experience, nor is it the announcing to others of such an experience (Reinach 1983, p. 19).

Reinach’s account of the variety of social acts and of their effects is only the first step in his demonstration of their role in social intercourse. The second step is provided by his analysis of six possible modifications of social acts. In his analyses of such solitary mental acts as seeing or judging, Husserl had already noted that such acts could be modified. Thus one modification of seeing is visual imagining, one modification of judging is supposing. Similarly, argues Reinach, each type of social act can be modified in various ways. A promise may be a sham or pseudo promise, the promisor does not really intend to do what he promises to do. A command may be a conditional command: ‘In the event that such and such occurs, I order you to do such and such.’ The social act of informing someone that something is the case, however, is not subject to this sort of modification. A conditional social act is to be distinguished from a social act that has conditional content, for example a promise to do one thing if some other thing occurs. A social act may be performed by more than one person.

[We] have here to do with the case where each of the persons performs the act ‘in union’ with the others, where each knows of the participation of the others, lets the others participate and participates himself, we have one single act which is performed by two or more persons together (Reinach 1983, p. 24).

Similarly, a social act may be addressed to more than one person. Finally, a command or a promise, for example, may be performed in the name of another person; there are representative social acts.

3. Collective Intentionality

The intentionality of acts and states, their relation to an object or state of affairs, is always the intentionality of one subject. But whereas the intentionality of solitary acts such as judging, inferrings, or seeings typically involves only a more or less explicit awareness of the self—if I judge that it is raining, I am aware that I am judging, although this is not part of what I judge—there are acts, states, and activities which involve a more or less explicit awareness of others whether these are presented as ‘you,’ ‘she,’ ‘they,’ ‘one’ or ‘us.’ This phenomenon, nicely expressed in German by conjoining ‘Mit’ (with) and many a psychological verb, noun, or adjective (e.g., ‘Mitschuld’ collective guilt), is now called ‘collective intentionality.’ One example of the phenomenon, as we have seen, is furnished by joint social acts. Reinach also points out that in the case of actions that are not social acts it is possible to speak of several performing subjects of one and the same action. There is a way of acting ‘in union.’ The criminal law’s concept of ‘complicity,’ as it seems to us, has to base itself on this, and such collective actions are also important for public law, administrative law, and international law (Reinach 1983, pp. 24–5).

But the starting point for an account of collective intentionality is not ‘Mithandeln’ (joint action, coaction) but the analysis of the mental acts and states involving affective participation such as ‘Mitgefuhl,’ fellow-feeling or sympathy, those involving shared beliefs and those involving trust, confidence, or belief in someone or something (see Scheler 1966, IV B 4, Reiner 1934, pts. 1 and 2).

Scheler’s 1913 account of sympathy distinguishes between identification of emotional contagion, vi-carious feeling, feeling something together with someone (‘Mit-einanderfuhlen’), fellow-feeling (‘Mitgefuhl’), benevolence or love of humanity, and personal love, and argues that these stand in different sorts of relation of dependence or foundation to each other (see also Walther 1922).

The phenomenologists made three important claims about collective intentionality. First, although for every type of collective intentionality implicit aware-ness of feeling, believing, willing, or acting together with others is to be distinguished from thoughts containing the concepts expressed by the different personal pronouns, such concepts depend on the relevant types of implicit awareness. Representations employing ‘we’ and ‘they’ presuppose presentations which help to fix the reference of our uses of the personal pronouns and cognate forms as in ‘Cosa Nostra,’ ‘Sinn Fein,’ ‘Mare Nostrum,’ and ‘Pater Noster.’ Second, collective intentionality cannot be reduced to mutual belief or knowledge. There is, Scheler claims, a type of ‘co-experiencing something’ which cannot be understood by saying that A experiences something that is experienced by B, and that both, in addition, know of their experiencing it (Scheler 1913/1973, p. 526).

Finally, the sense or feeling of togetherness may be actual or habitual, in which case it constitutes a type of habitual background (see Walther 1922). The notion of background, like that of horizon, was first explored within phenomenology in connection with perceptual experience.

4. Emotions And Explanation: Ressentiment

Of all the psychological phenomena analyzed by phenomenologists, emotions and related phenomena enjoyed by far the most attention. One reason for this is the conviction that a philosophy of mind which concentrates exclusively on beliefs, inferences, and desires can only scratch the mind’s surface and that explanation and understanding within the human sciences will suffer from any such limitation. This conviction in turn relies on the claim that emotional dispositions, tendencies, long-standing states and sentiments, both those directed towards the past and those directed towards the future, determine desires and preferences. In order to mark the importance of emotions Scheler emphasizes that mind or spirit (‘Geist’) comprehends not only cognitive phenomena but also the will and affective phenomena, an emphasis also prominent in the fiction and essays of the Austrian thinker Robert Musil.

One important illustration of these claims is provided by Scheler’s analysis of ressentiment and subsequent interest in the topic. Building on suggestions of Nietzsche and the historical sociologist Sombart, Scheler takes ressentiment to be a long-lasting psychological attitude that comes into being when emotions and sentiments such as envy, rancor, revenge, resentment, and spite are repeatedly bottled up and lead to ‘value-illusions’ and false evaluations. In particular, it is a felt impotence or incapacity to realize or live up to certain values that leads the woman of ressentiment to false evaluations. In the (slightly modified) example from La Fontaine’s fable, the fox initially sets a high value on the grapes and changes its mind about their value solely as a result of its inability to obtain them. Scheler’s account relies on his view that value judgments are true or false—‘cognitivism.’ It is indeed essential to the mechanism described that it involves a re-evaluation, and not merely one or another type of change of preference. But it is not necessary to assume cognitivism. A weaker version of the account would simply have it that ressentiment involves a transition from an attribution of value to an attribution of disvalue (or vice versa) that is caused in the way described by Scheler and is thus, in the absence of any other justification, unjustified, unmotivated, or irrational. The central historical example discussed by Scheler is Nietzsche’s claim that early Christianity was characterized by pervasive ressentiment. One of the many other examples he discusses is the claim that the disinterested disposition to assist in the punishment of criminals and a certain sort of moral indignation together with the relevant evaluations emerge from lower-middle class envy. This claim was the object of extensive empirical investigation by the Danish sociologist Svend Ranulf (1930, 1938), who castigates Scheler’s almost complete disregard of the canons of empirical inquiry.

5. Types Of Coexistence

Scheler’s taxonomy of forms of social coexistence draws on distinctions to be found in the classical writings of Tonnies, Weber, and Simmel and on his own philosophy of mind and ethical psychology. In particular, four types of coexistence are distinguished with reference to different types of collective intentionality: masses, communities, societies, and superordinate entities such as nation-states, state-nations, empires such as the Belgian Empire, and the Catholic Church. A mass is characterized by affective contagion, its members do not behave as autonomous persons. The community—families, tribes, clans, peoples—displays such forms of collective intentionality as sympathy, trust, piety, loyalty, and collective responsibility rather than individual responsibility. A community forms a milieu or niche within which certain shared values are prominent. Empathy and understanding are there, typically automatic and unreflective. Philosophers have often assumed that the choice between the two accounts of empathy distinguished above is exclusive: either awareness of other minds is always immediate or it is always a process involving inference, for example analogical reasoning. Scheler rejects the assumption and argues that although the former account fits communities, the latter is typical of societal relations. Within societies self-interest, mistrust, and a lack of solidarity go together with the predominance of the artificial relations engendered by social acts such as promising and contracts which connect autonomous, individually responsible persons. The relations that constitute a community, unlike those created by promises and contracts, have no determinate temporal duration or terminus. In his account of such ‘collective persons’ as the nation–state—an account that he only sporadically attempts to make consistent with the requirements of ontological individualism—these are said combine certain traits of communities and societies. They resemble communities in that they are not typically held to enjoy a determinate duration and in the affective importance their members attach to the past. But like the autonomous persons standing in societal relations they enjoy personal responsibility. Finally, each form of coexistence is characterized by different values: the vital values of the community—its life, survival, flourishing, and death—contrast both with the values of civilization—utility, agreeableness, sociability—of society and with the spiritual values of nation–states and state–nations—culture, law, language. (On the relation between the account of values given by Scheler and by the founders of sociology, see Boudon 2000.)

These forms of coexistence are related, Scheler thinks, in the following ways. Societies are founded on communities, states on communities, and societal unities. Thus the societal relations created by promises and contracts rely on the fact that the persons standing in such relations have some familiarity with the phenomenon of trust characteristic of communities (see Scheler 1966, VI, B 4, Scheler 1963, 334ff., Stein 1970).

6. Sociology Of Knowledge

Scheler’s extensive writings on sociology in the 1920’s, in particular his Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge and other papers collected in his 1925 The Forms of Knowledge and Society, display a growing appreciation for American Pragmatism. Together with the work of Karl Mannheim they established the sociology of knowledge. Scheler employs his accounts of collective intentionality and of affective phenomena in order to set out a comprehensive formulation of the view that scientific knowledge and technological knowledge are inseparably bound up with the ‘instinctual structure’ of the bourgeoisie, the desire to dominate nature, and with the predominance of vital values. Scientific knowledge and its sociology is opposed to philosophical and cultural knowledge (‘Bildungswissen’) and to religious knowledge (‘Heilswissen’) and the sociologies of the spiritual values essential to these, all of which rest on the natural world view and natural language. His account of the link between science and mastery of nature and his distinction between scientific and a superior, non-scientific knowledge have proved remarkably influential throughout the century (see Leiss 1994). But on two points Scheler differs from the majority of his many successors. He retains a realist view of scientific knowledge. The values he distinguishes from those of science, in his philosophy as in his sociology, are spiritual: salvation is not emancipation and philosophy does not involve hearkening to the voice of being.

7. Social Objects

What sort of an entity is a social object? There are, it seems, social entities of many different kinds—enduring ‘substances’ such as judges and the unemployed, processes such as electioneering, events such as voting, states such as ownership. But, as Reinach pointed out, neither of the two venerable philosophical distinctions, physical vs. psychological, temporal vs. ideal, is of much help if we want to understand the status of, for example, the claims and obligations created by promises.

Through the act of promising something new enters the world. A claim arises in the one party and an obligation in the other. What are these curious entities? They are surely not nothing … but they cannot be brought under any of the categories with which we are otherwise familiar. They are nothing physical; that is certain. One might rather be tempted to designate them as something psychical or mental, that is, as the experiences of the one who has the claim or the obligation. But cannot a claim or an obligation last for years without any change? Are there any such experiences? Recently one has begun to recognize again, in addition to the physical and psychical, the distinct character of ideal objects. But the essential mark of these objects, such as numbers, concepts, propositions, is their timelessness. Claims and obligations, by contrast, arise, last a definite length of time, and then disappear again. Thus they seem to be temporal objects of a special kind of which one has not yet taken notice (Reinach 1983, p. 9).

Husserl baptized such entities ‘bound idealities.’ Unlike ‘free’ idealities such as numbers, bound idealities such as word types, word meanings, and other cultural entities such as institutions and tools come into being at a particular time and are ‘earth bound … bound to particular territories’; if there were men on Mars there would be ‘Mars bound’ idealities (Husserl 1973, §65). Like many free idealities, bound idealities such as word meanings, rules, and types of ceremonies are multiply instantiable. The most thorough account of such entities is Ingarden’s (1931) ontology of word-meanings and of works of art.

If social entities are brought into being then it is plausible to say that they are mind-dependent entities. But since mental activities belong to the category of episodes it might seem that social entities must all have the reality of episodes. This ‘actuality theory,’ from the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, was rejected in the two most substantive phenomenological ontologies of the social world, A Contribution to the Ontology of Social Communities, by Gerda Walther (1922), and Foundation of the Theory of the Social Bond (1932) by Husserl’s Japanese pupil, Tomoo Odaka. Social entities are, they argue, brought into being and sustained by the mind, but do not all belong to the category of episodes. A thorough criticism of holism about social entities within the framework of Husserl’s theory of objects is given by Felix Kaufmann (1929 30, Kaufmann’s (1936, 1944) philosophy of the social sciences is, however, closer to the ideas of the logical positivists than to phenomenology).

What type of mental activity is responsible for social entities? According to Walther and Otaka, collective intentionality, implicit and explicit, and in particular we-intentionality, is a necessary condition for the emergence and maintenance of social entities. What, runs Walther’s influential question, makes a group of laborers working for a constructor, who interact, know this, pass bricks along and receive such social acts as orders, into a community? What are the marks of a common form of life? Among the thirteen features she puts forward is the sense of togetherness or collective intentionality, a feature also necessary for the existence of all products of a community.

8. Sociology And History Of Phenomenology

A notable sociological feature of phenomenology is the role played by female philosophers. A later parallel is the role of women within analytic philosophy, phenomenology’s most influential rival.

Many of the distinctions, approaches, and theses of the phenomenologists were rediscovered within analytic philosophy. Reinach’s analysis of social acts anticipates John Austin’s account of speech acts. The phenomenological discovery of collective intentionality anticipates the work of John Searle and Raimo Tuomela. Similarly, the claim that social entities depend for their existence on collective intentionality has been defended by Searle. Jon Elster’s work on such phenomena as ressentiment and on emotions in general (see Elster 1985, 1999) confirms the phenom- enologists’ conviction that a desire–belief–inference psychology and sociology are inadequate. A variety of theories of motivation and of its relation to causality have been canvassed since Wittgenstein. Scheler’s account of communities and their relations to other types of social formation anticipates many of the contemporary varieties of communitarianism. Thus phenomenology is now by and large of interest only to the historian.

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