Consequentialism Research Paper

1. The Definition Of Consequentialism

Nonconsequentialism comes in many forms. Deontologists hold that agents ought to discharge certain duties: they ought to tell the truth, keep their promises, be nonviolent, etc. Kantians say that agents ought to act on the categorical imperative—act only on a maxim that they could accept as a general law of behavior—or ought to treat other people always as ends. Virtue ethicists say that they ought to manifest certain virtues in their behavior. Rights theorists maintain that they ought to respect certain rights that others have against them. Contractualists assert that they ought to conform to principles that no one could reasonably object to as the bases of social life. Theorists of special obligation say that they ought to deal in a certain way with those who are bound to them, such as their children, spouses, and friends. And so on.

What is the common thread in these positions? All nonconsequentialists speak, at whatever level of abstraction, about what any or every agent ought to do or be; in that sense they are universalists. All nonconsequentialists prescribe neutral patterns of behavior or psychology or relationships: that people act on the categorical imperative, manifest certain virtues, respect the rights of their dependants, nurture their friendships, and so on. The patterns are neutral in the sense that they can be understood in the same way by everyone. And all nonconsequentialists say that the right thing for an agent to do is to instantiate the prescribed patterns—so far as they are coinstantiable—in their own behavior or psychology or relationships. In particular, they say that that is the thing to do even if instantiating a pattern in their own life means, because of the perversity of the agent’s circumstances, that the pattern will be less fully realized than otherwise in the world as a whole.

Consequentialism makes a dual assertion in response to such positions (Baron et al. 1997). First, it asserts that there are certain potentially shared values by means of which possible states of affairs can be ranked, although perhaps not completely. These may be neutral patterns in human behavior or psychology or relationships, of the kind that the nonconsequentialist prescribes, or they may be neutral outcome patterns that are more detached from agency: patterns such as the maximization of human happiness or the saving of uninhabited wildernesses. And second, consequentialism maintains that the right choice for an agent to take in any decision is one of those choices, assuming there is at least one—assuming incomplete ranking is not a problem—that promote the overall realization of such values or patterns (more below on what it is to promote values).

The basic difference, then, between consequentialists and their opponents is that while each side privileges certain general patterns—treats them as values, as it is natural to say—the consequentialist side says that the important thing is to promote the realization of those patterns in the world at large, while the opposing side says that the important thing is rather to instantiate the relevant patterns in one’s own life: in one’s behavior or relationships or psychology, or whatever. Consequentialists say that privileged patterns should be treated as consequences to be promoted, nonconsequentialists that they should be treated as constraints to be satisfied.

The difference between the two approaches is particularly salient for simple cases where only one pattern is taken to be relevant, and where there is no issue about the relative importance of different pat-terns. Consider those cases, then, where nonviolence is assumed to be the only privileged pattern—the only value—that is relevant. And consider the different ways in which that pattern may be espoused among pacifists.

The nonconsequentialist pacifist says that nonviolence is to be instantiated by agents, even if this means that there is less nonviolence overall. The consequentialist counterpart says that nonviolence is to be promoted overall, even if this means instantiating violence: say, waging the war to end all wars. In practice the two sorts of pacifist will often converge in their recommendations, as nonconsequentialist Quakers converged with Bertrand Russell in their opposition to World War I. But there is always a possibility of their coming apart, as indeed those Quakers and Russell came apart in their attitudes to World War II.

Making the distinction between consequentialism nonconsequentialism by reference to whether the agent is required to promote certain privileged pat-terns or rather to instantiate them—to honor them—is only one among a number of ways of making it. Another common approach is to distinguish between agent-neutral values and agent-relative ones, and to say that consequentialists advocate the promotion only of agent-neutral values, nonconsequentialists the promotion of a mixed bunch, or of agent-relative values only (Nagel 1986).

Agent-neutral values are patterns that are identified without reference to who is doing the identifying: patterns like those involved in peace being achieved, happiness maximized, a wilderness preserved, and so on. Agent-relative values are patterns that are identified by back reference to the identifying person: patterns, to take the case where I do the identifying, like my doing my duty, my conforming to the categorical imperative, my manifesting certain virtues, my looking after my children, and so on. Where consequentialists advocate the promotion of agent-neutral values, and in particular agent-neutral values of a universal cast—they do not involve benefits just to a particular person or place or whatever—nonconsequentialists can be represented as advocating the promotion of agent-relative values: the promotion by every agent of their doing their duty, their conforming to the categorical imperative, their manifesting certain virtues, their looking after their children, and so on.

2. A Theory Of The Right, Not A Theory Of The Good

To say that something is good is to hold that it has a certain value, in particular a certain positive value. To say that something is right is to hold that among certain relevant alternatives—say, among the options in a choice—it is the one to have. And so rightness and goodness may come apart. An alternative that is wrong may yet be an object of great value; it may be wrong simply because another option is an object of even greater value. An alternative that is right, on the other hand, may not be something of great value; it may be right, simply because it is the least bad option among a very poor set of alternatives. A theory of the good, a theory of value, would enable us to determine the values of different entities. A theory of the right would enable us to determine, for any set of alternatives, which alternative or subset of alternatives is the right one.

When I speak of what is good, and of what has value, I have in mind an impersonal or agent-neutral conception of goodness and value. If I value a prospect for the increase of happiness it promises, or even for a particular effect it will have, say on planet Earth, then I value it agent-neutrally. If I value it for the benefits it will have for me or mine, or for the fact that it will keep my hands clean, or for any reason of that self-referential kind, then I value it agent-relatively. The theory of the good, or the theory of the valuable, refers to the theory of what is agent-neutrally valuable.

Does consequentialism present itself as a theory of the good or as a theory of the right, or as something involving commitments in both areas? By the account given, the theory is concerned only with the right, not with the good. It says that the right alternative in any choice is that which promotes the good, without making any commitment on the nature of the good. While it makes the right a function of the good, it says nothing in itself on the matter of what is good.

This aspect of consequentialism is often found surprising, as many people tend to identify consequentialism with utilitarianism. But utilitarianism involves a double commitment. It says that the good should be equated with happiness, whether this is understood in the sense of pleasure or preference satisfaction, and then it adds that the right alternative in any set is that which best promotes such happiness (Sen 1979). Thus when G. E. Moore (1903) rejected utilitarianism, arguing that the good was not reducible to happiness—it was a non-natural property that allowed of no such reduction—he remained a consequentialist about the right. Many contemporary consequentialists have nonutilitarian theories of the good or the valuable. Indeed they often look like nonconsequentialists to the extent that they may think that the good encompasses reflexive patterns, such as those involved in each person keeping their promises, respecting those with whom they deal, or giving their children special attention.

Robert Nozick (1974), himself an outstanding non-consequentialist, supports this view when he distinguishes between a nonconsequentialist theory of rights—a theory of rights, proper—and a consequentialism or utilitarianism of rights. The consequentialist theory of rights would say that it is good that certain rights are enjoyed generally, and it would imply that the right option in any choice is that which promotes the enjoyment of such rights. This right option will itself instantiate the rights-observing pattern in most imaginable cases but it will not do so in those exceptional circumstances where the best way to promote the pattern is not to instantiate it oneself: where the best way to promote rights-observance is to breach that observance in one’s own case.

3. Consequentialism, Global, And Local

Consistently with being a theory of the right, consequentialism can be thought of as having a smaller or a larger range of application to human agents (Pettit and Smith 2000). There are sets of alternative acts that we might perform in different choices, sets of alternative decision procedures that we might follow in choosing acts, sets of alternative motives out of which we might be led to act, sets of alternative rules that we might comply with in acting, and so on. Is consequentialism a local doctrine that just tells us what the best act is in any choice, for example—or the best decision procedure, or motive, or rule, or whatever— and that then says that the best alternatives in other sets are to be defined in a derived way? If acts are privileged, the best decision procedure might be that which produces the best acts, the best rule that which is consistent with the choice of the best acts, and so on through other categories. Or should consequentialism be taken to apply globally, telling us that as the best act is that which produces the best consequences among the alternatives on offer, so the same lesson holds for items in the other sets of alternatives?

Most consequentialist positions in the literature tend to be local in character. Act-consequentialism, as it is called, tends to say that the best act is the act with the best consequences, and that the best factor in any other set of alternatives involving an agent is to be defined in some way—a number of ways are possible—by reference to how it serves the choice of best acts. Rule consequentialism gives the priority to rules in a parallel way, and motive consequentialism gives the priority to motives.

The most natural position, however, would seem to be global consequentialism (Parfit 1984). It would say that no matter what the set of alternatives under consideration, the one to be preferred is that which does best by the consequences. The same lesson will apply, of course, to that set of alternatives whose members are different sets of act–procedure–motive– rule combinations; the right combination will be that which does best by the consequences overall. The act or procedure or motive or rule selected for any context under the best combination may not be the best possible one relative to the apparent alternatives in that context. But it will be the best possible one that is available consistently with the best possible combination overall.

4. The Role Of Consequentialism

There is a long tradition among the opponents of consequentialist doctrines, in particular the opponents of utilitarianism, of suggesting that consequentialists are committed to holding that every choice should be made in a highly calculative, actuarial mode. F. H. Bradley made the point in the last century, writing about the utilitarian approach: ‘So far as my lights go, this is to make possible, to justify, and even to encourage, an incessant practical casuistry; and that, it need scarcely be added, is the death of morality’ (Bradley 1876, p. 107). Consequentialists have almost always resisted this charge. Thus, Henry Sidgwick in the last century and J. J. C. Smart in this have argued forcibly that utilitarianism does not require that agents all make their decisions by explicit reference to how the options will do by the promotion of happiness (Smart and Williams 1973). The point they have wanted to make was nicely summed up early in the nineteenth century by the jurisprude, John Austin, in defending the utilitarian thinker:

Though he approves of love because it accords with his principle, he is far from maintaining that the general good ought to be the motive of the lover. It was never contended or conceived by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the lover should kiss his mistress with an eye to a common weal (Austin 1954, p. 108).

As recent consequentialists hve almost all taken the view that consequentialism is a theory of the right, not a theory of the good, so they have nearly unanimously argued that it is a theory for assessing the right alternative for an agent or an agency to have adopted, not necessarily a useful theory to be applied in choosing from among alternatives. The point is usually made with respect to acts but it can also be extended to alternatives in other categories. The claim is that making one’s decision by reference to which option has the best consequences may be a way of making one’s decision that does not itself have the best consequences. Suppose one is concerned with one’s own pleasure, for example. It is notorious that agents who make their decisions by reference to which option will promote the most pleasure may actually enjoy less pleasure than those who make their decisions in the more spontaneous fashion, say by reference to certain rules of thumb (Railton 1984, Pettit and Brennan 1986).

This aspect of consequentialism has been described as ‘the paradox of teleology’ (Scanlon 1998, p. 383, n. 15). It has important implications and these need to be appreciated, if the appeal of consequentialism is to be understood. It means that the consequentialist can look with approval on agents whose mode of decision making in everyday life involves a consideration of consequences only in periodic reviews of their performance or in times of crisis. These agents may be routinely available to their family and friends; they may be reliable truth tellers and promise keepers; and they may be dependably respectful of the claims of others upon them. The consequentialist will approve of such people to the extent that they are more likely to promote the good—whatever view of the good is adopted—than actuarial, calculative types.

5. The Positive Case For Consequentialism

Why be a consequentialist? Surprisingly, there has been very little discussion of this question in the literature. Consequentialists tend to assume that if one is to be serious about the enterprise of moral assessment, then there is no alternative to looking at the consequences—the consequences, neutrally, or impersonally characterized—of the choices assessed. How could it be rational, they ask, to neglect any such consequences? They assume that if nonconsequentialists think otherwise, that is because of an unquestioning commitment to a theological or a commonsense viewpoint. A theological viewpoint might suggest that human agents ought to fulfill prescribed obligations and let God look after the consequences. And a commonsense viewpoint might support the attitude that the important thing in moral decision making is to look after one’s own moral standing, to keep one’s own hands clean, and not to worry, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, about any bad consequences that may follow on this.

There is also a second reason why consequentialists may not have concerned themselves much with pro-viding a defense of their position. Consequentialists are a mixed bunch, as we saw, insofar as they differ widely among themselves on the question of which substantive sorts of consequences—which valuable patterns—are the ones by reference to which choices ought to be assessed. For example, they divide into utilitarians and nonutilitarians, depending on whether or not they accept the view that it is only consequences that bear on the utility of sentient beings which matter: only consequences that affect the happiness or preference satisfaction of such beings. Being a mixed bunch, consequentialists tend each to be concerned more with arguing for their particular view of what consequences count than with arguing for the shared consequentialist credo that it is indeed consequences that matter and not the sort of thing on which deontologists and other nonconsequentialists focus.

My own belief is that those who are attracted to consequentialism are moved by a different view of justification from those who are attracted to the different forms of nonconsequentialism (Baron et al. 1997). According to consequentialism, people will be able to think of their choices as justifiable to one another only insofar as they think that there are agent-neutral values that others ought to accept and that serve to justify those choices. According to nonconsequentialist positions, people will be able to think of their choices as justifiable under a weaker condition: if they think that there are agent-relative values such that others can be made to understand why they should be moved by those values—others are moved by corresponding values in their own case—and the values justify their choices. Thus consequentialists think that justification must ultimately be based on potentially shared or identical concerns: say, with overall happiness or peace or good relations between people. But nonconsequentialists think that it can be based, even at the most ultimate level, on concerns that are isomorphic rather than identical across people: say, on the individuals’ concern that they should not break their promises, whatever the impact on promise keeping more generally, or that they should further the welfare of their children, whatever the repercussions for overall child care.

6. The Negative Case For Consequentialism

But if consequentialists have not done much in the way of arguing for their position, what have been the issues debated between them and opponents (Scheffler 1988)? These have mainly had to do with how far consequentialism can support firm commonsense intuitions about what is morally right. Opponents typically object to consequentialism on the grounds that in one way or another it would undermine otherwise compelling moral attitudes. Rather than providing positive reason for adopting their position, consequentialists have often been content to try to deal with those objections or to try to argue that while the points made are valid, they are not as important as deontologists make them seem.

There are three sorts of objection, in particular, that consequentialists have had to confront in this ex- change. First, that their doctrine would make many intuitively wrong choices right, many intuitively right choices wrong; second, that even where it represents many intuitively right choices as right it would provide intuitively the wrong reasons for thinking them right; and third, that it would represent as obligatory various right choices that are supererogatory, that is intuitively beyond the call of duty (Scheffler 1982, Kagan 1989). Consequentialists have often argued in this exchange that our intuitions on relevant matters need to be revised but the more general line has been to maintain that on reflection consequentialism proves less counterintuitive than its opponents maintain.

7. The Collective Face Of Consequentialism

Suppose we had a society of utilitarians, each of whom acted in a way that utilitarians would approve. Is it possible that the collective result of their so acting might be worse than the collective result of actions that did not individually earn utilitarian approval? Is it possible, in particular, that the collective result might be worse in utilitarian terms: that it might actually lead to less human happiness or preference satisfaction than certain alternatives? Is it possible that, however satisfactory as a theory of rightness for individual agents, it is not in this sense a collectively satisfactory theory (Hodgson 1967)?

Does it matter that a theory designed for individuals is collectively self-defeating Does it matter that agents who try to do what is best by the theory, or succeed in doing what is best by the theory, generate a collective result that is worse in their own terms than it might have been (Parfit 1984)? Some are happy to say that a theory can be self-defeating in this way and yet remain a compelling theory for individuals. Others will think that this is a matter of the first importance for the assessment of a theory.

Some may be willing to concede that consequentialism can be collectively self-defeating but most deny this, on variety of grounds (Lewis 1972, Singer 1972). One well-known line is that where collective self-defeat appears to threaten, it usually transpires that one of the options before the individuals is not being taken into account: say, the option of exploring possibilities of cooperation with others, rather than acting unilaterally, or the option of seeking further information on the prospects facing the agent (Regan 1980).

The prisoner’s dilemma is often taken to show that what is individually rational may not be collectively rational: each of two prisoners confesses to a crime because, whatever the other does, confessing promises a better result than refusing to confess; yet each would be better off if both refused to confess than they are by both confessing. It is worth noting that where agents have distinct ends, as they will have under nonconsequentialism, then a prisoner’s dilemma is a constant threat. The distinct ends that agents have may consist in individually wanting to do their own duty, individually wanting to instantiate the categorical imperative in their own behavior, individually wanting to do the best by their own children, and so on. Such ends are potentially competitive and so it is a permanent possibility that by each pursuing their own ends as best they can, they will secure a result under which neither does as well as they might have done in their own terms. By each trying to do the best they can by their own children, for example, they may each do less well than if they pooled their resources and did their best for children as such. Whatever problems are raised for consequentialism on the collective front, it is better protected in this respect against prisoner’s dilemmas, for it assigns to each agent the same end of promoting the best consequences (Parfit 1984).

8. Some In-House Issues

There are a number of more or less in-house questions that are debated among consequentialists. One bears on how we should identify the alternatives to be evaluated in any decision. Should an agent do A or B, we ask. A, we answer, because its consequences do better on the relevant theory of the good. But what if there is some other option, C, which the agent might have chosen instead and which would have itself been better than A? This sort of example alerts us to the fact that in the consequentialist assessment of any choice, we have to be clear about what are the relevant alternatives to bring into consideration.

The question about alternatives has not received as much attention as it deserves in the literature, but it is undoubtedly of great importance (Bergstrom 1966, Jackson and Pargetter 1986). According to one view, we should assess any action against the alternative (or disjunction of alternatives) that the agent would have taken, had the action not been performed. According to another we should assess it against the alternatives that the agent could have performed instead: against the alternatives that were, in a relevant sense, within the power of the agent. From a third-person point of view the first approach would seem to be the most pertinent, although from a first-person point of view things are not so clear.

A second in-house question has been more widely debated in consequentialist circles. This is the issue as to whether in looking at the decision an agent or agency ought to have made, we consider the actual consequences of the option chosen and the con-sequences that would have followed on alternatives; or whether, rather, we look at the expected consequences at the time of choice (Lewis 1969, Jackson 1991). If the answer is that we should look at expected rather than actual consequences, then the question is whether we should look at the subjectively expected con-sequences—in the manner of decision theory—or whether we should look at the consequences that were in some sense objectively expected (Menzies and Oddie 1992). Suppose that a doctor prescribes a drug for a nonfatal skin condition, which has the following features: there is a 10 percent chance that it will kill the patient, an 80 percent chance that it will make no difference, and a 10 percent chance that it will cure the complaint. Imagine that the drug works and the complaint is cured. Does consequentialism take its cue from actual consequences and say that the doctor made the right choice? Or does it look to expected consequences, whether subjectively or objectively expected, and say that the doctor made the wrong choice? That is the issue here.

The third more or less in-house issue is whether consequentialism should hold that the right option is that which does best by relevant consequences—that which is optimific—or whether it is sufficient for an option to be right that it does well enough, as we might say, by the relevant consequences. Some theories of rationality are maximizing theories, requiring rational agents to maximize some function, whereas others are satisficing theories: these require rational agents just to perform satisfactorily by some relevant criterion. The question here is whether consequentialism should not take the softer, satisficing line, rather than the stern, maximizing one (Slote and Pettit 1984).

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