European Religion Research Paper

1. The Religious Boundaries Of Europe

The complexities involved in the concept of Europe are clearly outlined by Davies (1996). In the early modern period, the idea of Europe gradually disentangled itself from the concept of ‘Christendom,’ a process in which the religious factor played a decisive role. As the nations of Europe endured centuries of religious war, they were disinclined to remind themselves of what they supposed to have in common: the notion of Europe provided a more neutral alternative. A longer historical perspective reveals, however, that Christendom had itself been divided long before the early modern period: between an Orthodox East (centered first in Constantinople and then in Moscow) and a Catholic West (centered in Rome), a dispute which came to a head for a mixture of theological and political reasons in the eleventh century.

The central question of Europe’s self-understanding is closely connected to this division: should this or should it not include Russia, an Orthodox, economically backward, and slavophile state? This research paper will include Russia, but will at the same time emphasize the distinctiveness of the Orthodox part of the continent. Such distinctiveness takes the form of a markedly different cultural heritage. The nations associated with Western Christianity have, for example, experienced the Renaissance, the Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and the Romantic revival (and take these pivotal movements for granted). Countries further east have been through an equally formative, but entirely different historical evolution. For them the ebb and flow of Islam has been of greater significance. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the concept of Europe finally gives way to something else as Orthodoxy gives way to Islam, on a line which has fluctuated over centuries and continues, from time to time, to play a crucial and not always peaceful role in the establishment of identities. The 1990s disputes between Russia and Chechnya or between Armenia and Azerbaijan are cases in point.

Given its long-term cultural significance, the boundary between Catholic and/or thodox is of more importance in understanding Europe’s religious life than the much more recent division between communist and noncommunist Europe. With this in mind, it is useful to introduce the terms ‘East’ and ‘central’ Europe when dealing with the former communist countries. East Europe (European Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedonia) belong to the Orthodox tradition, whereas the central European countries (the Baltic states, Poland, the former East Germany. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia) developed within Western Catholicism. It is only in the postwar period that they have been separated from the economic and cultural traditions of the West. The position of Greece is anomalous in this respect; it is the only Orthodox country within the European Union. In a much longer timescale, the contribution of Greek culture to the understanding of what it means to be European in the Western sense can hardly be overestimated.

The border between ‘East’ and ‘central’ Europe is, however, as problematic as any other, for on it are found the Greek Catholic or Uniate churches—those, in other words, which have been received under the jurisdiction of Rome, but which retain their own ritual, practice, and canon law. In the emergent identities of this part of Europe, moreover (notably in the Ukraine and in Belarus), the Uniate churches are of considerable importance. Further south and in a rather different way, Bosnia-Herzogovina is uncomfortably pincered between Orthodox Serbia and Catholic Croatia, a situation rendered all the more complex by the presence of a sizable Muslim population dating from the time of the Ottoman occupation.

So much for the east–west boundaries of Europe. The subsequent divisions of the west into areas or nations which are primarily Catholic or Protestant (or combinations of the two) are inseparable historically from the emergence of the nation state as the dominant form of Europe’s political life. The processes by which such divisions occurred are highly complex, involving economic, social, political, as well as religious issues. Which of these led to the others and how the whole thing was set in motion in the first place is the subject of an ongoing debate among historians, themselves of different persuasions. What remains indisputable, however, is an unprecedented upheaval in the ordering of Christian society in the sixteenth century; an upheaval which included the emergence of separate political entities or nation states, some of which expressed their independence from papal interference in the form of a state church.

Part of the ambiguity regarding the whole historical process lies in the understanding of the term ‘Reformation.’ Does this imply innovation and the breaking of new ground? Or does it involve a return to and rediscovery of primitive excellence? Were those who endorsed the theological changes taking place at this time looking primarily for radical change or for conservative independence? Motives were mixed. The more conservative interpretation, however, was bound to appeal to those political rulers anxious to establish independence from external authority, but with a careful eye on stability within. Both were possible within the Lutheran concept of a ‘godly prince.’ Sometimes the prince had jurisdiction over a whole kingdom or kingdoms. Such was the case in Scandinavia where Lutheranism became embodied in the state churches of Northern Europe. Elsewhere the process was far more local and concerned relatively small patches of land. The German case exemplifies the latter, leading to patterns which are not only extant but influential some 400 years later.

The Reformation took different forms in different places. In addition to Lutheranism, parts of Europe—notably the Swiss, the Dutch, the Scots, some Germans, some Hungarians and Czechs and a small but significant minority of French people—were attracted first by Ulrich Zwingli, but then by Jean Calvin, towards a more rigorous version of Protestantism. Calvinism was both more radical and more restrained: radical in the sense of a new kind of theology based on the doctrines of predestination and redemption, but restrained in terms of its stringent moral codes. The effect of this particular combination on the subsequent economic development of Europe has provided inexhaustible material for an ongoing debate among historians and sociologists alike.

Broadly speaking West Europe divided itself into a Catholic South (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, but including Belgium and Ireland), a Protestant North (Scandinavia and Scotland), with a range of ‘mixed’ countries in between (England and Wales, Northern Ireland, The Netherlands, and Germany). Central Europe exemplifies similar categories, though the geography is rather more complicated. Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia are firmly Catholic; Estonia and Latvia are Lutheran and relate closely to their Scandinavian neighbors (a commonality strongly re-emphasized as the Baltic Republics regained their political independence); Hungary and the Czech Republic, finally, are rather more mixed (primarily Catholic but with significant Protestant minorities). In other words, boundaries gradually emerged all over Europe dividing one nation from another, one region from another, and one kind of Christianity from another. Boundaries, moreover, imply dominance as well as difference. Majorities and minorities were, and still are, created depending on the precise location of the line in question. One of the most arbitrary in recent years has been the line that divides Northern Ireland from the Irish Republic.

2. Patterns Of Religious Life In Europe

The European Values System Study Group (EVSSG) provides a principal source of data for this section (Barker et al. 1992). Using careful sampling techniques, the EVSSG aims at an accurate mapping of social and moral values across Europe. The first study was carried out in 1981, the second in 1990 and a third—unavailable at the time of writing—in 1999. Initially only some countries in West Europe were involved, a coverage which quickly extended to most of Europe and beyond. The following discussion starts with West Europe; East and central Europe will be dealt with subsequently.

There are, broadly speaking, five religious indicators within the EVSSG data: denominational allegiance, reported church attendance, attitudes towards the church, indicators of religious belief, and some measurement of subjective religious disposition. These variables have considerable potential: they can be correlated with one another and with a wide range of sociodemographic data. In this respect the survey shows commendable awareness of the complexity of religious phenomena and the need to bear in mind more than one dimension within a nation’s religious life. What emerges in practice, however, with respect to these multiple indicators is a clustering of two types of variable: on the one hand, those concerned with feelings, experience, and the more numinous religious beliefs; on the other, those which measure religious orthodoxy, ritual participation, and institutional attachment.

It is, moreover, the latter (the more orthodox indicators of religious attachment) which display, most obviously, an undeniable degree of secularization throughout Western Europe. In contrast, the former (the less institutional indicators) demonstrate considerable persistence in some aspects of religious life. Bearing this in mind—it seems more accurate to suggest that West Europeans remain, by and large, unchurched populations rather than simply secular. For a marked falling-off in religious attendance (especially in the Protestant North) has not resulted yet in a parallel abdication of religious belief. In short, many Europeans have ceased to belong to their religious institutions in any meaningful sense, but they have not abandoned, so far, their underlying religious aspirations (Davie 2000).

Two short parentheses are important in this connection. The first may seem obvious, but the situation of believing without belonging (if such it may be called) should not be taken for granted. This widespread, though fluctuating, characteristic within European religion in the late twentieth century must be examined, probed, and questioned. The second point illustrates the need for caution. At the same time it introduces the contrasting situation in parts of East and central Europe where believing without belonging was not the norm. Indeed, prior to 1989, the two variables were (in some places at least) reversed, for the nonbeliever quite consciously used Mass attendance as one way of expressing disapproval of an unpopular regime. The Polish case is the most obvious illustration of this tendency (Michel 1998).

Returning to the West European data and beginning to probe more deeply, there is further evidence of consistency in the shapes or profiles of religiosity which have been obtained across a wide variety of European countries. Whatever the overall level of belief in any given country, for example, the following variables—belief in God, in a soul, in heaven, in life after death, in the devil, in hell and in sin—almost always come out in the same order. Correlations between religious indices and socioeconomic variables confirm the existence of socioreligious patterning across national boundaries. The correlation with age is particularly striking, and raises the future shape of European religion. Indeed, it prompts the most searching question of the study: is it the case that West Europe is experiencing a permanent generational shift with respect to religious behavior, rather than a manifestation of the normal life-cycle? The EVSSG findings seem to indicate that this might be so. Data from the 1990 restudy reinforce this point.

So much for the similarities across West Europe. What about the differences? The first and most obvious of these lies between the notably more religious, and Catholic, countries of Southern Europe and the less religious countries of the Protestant North. This variation holds across almost every indicator; indeed, they are inter-related. Levels of practice, for example, are markedly higher in Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Ireland (closer in its religious life to continental Europe than to Britain) than they are elsewhere. Not surprisingly, one effect of regular Mass attendance is a corresponding strength in the traditional orthodoxies through most of Catholic Europe.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, and at this point it is necessary to point to the limitations in the EVSSG data. There is no way of telling from the data why a particular country should be similar to or different from its neighbors. France, for example, displays a different profile from the other Catholic countries (with markedly lower levels of practice), a contrast that cannot be explained without reference to the specificities of French history. Other exceptions to a European pattern, or patterns, should be looked at in a similar light; notably, the countries which do not conform to the believing without belonging framework. Conspicuous here are the two Irelands in both of which practice as well as belief remains unusually high. Within central Europe, the Polish case reflects a similar pattern. As ever, there are historico-political reasons for these exceptions.

A crucial point concludes this section. It concerns the patterns of practice and belief in East and central Europe and their possible future(s). In making this assessment, it is important once again to remember the distinctiveness of Orthodoxy, a form of belief which contains within itself a greater degree of diversity than is possible in the Western churches (it is more inclusive). It is also different in its relationship to political power (see below). The profiles of religion in East (and indeed central) Europe are, moreover, not only varied but volatile—in some places the indices rise sharply after 1989, in others less so. With this in mind it is probably too soon to answer the key question. Will Eastern Europe follow the West into a state of relative religious indifference (increasingly unusual in the modern world) or will this part of Europe emerge a distinct alternative, following its own religious trajectory? Only time will tell.

3. Church–State Relationships

A broad brush profile of religion in West Europe provides the background for a more detailed discussion of church and state relationships; these in turn constitute the parameters within which religious life on a national level takes place. It is helpful to set a discussion of church–state relationships within the following framework, taken from Martin’s seminal work on the evolution of secularization in the Western world (Martin 1978). Following Martin, Europe is a unity by virtue of having possessed one Caesar and one God (the legacy of the Judaeo-Christian tradition); it is a diversity by the existence of nations. The patterns of European religion derive from the ongoing tensions and partnerships between religion and the search for national integrity and identity. These tensions and partnerships have resulted in a bewildering variety of church–state relationships within the continent as a whole.

In Western Europe, such relationships range from the state churches of Northern Europe, through the pillarized cultures in The Netherlands and Belgium, to the considerable diversity contained within the United Kingdom and Ireland (including a Calvinist national church in Scotland, an Anglican establishment in England, assorted nonconformity in Wales, and a technically secular but heavily Catholic state in Ireland). Germany is a biconfessional state in which both the Lutheran and Catholic churches remain important public bodies. Latin Europe includes the privileged Catholic churches of Italy, Spain, and Portugal and the rather different situation in France (the only European nation, for example, with a rigorously secular school system in addition to the state itself). In this part of Europe (and especially in France), anticlericalism has a historically important role—itself diminishing as the Catholic hegemony declines.

In East and central Europe, it is necessary to start with the autocephalous churches of Orthodox Europe, closely aligned with political power over centuries (of which Russia is the prime example). In central Europe there are examples (notably Poland) of the Catholic Church becoming the effective carrier of an alternative memory in the communist period; elsewhere—in Hungaria and Czechoslovakia—the churches were more compromised. The Lutheran churches (in, for example, Estonia or the former East Germany) all but collapsed altogether—notwithstanding the outstanding courage of individual believers. In all these cases, the postcommunist period brings a new set of challenges in terms of church–state relationships and the associated privileges.

Indeed, in a whole variety of ways, the Europe that is emerging as the twenty-first century dawns is a rapidly changing place. From a religious point of view, one of the most significant evolutions is undoubtedly the increasing representation of faiths other than Christian. Analytical concepts must evolve accordingly. European religion is giving way to the ‘religions of Europe’; a continent which now houses a significant representation of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists in addition to the Jewish communities which have played such a crucial role in Europe’s recent history. Martin’s tension between unity and diversity remains paramount, though in forms that are peculiar to late modern rather than early modern European society.

A final section of the population should be mentioned in conclusion: the sizable minority of Europeans who declare that they have no religion and are not affiliated to any religious institution. A striking but overlooked factor within this significant minority is its internal diversity. Not only does it vary from the cautiously agnostic to the aggressively atheist, it is unevenly present in different European nations and in different socioeconomic groups. From a sociological point of view, the lack of material concerning this significant minority is striking.

Bibliography:

1. Barker D, Halman L, Vloet A 1992 The European Values Study 1981–1990: Summary Report. Gordon Cook Foundation, Aberdeen, UK
2. Davie G 2000 Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
3. Davies N 1996 Europe: A History. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK
4. Martin D 1978 A General Theory of Secularization. Blackwell, Oxford, UK
5. Michel P 1998 East Europe. In: Wuthnow R (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Politics and Religion. Routledge, London