The Cold War Research Paper

1. The Concept And Its Salience

The persistent central features of the Cold War are the global contest between the US and the USSR, the dependence of the allies on the security guarantee of their respective superpower, and bipolarity. The latter was reinforced in the core area, the arms race, due to the widening gap between the extensive and highly diversified weapons systems of the superpowers and the arsenals of Britain, France, and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRCh), the other three established nuclear powers. This explains that American and Russian writings hold to Cold War as a concept fitting the entire epoch. It allows for distinguishing between moments of imminent war—Cuba, October 1962, and Yom Kippur war, October 1973—times of high tensions and war outside Europe—Korea, 1950–53; Vietnam, 1964–75; Afghanistan, 1979–88—long intervals of detente, and even moments of concerted crisis management (June 1967 Near East war) or collaboration (during the Laos crisis and Vietnam war in the 1960s and ending wars in Africa in the late 1980s).

This version pays less attention to the fact that throughout the four decades not all parties to the Cold War were involved on the same issue-at-stake and at the same time. France joined Britain (UK) and the US in 1948 in founding the West German state as the Western allies’ response to Stalin’s anchoring of Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia firmly into the Soviet security-zone, and maintained staunch opposition to proposals for a neutralized, but nationally rearmed united Germany (Hitchcock 1998). Since the mid-1960s, France became the spokesman for a Europe less dependent on the US and discussing terms of settlement with ‘Russia.’ The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) converted Cold War into cold peace with the ratification of Ostund Deutschlandertrage (1970–3). Both governments co-operated in defending detente in and for Europe; by implication, this aspiration for a European peace-zone rejected the American concept of the indivisibility of the global contest between East and West. The PRCh, the only principal ally the USSR ever had (1950–58 9), made its peace with the US in 1972 on Pejing’s term of ‘One China.’ While the PRCh had provoked the US during the 1950s to continuous nuclear sabre-rattling, it turned its antihegemonic posture throughout the 1970s and 1980s against the USSR.

1.1 The Components Of The Term

The definition refers to four aspects of the conflict: (a) the ideological antagonism between the Western concept of freedom of choice for the people of the domestic regime and external alignments of their state and the Soviet-imposed monopoly of the ‘workers’ and land-labor party and subjugation to the community of socialist states; (b) the geostrategic struggle for bases of power-projection; (c) the domestic political contest, but almost exclusively within Western countries, about commitments to the military alliance or equidistance to both of the superpowers; (d) the dispute about where to draw the line between permissible and noncompatible elements in the policy mix of market-oriented and government-controlled economies. Of these four components, the last became least important for refueling the confrontation; the convergence of the mixed economies rather promoted the idea that Osthandel, credit facilities, and technology transfer might enhance not only ‘liberalization’ in the East European economies, but also generate trans-formation of the political system.

1.2 The Ideological Antagonism

The ideological antagonism was the first impulse for confrontation, but it was also subject to changing threat perceptions and shifts of emphasis in the balance between confrontation and detente in the overall relationship. The wider notion of East–West Conflict posits the Cold War as a distinctive period into the ideological struggle, originated in 1917–18, between the Wilsonian Impulse and Lenin’s urge for peoples’ democracy as the basis for securing peace (Link 1980). From this perspective, Stalin and Truman likewise took the lead in splitting the world along ‘alternative ways of life.’ Western leaders argued that the West had to learn its lessons from the vain hope to appease an expansionist regime. ‘No more Munichs’ informed the confrontation stance of containment as the West’s answer to the external threat. The concomitant stance at the home-front is based on the thesis that authoritarian regimes abuse state-power against large parts of their own population; therefore Communists must not be given a chance to occupy crucial positions of government such as Interior, Public Transport, or Justice.

Conversely, Communist ideology maintained that capitalism on the one hand inspires the state to prosecute the working-class and thus breeds fascism, and on the other hand is inherently expansionist and therefore knows no boundary to its domination. The belief, however, that capitalist nations are bound to fight for defeating rivals, made Stalin expect that Britain would resist the US’ aspiration to become heir to the British Empire. The new feature of the post-World War II international system is that the US and the UK were competitive partners in founding the International Organizations destined to develop and monitor rules of conduct for international trade, currency exchange, and development aid (Gardner 1969). The UK and France, but also Italy, expected the up-to-then reluctant US government to come to the rescue and infuse capital into the European economics as the only strategy which could render support to the parties willing to exclude Communists from governments (Lundestad 1986). The formation of Western-oriented governing coalitions ensured that the European allies, as well as Japan, cooperated with the US in the evolution of the International Economy, to which the USSR and the PRCh were not negotiating parties after the outbreak of the Cold War. Most allies did not comply, however, with the American demand to restrict ‘trading with the communist enemy,’ except in conspicious moments of Soviet war activities.

The ideological component became a wasted asset after its overexploitation during the first phase (1947– 53). Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin’s death toll in February 1956 and the NATO allies’ perception that the Kremlin was unlikely to launch a general war on European territory (1956 7) put a break on the momentum of ideology as a driving force in the East–West conflict. But it was on the Kremlin to end the system conflict. In 1987 Gorbachev rescinded the Breshnev doctrine and made it known that hardliners in Eastern European governments should not reckon with Moscow calling on the Red Army to back up unpopular communist regimes (Adomeit 1998).

1.3 The Long Duration Of The Cold War

For explaining the longevity of the Cold War, the account therefore has to focus on the other two factors: the structures which emerged with the consolidation and reaffirmation of the divisions of Europe and of Germany, and the pecularities of the military– geostrategic balance between the two sides.

1.3.1 The Divisions Of Europe And Germany. The key feature is the hinge between the two divisions. The stark contrast between Stalin’s refusal to con-sider concessions on Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania in exchange for American economic assistance and his demand to have a say on questions concerning primarily intra-West relations, e.g., the status of the Ruhr area or of Norway, provoked the US and the UK to tie their zones firmly to Western institutions (Deighton 1990). The implementation of this basic strategy was, however, complicated by clashes of interest between the US, France, and Britain. These tensions prevented them from advancing as far as the USSR had with incorporating its German state, the GDR, into the Soviet Empire. Hence they could not, as wanted, negotiate from a position of strength, but expected to be asked to give away on what ‘the West’ did not yet have, whereas the USSR would persist in its refusal to put its reign over Eastern Europe on the agenda. The stalemate was compounded, when the reimposition of the Ulbricht regime in 1953 revealed that the Kremlin considered the GDR as its west-side lever for control over Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The structural impediment to a negotiated settlement disappeared when Moscow tacitly bowed to Germany’s entry into NATO (1955) and when the ‘West’ acknowledged the fact that the USSR was strong enough to prevail in Eastern Europe (1956). German Ostpolitik put the final stamp to the ‘normativity of the facts.’ On this platform, the so-called Helsinki process, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), lingered on through-out the 1973–89 period. Neither side was ready to proceed towards peace-making.

The Cold War might have ended earlier if Gorbachev’s predecessors had responded to the US view that Germany’s double-bind into a US-centered NATO and European integrated structures would prevent Germany from positing a threat to the security of the USSR (Schmidt 1993–5). Instead, Moscow’s attempts to push the divisiveness of nuclear diplomacy within NATO rather than wait for the outcome of such conflicts provoked the ‘Atlanticists’ to close ranks and reiterate the standard thesis that the West could prevent the USSR from winning the Cold War if its members resisted the temptation to court Moscow and make separate deals with the USSR. The Soviet leadership’s ‘stupidity’ is said to have saved the US or NATO to get rearmament projects—such as NSC-68 or the 1979 dual-track decision—through.

1.3.2 The Peculiarities Of The Military–Geostrategic Balance. The key feature is the fundamental asymmetry between the nature of America’s and Russia’s predominance in their respective sphere. This asymmetry is reinforced by the imbalance of military forces between NATO-Europe and the USSR’s forward deployed forces (Kugler 1993).

The advantage of the US in its global contest with the USSR was that all other principal powers, including Germany and Japan, were allied to the US. This helped in the build-up of the international economy, but not necessarily in defense. Consequently, US diplomacy was absorbed as much in intra-West crisis management as in the context of East–West relations. The allies wanted to be assured that there were no long-term security risks involved for them in America’s option for sponsoring the resurgence of the enemies and occupiers of World War II as strongholds of the West. Having imposed limits on Germany’s and Japan’s military status, the US could not reckon with a defense contribution for some years to come; both were prohibited to engage in ‘out-of-area’ defense activities (Schmidt and Doran 1996).

By contrast, the USSR gained a formidable ally in the PRCh, who was keen to test the credibility of the American commitment to South Korea and Taiwan. Although the USSR copied the West’s community building by setting up COMECON (1949) and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 1955, the Kremlin relied for exerting influence de facto on the penetration of the bloc partners’ central agencies: the State Party, Secret Service, and top military echelon. The USSR also made sure through logistic measures that the Soviet military could operate from its allies’ territory inde-pendently, and if need be without the consent of the incumbent governments (Wolfe 1970).

The military imbalance between NATO-Europe and the USSR existed throughout 1947 until the mid- 1980s. The US found no takers—except the FRG from 1961 onwards—for its concept of balanced collective forces in the sense that the US were the sole provider of strategic forces, that is, weaponry projected to hitting targets located in the USSR, whereas the allies would recruit the ground forces and tactical air forces required for the defense of the region against infiltration or surprise attacks. Britain and France preferred to duplicate the US strategic role, albeit on a much minor scale, and took the relaxation of tensions in Europe and their entanglement in the legacies of their imperial rule as the rationale for reducing their force assignments to NATO.

2. The Intersection Of Economic And Strategic Decisions: The European Structure

The failure of the ‘Big Four’ to cooperate on a German Peace Treaty is identified as a crucial turning point towards the Cold War (Leffler 1992). Stalin did not want to give the impression that the US, thanks to the atomic bomb and its economic wealth, could impose its will on the USSR; he therefore pressed his claims on Iran, Turkey, during the Peace Conferences with Germany’s war-time allies and in the Allied Control Council. This in turn was taken in Washington as a signal that hope of Russian cooperation must be abandoned. Truman and Byrnes had been reluctant to confront the USSR when the Cold War started over the fate of Eastern European nations (1944–7). Now, in view of the havoc the 1946–7 crisis wreaked on the economies of Britain and France, the US government conceived that Western Europe could not save itself (Hogan 1992).

From there on, the ‘West’ displayed a dynamic of its own. The first act was that the economic recovery of Europe was said to require the inclusion of (West) Germany; the price for getting France to change its German policy was the assurance that the US and the UK would back up the French quest for security against a resurgent Germany. The second act followed: Britain and France pleaded with Washington that the Marshall Plan initiative would not suffice to attain stability without an American security guarantee. Against the background of the Berlin blockade, Truman in October 1948 ordered that the US provide the major counterbalance to the ‘ever-present threat of the Soviet military power.’ In September 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) had already resolved that the defense of Western Europe should be as far to the east (of West Germany) as possible. Because this was beyond the means available to the BTO and not yet compatible with the military strategy of American and British defense planning, it was only a question of developments in the Cold War that the third issue be placed on the agenda: German re-armament. The logic behind the build-up of conventional forces sounded compelling: why do the old allies expect the US to provide ground and air forces and the Supreme Allied Commander to NATO’s integrated forces with a view to realize the concept of forward defense when they deny the indispensibility of a sensible German defense contribution, on whose territory the French in particular wanted to stop the enemy’s offensive? At that time, however, all the US military could offer was an air offensive to deter the USSR; they did not yet want to rely on ‘the bomb’ (Ross), and the USSR had acquired by then (Fall 1949) an atomic capability.

The outbreak of the Korean War generated the fear of a similar war-by-proxy in divided Germany. The US did not only reverse its stance on what countries were of absolute importance to US security by now declaring Korea the test case of what became the domino syndrome, that no US ally should fall prey to a Communist invader, but also designated the National Security Paper NSC-68 as the platform for a massive conventional rearmament of the US, adequate force deployment abroad and military aid to upgrade the defense capabilities of its European and Asian allies (May 1993).

The issue of German rearmament was divisive, but the US compromised with France on the understanding that German forces be integrated into a European Defense Community (EDC), whereas the EDC would delegate strategic planning and fixing force requirements to NATO. The project became the victim of French domestic politics; the US and the UK had to comply with the French request that no German soldier be officially recruited until France had ratified the EDC and German Contractual Agreements. The demise of the EDC meant that Washington had to forego the hope that US force deployment would be a temporary stop-gap until the European allies, and especially the FRG, were able to do more towards meeting NATO’s minimum force requirements.

The parallel staged fourth act (1952–4) produced the definitive structure of the Cold War in Europe: the NATO, to which the FRG was finally admitted, had made itself dependent on the credibility of the US (and UK) strategic deterrent. This provoked the issue how the USSR would react to the logic that NATO’s new member would have to be equipped with the same weaponry as the allied forces into which the German divisions were to be incorporated. Chancellor Adenauer made it clear that the FRG did not want to provoke Moscow unnecessarily by dislocating medium-range ballistic missiles on German soil, whose later replacements might be able to hit targets in Russia, but he and his successors insisted on having at least a crucial German vote in all decisions on the use of nonstrategic weapons in NATO’s custody in case deterrence to all types of war failed (Heuser 1998, Trachtenberg 1999).

This final act of incorporating the two German states into alliances dominated by the nuclear-strategic superpowers had a far-reaching effect: plastering the ‘front-line’ states with short-range atomic weapons was the best insurance premium that the Germans would not launch war from their soil (Ullman 1991). As long as the US and USSR stationed troops there and resolved to maintain control over the warheads, the danger of accidental war could be excluded. The parallel to the military factor written into the strategic landscape is the interest of the Western nuclear powers in confirming the status quo and discuss on that territorial basis the questions of putting ceilings on rearmament. Separately, the two German states re-launched their rivalry and demanded (1955–73) allies and Third World countries alike to subscribe to the Alleinvertretungsanspruch of the Western democratic or peoples’ democratic German republic.

3. The History Of The Concept, Major Developments, And Empirical Results

The invention of the term is accredited to Walter Lippmann who took issue with G. F. Kennan’s ‘X’-article ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct.’ Kennan’s long telegram of February 22, 1946 molded the agenda of America’s containment policy. His arguments were selectively used by top officials in Washington to assert that the ‘Soviets’ will develop all means and methods ranging from threat of military aggression via propaganda warfare to clandestine activities to a degree without precedent in history. Therefore, the US had to strengthen its executive branch, introduce a national security policy, establish a professional intelligence agency, and develop an unassailable military–industrial base (Leffler 1992, Paterson 1979).

The opposite Communist view emphasizes three aspects: the economic aggressiveness of the long-standing hegemonic US project to attain a ‘one-world market’ and abuse of the open-door doctrine for penetrating other nations’ economy; the manipulation of anti-communism as a club to suppress claims for social justice and equality of rights within the American and other Western capitalist systems; and America’s acquisition of bases bordering on the USSR for purposes of encirclement and monitoring inside the USSR. In geostrategic terms the US became a direct neighbor of the USSR, whereas the USSR required long-distance bombers (it introduced such jets by 1955) and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) to show the US its vulnerability. The strong engagement of the US in the post-1990 contests about Caucasian and Middle East oil and gas concessions and pipeline routes indicates that the US–USSR rivalry did not end with the Cold War.

The ‘Revisionists’ (LaFeber 1991, Paterson 1979) disclaim that Stalin pursued an offensive strategy aiming at extending Soviet rule; they discern rather the US’ responsibility for causing the Cold War. The postrevisionist approach accounts for the Soviet aspect of the fundamental change in the Cold War since about 1954–5, and explains the US interest in detente, i.e., the coinciding interest in Long Peace (Gaddis 1987). Moscow settled the Austrian question, tolerated the FRG’s entry into NATO, and opted for reconciliation with Tito, the only East European leader who had got away with breaking ranks with Stalin. The cumulation point was the declaration of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. The Western allies’ match was tacit satisfaction with consolidating the status quo after they had absorbed the FRG. Stability in Europe turned the UK’s, US’s, and France’s attention to the Third World. In reaction to Communist China’s revolutionary foreign policy, the Soviet leadership in 1960 declared wars of liberation from colonial rule legitimate and thus distinguished peaceful co-existence in the developed world from just wars in the ‘southern’ part of the globe. In this sense, the East–West conflict was exported to the Third World.

The US resolved on noninterference in the internal affairs of the Soviet bloc and relaxation of tensions. The US was somewhat dependent on Russia’s resistance to become the air and nuclear strategic arm of Pejing’s violent anti-American activities in the Far East. The emerging picture is that the US, in parallel with the Berlin and Cuba crises (1958–62), wanted to concert the superpowers’ activities in China’s ‘hinterland’ (former ‘Indochina’) in the sense that both exert pressure on the parties to a conflict amenable to their respective influence and through such agreement attain the neutralization of the conflict area, including the installment of all-party or power-sharing coalition governments, however unstable (Nelson 1995).

3.1 European Perspectives On The Cold War

A different strand in the history of the concept is the perception of the impact of the other Western powers, especially Britain and France, on how the struggle was waged (Greenwood 2000, Bozo 1991). The contribution is twofold: (a) the Cold War is viewed as a new stage in great power rivalry. These studies stress the Europeans’ interest in devoting resources to restoring or preserving their assets and commitments overseas (Kent 1993, Bossuat 1992). (b) The second contribution takes a different direction: it challenges the assumption that Western Europe by 1947–8 was in such a critical state that the leading nations had to ‘invite’ the US to reconstruct and protect Western Europe. Examining the economic potential of the European nations and how their governments used the financial means provided under the Marshall Plan, Milward (1984) presents the thesis of the rescue of the nation-state. His complex argument also draws on the observation that at that time the West did not reckon with an immediate Soviet threat. The implication is that an unwarranted haste was imposed on a process which in any case depended on what the European countries did to and for another, formally, US assistance was tied to the Uniting of (Western) Europe and to parallel bilateral agreements between the US and the recipient country.

3.2 Competitive Cooperation Between The Superpowers

By the end of the 1960s, researchers discerned the convergence of five developments which demonstrated the continuing relevance of the ‘competitive cooperation’ between the superpowers for the changing structures of the Cold War: (a) Soviet policy shifted towards accepting the US’s and Canada’s presence in Germany; (b) German Ostpolitik presumed the engagement of the US in NATO; (c) de Gaulle realized in the context of the Prague 1968 crisis that Breshnev’s Russia was no party to his vision that dissolving Cold War structures in the West, i.e., France’s disengagement from NATO’s military organization, might induce ‘Russia’ to allow for more evolution of national communist and then independent states in Eastern Europe; (d) the US embroilment in the Vietnam war caused a change in the intellectual climate; the abuse of the USSR being the cause of every evil became obsolete; instead the US became the villain in the piece; (e) new developments in arms technology—e.g., high-precision weaponry as a substitute for atomic weapons; MIRV-technique; antiballistic missiles— were beyond Britain’s and France’s capability to follow on; this reinforced NATO Europe’s self-elected dependency on the US with respect to security and defense (Hanrieder 1989).

Renewed US pressures on its allies to extend their conventional military capabilities and share the bur-dens for the ‘Defense of the West’ more evenly, the re-escalation of the strategic arms race between the superpowers under the aegis of limitation treaties, and the evidence presented by German Ostpolitik that negotiations with Russia generate tolerable results, combined to raise the basic questions: what are the costs of the ongoing Cold War? on what terms could the conflict be ended and converted into politico-economic competition? (Garthoff 1985).

3.3 From The Second Cold War To The End Of The Cold War

The USSR, after getting Germany’s pledge to observe the invulnerability of the territorial status quo in Europe, revived the global contest with the US, which was immersed in domestic turbulences and disputes with all its allies about oil and the dollar. The Kremlin demonstrated its self-confidence by expanding Soviet naval forces and establishing bases, however short-lived, stretching from Vietnam via Mozambique, Somalia, and Angola to Central America. In contrast to the 1950–3 period, the US catchword ‘arch of crises’ did not resonate well with its allies. The latter wanted to develop detente, notwithstanding the fear, expressed by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977, that the Soviets’ new equipment (Backfire bombers; SS-20) made NATO Europe hostage to the Kremlin’s whip of the will. This raised the question whether the USSR was about to win the Cold War or whether the Kremlin was overstretching the country’s resources and would thus expose the USSR sooner rather than later to the need for radical changes in her system. The wishful thinking that the USSR would fall victim to its inability of continuous adaptation worked out after three decades of aspiring military strategic and political parity with the US. Some authors argue that Reagan’s defence build-up deliberately forced the Soviet leadership to acknowledge the failure of its domestic system and hence the USSR’s inability to persist in the contest and sustain bipolarity. (Adomeit 1998, Gaddis 1987, Wells’ article in Hogan 1992). The way the global contest ended invited Americans to believe that they had won the Cold War.

4. Methodological Problems

The immersion of the concept Cold War in the perpetual clash of interests between East and West and within each ‘bloc’ subjects the interpretator on the one hand to the political climate of his own times, and may thus reload or de-emphasize the contentions of the past; on the other hand, access to newly available records reveals new insights into previous phases of the Cold War and thus demands rethinking the past but in a different way. Getting the balance right between these two operations is difficult when knowledge about one party to the conflict is the result of generations of research, whereas the more recent presentations of findings from Soviet, GRD, Czech, or Polish sources are both less systematic or structured and more exposed to be taken instantly as evidence for one interpretation e.g., of Stalin or Krushchev or another. The task to study the records comprehensively, but also be prepared to modify one’s assessments in response to newly available empirical evidence is prone to collide with the other obligation, namely to explain what were the basic causes of a conflict and which causes—meaning in politics: sins of commission and omission—are accountable for what developments.

A second main problem is the exact phase-by-phase and overall intersection between the interpretation of the collaboration leading to the evolution of ‘Western’ structures in the economic sphere and the assessment of the concomitant events in the politico-strategic (military) sphere, where the USSR appeared to be the winner, but then ended the Cold War on western terms.

5. Future Direction of Research

‘East’ and ‘West’ waged the struggle by all means and methods except ‘hot’ war in the area stretching from Vancouver to Wladivostok. Hence, research must attend to different subject areas and to the expertise developed in the many scholarly communities. Some areas of research, e.g., diplomatic or intellectual history and biography, are more established than others. The impact of intelligence on policy-makers is a relatively new area of systematic research. Inter-national cooperation projects have done much to promote nuclear history and strategic studies, but the history of the military alliances and of national defense organizations and policies depend still on the authorities’ grant of access as well as clearance and permission for publishing inspected material. The studied ambiguity of the political leaderships and the top military echelon about the worth of strategic nuclear weapons in case deterrence should fail and about the use of short-range atomic weapons deserves further study in order to know the implications of nuclear weaponry on the conduct of Cold War diplomacy and governmental guidance to their military.

Future research should be more systematic in the sense of extending the conceptualization beyond the national and bilateral focus to the regional context and intensifying the approach by addressing the fundamental questions about the changing nature of the struggle, its costs, the persistence or recreation of patterns of conflict, and above all the question whether the Cold War structure affected all other bilateral or intraregional conflicts or whether re-emerging older conflicts pervaded the East–West conflict, so that the parties to such conflicts used the Cold War for the purpose of engaging wealthy allies on their side.

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