Relative Deprivation Research Paper

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A person is relatively deprived if he or she does not enjoy material or symbolic goods compared with the norm or with other people that enjoy them. Relative deprivation and the notions that are directly or indirectly linked to it constitute a strongly structured conceptual set. The related propositions make up what Merton terms a ‘middle range theory,’ that is, a set of propositions which combines hypotheses and empirical regularities proper to a specific domain of validity and without which these regularities would be neither accounted for, nor cemented.

Even if the concept of relative deprivation was first used by Stouffer et al. (1949) in The American Soldier, this idea can be found in the writings of several classical sociologists such as Tocqueville (1852), Durkheim (1893, 1897), and Weber (1904). It also features in the works of contemporary non-sociologists such as Duesenberry (1949) and Easterlin (1973). These authors underscore the importance of the notion of relative income compared to absolute income and thereby that of the comparison between two statuses of the same individual at two different time intervals. This accounts for certain paradoxical phenomena that the standard economic theory is unable to explain. Starting with the well-known study of Stouffer et al. (1949), the theory of relative deprivation has been gradually developed, particularly by Merton and Kitt (1950), Runciman (1966), Boudon (1977), and Hirschman (1981). Its application expands to various areas, mostly to those where the relations between individual contributions and retributions are crucial, just like the problems of justice and equity or revolution. This theory is also interpreted from different standpoints that are discussed later.

1. Themes And Theory Of Deprivation

Relative deprivation is often used in The American Soldier to account for puzzling results whose exhaustive study was conducted by Merton and Kitt (1950). One of these results is that the most favored groups seem to be inclined to criticize the system of promotion. Thus, Military Police soldiers belonging to a unit where promotion is scarce are satisfied with the promotion system governing their military career. In contrast, men in the Air Corps, although belonging to a body where promotion is frequent, are dissatisfied with their opportunities for promotion. To explain this paradox, Stouffer et al. (1949) introduced the notions of relative deprivation and reference group: ‘if at the same age, level of education, and seniority, the majority of my colleagues and I have been promoted, I will consider my promotion as normal. If, however, I have not been promoted, I will go through a feeling of injustice, which can translate into criticism of the mobility system. If the promotion is relatively scarce in the group to which I belong or refer to in my evaluations, I will be very pleased with my promotion. However, if I am not promoted I will not experience any sense of injustice since all my peers have not been promoted.’ Deprivation therefore occurs only under specific conditions:

(a) The individual retains some knowledge of the system of social promotion, mobility or retributions.

(b) He or she does not get an expected good, for example promotion.

(c) This expectation is based on an evaluation and a comparison that the individual conducts between his or her position, contributions and retributions on the one hand, and those of a large number of his or her peers, who make up his or her reference group on the other hand. This condition expresses inter alia the principle of interdependence among social actors.

(d) He or she has a feeling of inequity, which translates into criticism of the mobility system.

Thanks to particular models illustrating the idea of deprivation, several heterogeneous paradoxical phenomena have been accounted for by the founders of sociology as well as by contemporary sociologists. In The Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville (1852) underscores the following surprising positive ecological correlation: the higher the economic prosperity, the quicker the laws of the old regime disappear and political liberalization gains ground in certain regions, the stronger the support of these regions to the Revolution. He points out that:

While prosperity (…) in France is growing, general attitudes seem to be less content and more anxious; public dissatisfaction is turning sour; hatred for all the old institutions is increasing. The nation is clearly heading towards a revolution. Moreover, the parts of France which should have been the major sources of this revolution are precisely those parts where progress is being shown most …. It is not always by going from bad to worse that we fall into revolution.

Durkheim (1893, 1897) also develops two partly complementary ideas linked to deprivation. In the Division of Labor, he maintains that happiness is not an increasing monotonic function of wealth. The relation between satisfaction and abundance of wealth is a parabolic function with a maximum corresponding, according to him, to the happy medium, to the aurea mediocritas of the common saying: ‘happiness lies between the two extremes of wealth.’ Besides, the French sociologist devotes the chapter on ‘the division of constrained labor’ of the same book to the analysis of the relation between deprivation resulting from the violation of meritocratic rules and the questioning of social order. Equal opportunities and congruence between distribution of talents and jobs are, in his view, the conditions of legitimacy and stability of social order. In Suicide, it is the pure model of anomie that expresses deprivation. When aspirations and expectations grow faster than the means of realization and when these are not set back or brought to an end, a state of anomie occurs with numerous individual and social consequences. The absence of social regulation is a source of social pathology. With no clear limits to the legitimate needs, and free from any social pressure, men like Goethe’s Faust will experience the infinite dimension of desire, frustration, and torment and can go as far as committing suicide.

Hirschman (1981), as an example of contemporary authors, explains tolerance to inequality in the developing countries by his ‘tunnel effect’ which is directly tied to the theory of deprivation and reference group. Let us take the example of a car driver in a two-lane tunnel with two lanes going in the same direction. Suppose that, after a short period of time during which no car in either lane has moved forward, the cars on the other lane start moving. He will feel relieved and hopeful that the cars on his lane will also move forward. However, upon realizing that only the cars on the other lane keep moving, he will feel disappointed and later furious. He might end up tempted to readjust the inflicted injustice by switching to the other lane, thus violating traffic regulations. The same applies to inequalities. An improvement of the social positions of my neighbors or my peers gives me hope. In case of disappointment, I will feel deprived and try to change the order of things.

2. Generating Mechanisms Of Deprivation

One can wonder, following Boudon (1977), if all these phenomena are not likely to be generated by social mechanisms. He sets up simple models stemming from game theory, which bring about and explain relative deprivation. In his view, this deprivation can be interpreted as the product of the structures of interaction in which individuals end up. Deprivation entails the notion of competition for good and that of objective opportunities for promotion (Stouffer et al. 1949).

Let us suppose a group of N players who can win the lot B1 for a stake C1 or the lot B2 for the stake C2 with:

N1 and n2 are the number of winners of the lots B1 and B2 respectively with n1+n2=N.

Being rational, the players will bet on C1 rather than C2 if the expected net profit by betting on C1 is superior to that corresponding to C2.

If x1 players (n1<x1< N ) bet on C1, the ex- pectation of net profit E1 (x1) of a player betting on C1 is

On the other hand, the expectation of net profit E2 of a player betting on C2, when x1 (>n1) players bet on C1 is,

Thus, x1(>n1) players bet on C1, a player is advised to bet on C1 rather C2 if

Or

i.e.,

One can analyze the relationship between the game structure and deprivation which is the proportion of individuals betting on C1 (the highest price) but winning only B2 (the lowest price). For that matter, one should examine the different values of the ratio (B1-B2) / (C1-C2) that is the ratio of the possible additional gain and the additional cost on one hand, the percentages of players 100 x1/N and of the winners 100 n1/N on the other hand.

The simulation shows how complex the nature of relations is between deprivation and the objective opportunities of promotion. Let us consider the following general cases:

(a) The rate of deprivation increases with the values (B1-B2)/(C1-C2). This rate increases with the marginal rate of profitability or return on investment {(B-B2)-(C1-C2)/(C1-C2) as shown by Kosaka (1986) who systematizes the propositions of Boudon (1977) and deduces new ones, and makes ‘critical points’ emerge.

(b) The highest levels of deprivation correspond to cases where a small number of players win the lot B1, the highest one.

(c) Deprivation rate is moderated as long as the moderated value lots are distributed to players in a limited number (the case of the Military Police in Stouffer’s study). This is no longer the case when the number of winners increases (the case of men of the Air Corps).

(d) We get equal deprivation rates when only a small number of players win important lots or when a large number of players win less important ones.

(e) In general, the curves corresponding to identical relative deprivation levels are complex with different plateaux (ceilings) and critical points.

The simulation confirms the idea according to which the game structure determines the deprived players and their number. It is equally possible to simulate the situations in which the players are not equal, that is when the group is stratified and each social class has its different resources and behaviors toward risk. These simple game models particularly show the conditions in which the mere fact of increasing everyone’s promotion opportunities can result in further increasing promotion expectations. These models also demonstrate that the propositions of Tocqueville, Durkheim, Stouffer are not unconditionally valid: when equal opportunities increase among individuals, deprivation tends to grow under certain conditions; but it can decrease under others. The trend of the relation between promotion or social mobility depends on the structure of interdependence among individuals.

3. Deprivation And Collective Violence: A Case Study

Revolution theorists generally agree on the assumption that revolutions occur during a period of economic growth and political liberalization. This paradox seems to cast doubt on the hypothesis of the rationality of human behavior. One can wonder why people revolt at the very moment of prosperity. Deprivation theorists’ respond that an improvement in objective living conditions tends to generate higher expectations. As the expectations grow faster than the improvement in objective conditions, a wider gap comes up and translates into a higher degree of deprivation. This model is similar to the Durkheimian theory of anomie, as shown by Besnard (1987) and Coleman (1990). The revolution theory developed particularly by Davies (1962), and Gurr (1968) is different. In their view, revolutions occur when a long period of socioeconomic prosperity is immediately followed by a sudden downturn, that is a sharp decrease in gratification accompanied by a constant increase in expectations. The rapidly widening gap between expectations and gratification generates revolution. This proposition commonly translates in an inverted J curve.

Even though the notion of deprivation in this theory is not as precisely and explicitly defined as with Stouffer, it is easy to demonstrate that it also supposes, a meaningful difference deems unacceptable between the expectation and the realization at the individual level and an interpersonal comparison. First, with regard to intra-personal comparison, the difference is at the same time relative and absolute. It is absolute if at the t1 moment we compare expectation with realization. It is relative if at the t2 moment, the difference between expectation and realization deems unacceptable or unbearable compared to what it was at the t1 moment. Besides, individuals with threatened social positions or subject to downward social mobility compare themselves to those with stable positions or upward mobility.

Several varieties of deprivations can be constructed. The first one relies on the theory of relative deprivation and shows up in the works of Gurr (1968) particularly for whom ‘a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater the magnitude of strife in one or another form.’ The relation between deprivation and civil strife is however mediated by societal variables such as coercive potential that can deter strife, institutionalization (social and political association may provide nonviolent means for expressing discontent), facilitation (i.e., means that facilitate civil strife) and finally legitimacy of the regime.

The second variety is that of the status inconsistency that can be found in the founding father’s works such as those of Tocqueville (1852), Weber (1904), and in such contemporary research as that of Lenski (1954). The rich bourgeois and the well-off farmer who, thanks to the liberalization of the rules governing the acquisition of land, end up as owners of vast lands, remain for the French aristocrat mere plebeians carrying visible stigma of their original social class. If, as Tocqueville states, the bourgeois and the aristocrats become unknown to each other, it is mainly because they evaluate each other according to values located on different scales. Whereas the bourgeoisie has economic quasi monopoly and looks forward to assuming political power and enjoying honors, the bourgeoisie can not gain access to these institutions because the noblesse get in the way. The bourgeoisie feels compelled to opt for the revolutionary solution. Conversely, in the nineteenth century, as Weber points out, while the Prussian Junker maintains his monopoly over the army and the bureaucracy, the industrialists buy lands to acquire nobility titles and gain access to political positions. Politically, as Weber states, this type of industrialist is reactionary. These two examples illustrate two special cases of the multiple effects of the status inconsistency whose complete taxonomy Cherkaoui (1995) attempts to construct.

The collective action theorists, especially those of mobilization, question the theory of revolution based on deprivation. As revolution is a collective action seeking to realize a public interest, the rational actor will face problems specific to this type of action, particularly the temptation of free-riding. Following Olson (1965), it is believed that the rational individual belonging to a latent group as a social class seeking to satisfy collective goals would rather turn to see the sacrifices accepted by the others. He would not be interested in participating in a revolutionary enterprise whose costs can be heavy. Eventually, as pointed out by several analysts of revolutionary movements as Cochin (1924) and Brinton (1965), the revolutions are the product of some elites of organized and almost unanimous conspirers toppling weak governments at periods of social disorganization. For the theorists of mobilization and social movements as Oberschall (1973), and Tilly (1978), a psychological explanation of the revolutionary phenomenon is unable to account for the shift from disenchantment to the mobilization against authorities and in particular against the state. Besides, the theory of rational choice reduces the moral and solidarity incentives, which play a key role in the emergence of collective action. This is sometimes a moral obligation for the individual who belongs to collectivities where solidarity bonds are predominant. From this perspective, it is rather the lack of participation that will be costly. Oberschall shows that the lack of bonds and the dismantling of social networks are major setbacks to mobilization.

As can be seen by trying to turn the theory of relative deprivation into a maid of all work, we put it through risks that hang over any theory whose domain of application has been excessively expanded. But despite some criticism, its underlying principles remain solid. To mention but one, the principle of interdependence is the center of its axiomatic structure that the formalization put forward by Boudon has clearly highlighted. To explain and understand, inter alia, the inflationary spiral of demands, the perception of inequality, the individual conception of justice and of equity, or the degree of satisfaction, the theory of relative deprivation reminds us of an obvious fact that the sociological tradition has taken for granted since the days of Montesquieu whereby the structures of interdependence between social actors are often decisive.

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