View sample Philosophy of Wisdom Research Paper. Browse other research paper examples and check the list of research paper topics for more inspiration. If you need a religion research paper written according to all the academic standards, you can always turn to our experienced writers for help. This is how your paper can get an A! Feel free to contact our custom writing service for professional assistance. We offer high-quality assignments for reasonable rates.
Wisdom is not a central topic of contemporary philosophy. Today’s philosophers seem to confirm Nietzsche’s observation: ‘When philosophers meet among themselves they start casting off all sorts of wonderful rubbish; above all … they hang up ‘‘the love of wisdom’’ like stuffy robes of office’ (Nietzsche 1980a, p. 511). Common sense, on the contrary, still expects wisdom to be provided by philosophy, and the discipline’s social reputation is partly based on this expectation. But as contemporary philosophy seems scarcely inclined or able to fulfill this demand, common sense draws on forms of wisdom from nonoccidental cultures or from esoterics. While ‘wisdom’ is a term rarely used in contemporary philosophy, the literature about wisdom from the esoteric and the anthropological–cultural side is flourishing.
Academic Writing, Editing, Proofreading, And Problem Solving Services
Get 10% OFF with 24START discount code
There is nothing wrong with sensing deficiencies in the academic field and turning to other sources instead. Yet in the second part of this article I will demonstrate that contemporary philosophy can in fact provide a great many elements of wisdom appropriate for our times. The first part is devoted to an accurate reconstruction of the main historical turns in the philosophical understanding of wisdom.
1. Philosophy—A Concept Introduced By Plato
As is commonly known, philosophy is related through its name to wisdom: ‘philo-sophy’ (in Greek: philosophia) means ‘love of wisdom’ or ‘quest for wisdom’ (in Greek: sophia). But this concept of philosophia corresponds neither to the original understanding of philosophical thinking nor to that of wisdom. The concept of philosophia was first created by Plato in the first half of the fourth century BC.
1.1 The Pre-Platonic Understanding Of Philosophy And Wisdom
Philosophers before Plato neither deployed the term ‘philosophy’ nor described their enterprise with respect to wisdom (sophia). Rather, they characterized their doctrines as ‘histories’. Moreover, the Greek under-standing of wisdom—as paradigmatically expressed in the topical talk of the ‘Seven Sages of Greece’— focused on practical, not theoretical knowledge. In everyday language, a wise person was just an expert of some kind or other (a craftsman, artist, doctor, military leader etc.); in order to be included in the catalogue of the Seven Sages his work had, in addition, to be of extraordinary political relevance. So Thales, the only ancient philosopher ever to figure among the Seven Sages, was included in this group not as a philosopher, but as an astronomer and engineer who brought military success to his community by predicting an eclipse and redirecting a river.
1.2 Plato’s Turn
What, then, is the specific sense of Plato’s introduction of the concept of philo-sophia—an innovation so successful that his concept is commonly taken to be the concept of philosophy altogether?
Three shifts are characteristic. First, the emphasis in the understanding of sophia as well as philosophia is put on theory instead of praxis. Philosophers observe the nature of things not for the sake of practical usage but for that of pure cognition. The new concept of philosophy is strictly opposed to the old practical aims of sophia. Second, a border line is drawn between philosophy and wisdom: philosophers can only strive for wisdom—without ever actually reaching wisdom. This is why philosophy is defined as philo-sophy (lo e of wisdom), not as wisdom proper (sophia). ‘Philosophy’ implies an element of modesty and limitation. Thirdly, this limitation cannot be overcome— complete wisdom is reserved for the Gods only. By philosophizing we do not surpass philosophy to actual wisdom.
1.3 Strategic Implications
Plato’s innovation was directed not only against the traditional and the everyday understanding of wisdom but above all against his contemporary competitors, the Sophists. In everyday language at Plato’s time—where compositions with ‘philo’ had long since become popular—‘philosophizing’ (philosophein) was a term without any extravagant meaning; it just meant studying, educating oneself, being inclined to reflective activity. So Plato’s declaration that wisdom is impossible for humans and reserved to the Gods alone discredited not only the mythical Seven Sages but also his compatriots’ devotion to philosophical activity and above all the Sophists, who at the time of Plato roved from city to city offering, for payment, lessons in rhetoric, virtue, poetry, mathematics, music or astronomy. As their name (Sophists) indicates, they were considered to be bearers of wisdom (sophia). The idea that they were in fact frauds—Plato was constantly trying to discredit the Sophists as dealers in fake knowledge, and as being the morally and intellectually dubious counterparts of the real philosopher—was the logical result of Plato’s redefinition: If wisdom is altogether unattainable for humans, then the Sophists who masquerade as teachers of wisdom, must obviously be frauds.
2. Philosophy’s Claim To Represent True Praxis And Wisdom
The introduction of modesty and limitations in matters of wisdom with the new concept of philosophy was an efficient strategy in distancing the Sophists, but once this was achieved the proponents of the new concept soon turned to more ambitious claims. Philosophy was successively considered capable of representing the utmost fulfillment of both practical and theoretical wisdom.
2.1 Philosophical Theory As The Highest Praxis
The move from a practical to a theoretical emphasis was meant as an empowerment of philosophy in matters of true praxis. The traditional concept of praxis, so characteristic of the original understanding of wisdom, was criticized for having in fact provided only a concept of pragmatic utility, one ignoring the very kind of praxis pertaining to the full accomplishment of human life. This higher and true sense of praxis was to be fulfilled precisely by philosophy in the new sense of theoretical activity. This tendency is obvious already in Plato, who always conceived of philosophy as the best way of human life, with respect to both the philosophizing individual and societies complying with philosophical insights. Aristotle (in his emphatic eulogy of theory in Nicomachean Ethics X, 7–9) declared the theoretical life to be the best and highest form of human praxis and life altogether. Significantly enough, he explained the supremacy of theoretical life by contrasting its self-sufficiency with the purposeful orientation of ordinary practical life: according to him, philosophical theory is the only activity ‘loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action.’
2.2 Philosophy As Wisdom Proper
Although Plato had initially declared wisdom to be reserved for the Gods, he made the border between human philosophy and divine wisdom permeable. Ultimately philosophizing should result in a homoiosis theo, a ‘becoming like the divine’ (Plato, Theiatetos, 176 b 1 f). Aristotle definitely dropped the Platonic reserve. According to him, philosophy and wisdom are one—his appraisal of philosophical theoria in Nicomachean Ethics X, 7–9 is one of sophia. In theoretical life, he says, we realize ‘the divine in our midst’ and hence our ‘true Self’. With Aristotle, ‘philosophia’ is no longer a modest term inferior to sophia. Hegel’s phrase that philosophy should ‘lay aside the title ‘‘lo e of knowing’’ and be actual knowing’ (Hegel 1977, p. 3) is Aristotelean in spirit.
3. Reaccentuating The Practical
3.1 Theory’s Open Flank
But philosophy’s effort to completely absorb the older practical aspects of wisdom has an open flank. In his theoretical attitude the philosopher may well possess the utmost theoretical knowledge—but this is not to possess all kinds of knowledge: genuinely practical insight, ethical knowledge and situational prudence (phronesis) are lacking. And, although theory may represent the highest form of praxis, it cannot as such replace all forms of praxis. Hence, specifically practical knowledge—lying outside theoretical sophia— requires respect and clarification in addition. This applies all the more, given that practical knowledge is (as, quite properly, Aristotle was the first to demonstrate) of an intrinsically different type from theoretical knowledge. So the new concept of philosophical theory, as impressive as it may be, remains in need of supplementation. Genuinely practical knowledge (which is so decisive for all our everyday orientation) requires a different approach.
3.2 Hellenistic And Roman Philosophy: The Return Of The Sage As A Practical Expert
Following Greek philosophy’s classical period, a return to conceiving the sage as an expert in practical matters took place in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy (with the Epicureans and Stoics). The sage once again became a figure of outstanding practical knowledge and exemplariness, knowing how to lead the best life. From now on wisdom was seen as the archetype of accomplished living. Theoretical capacities were to serve this goal.
This understanding of wisdom prevailed even in modern times. So Montaigne defined the sage as someone who appreciates that ‘our great and glorious masterpiece is to live appropriately’ (Montaigne 1958, p. 851). Kant too still declared that ‘the teacher of wisdom through doctrine and example,’ ‘the practical philosopher,’ ‘is the real philosopher’ (Kant 1992, p. 537). Even today we still expect a wise person to embody the right mode of human living.
4. Middle Ages
The Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages had trouble with wisdom. In the Bible the wisdom of this world had been declared to be foolishness before God (Paul, 1 Cor. 3:19; similar 1 Cor. 1:20 and Romans 1:22). This did, on the one side, have its advantages over pagan thinking, but on the other side it also called into question the very possibility of reasonable reflection and hence of Christian philosophy altogether. At the least it imposed severe limitations. Some philosophers tried to settle the conflict by developing the doctrine of ‘double truth.’ But distrust of purely human knowledge—be it wisdom, reason or science—prevailed. Luther was later to renew the accusation that reason is ‘the devil’s whore’ (Luther 1964, p. 164, cf. also Luther 1967, p. 82).
5. Philosophy In League With Science—Not With Wisdom
In modern times, philosophy’s ally has been science not wisdom. When philosophers, occasionally, do still use the term ‘wisdom’ what they actually have in mind is science. So Descartes uses ‘wisdom’ as just another name for the sum total of science (Descartes 1998, p. 65). Even Kant, though affording wisdom the highest rank, emphasizes that ‘science … is the narrow gate that leads to the doctrine of wisdom’ (Kant 1993, p. 171). Husserl was to resume this modern emphasis on science instead of wisdom by declaring ‘science has spoken, from now on wisdom has the task of learning’ (Husserl 1965, p. 63).
6. Modern Philosophy’s Practical Intentions
But modern philosophy has a strong practical side too. It comes in two flavors: as technical purposiveness along the lines of science, and as moral-practical orientation taking up older elements of wisdom.
6.1 Technical–Practical Side
From the start modern science was addressed to technical ends. It was in this respect that Bacon and Descartes commended it. Marx then claimed that philosophy should become altogether practical—and thus realize itself by vanishing as philosophy. Even if this project has failed, the prospect of technically reshaping reality has proven widely successful.
6.2 Moral–Practical Side
Complementary to this scientific-technical strain, to which wisdom is irrelevant, practical aspects of wisdom survive in modern philosophy’s other strain, the practical one devoted to ethics and morals. It is here, if anywhere, that ‘wisdom’ can be a substantial term in modern times. Descartes had already conceived of ethics as ‘the final stage of wisdom’ (Descartes 1983, p. XXIV), and Kant, having defined wisdom as ‘the idea of the practical use of reason’s complete conformity to law’ (Kant 1983), afforded this practical wisdom the highest rank, declaring ‘the practical philosopher’ to be ‘the real philosopher’ (Kant 1992, p. 537). In the moral-practical respect wisdom retains the highest esteem.
Enlightenment philosophers, as well as their opponents, agreed that true morality—and by consequence wisdom in its practical sense—is the most important thing for us humans. Rousseau certainly emphasized, in contrast to Kant, the simplicity of moral knowledge, but even this claim to simplicity was shared by a great many philosophers of the Enlightenment. In this they could even see the great advantage of practical over theoretical knowledge: ‘It took centuries to know part of nature’s laws. A single day suffices to recognize man’s duties.’ (Voltaire 1967, p. 342) With respect to this simplicity distinguishing practical wisdom, Wolff, D’Holbach and Voltaire proclaimed Confucius, the exemplary ‘simple sage’, to have been the wisest person ever.
But obviously this modern line of revalidating practical wisdom was not very fortunate. Why else would we feel disoriented and lament the absence of wisdom appropriate to our times and problems?
7. Protest Against Wisdom—Nietzsche
In the course of time modern philosophers came to protest more and more against all traditional understanding of wisdom. Nietzsche is the most prominent example.
He generally suspected the traditional ideal of wisdom to have been simply a symptom of weakness. The old philosophers’ ‘claim that they possessed wisdom’ appears to him to have always been ‘a screen behind which the philosopher saves himself because he has become weary, old, cold, hard—as a premonition that the end is near, like the prudence animals have before they die: tey go off by themselves, become still, choose solitude, hide in caves, and become wise’ (Nietzsche 1974, p. 315). The Stoic is the paradigm case for Nietzsche. His wisdom consists in making himself insensible of the tensions of life and acquiring an armor-plated attitude. Hence Nietzsche’s ruthless formula: ‘The stoic type. Or: the perfect ox’ (Nietzsche 1980b, p. 125).
The attitude of the ‘genuine philosopher’ would, in Nietzsche’s opinion, be completely different: he ‘lives ‘‘unphilosophically’’ and ‘‘unwisely,’’ above all imprudently, and feels the burden and the duty of a hundred attempts and temptations of life—he risks himself constantly, he plays the wicked game’ (Nietzsche 1989, p. 125). ‘The wisest person would be the richest in contradictions, who has, at it were, organs of touch for all kinds of person: and in their midst his great moments of grandiose harmony—in us too the lofty coincidence!’ (Nietzsche 1980a, p. 182).
Ultimately, however, ‘wisdom’ remains an improper expression in Nietzsche’s view—it is too strongly impregnated by its traditional meanings. Only in a critical manner can we still refer to or draw on wisdom. The first possibility is exemplified by Nietzsche’s phrase: ‘There is more reason in your body, than in your best wisdom.’ (Nietzsche 1966, p. 146) The second is represented by a striking claim of Nietzsche: ‘My wisdom has long gathered like a cloud; it is becoming stiller and darker. Thus does every wisdom that is yet to give birth to lightning bolts … For these men of today I do not wish to be light, or to be called light. These I wish to blind. Lightening of my wisdom! put out their eyes!’ (Nietzsche 1966, p. 401).
Languid wisdom or lightning wisdom, wisdom as a sedative or as dynamite—this is Nietzsche’s alternative in matters of wisdom. If wisdom is referred to, one should be on one’s guard as to which type of wisdom is involved.
8. Epistemological Contours
8.1 Shifting From Practical To Theoretical Philosophy
The disappointment with contemporary philosophy’s neglect of wisdom is flawed by one-sidedness. One assumes elements of wisdom must be found in the field of practical philosophy, where it would indeed be hard to discover any. Conversely, however, insights of contemporary theoretical philosophy provide a great many elements giving contours to a contemporary concept of wisdom. My thesis is that the design of wisdom today is to be drawn from the epistemological development in recent decades.
8.2 Recent Insights: Theoretical Reason With The Characteristics Of Practical Reason
Shifting to epistemology in matters of contemporary wisdom makes all the more sense given that in recent decades theoretical reason has been shown to be characterized by traits formerly considered typical of practical reason alone. Since Aristotle the difference between the two types of reason had been considered fundamental: theoretical reason considers permanent things, whereas practical reason deals with changeable things. Correspondingly, theoretical reason demands distance and provides perfect cognition, whereas practical reason requires involvement and allows only context-dependent cognition. In recent decades, however, theoretical reasoning has been shown to bear the same basic traits as practical reasoning: theoretical cognition too represents relative, not absolute cognition; it too is context-bound and its validity is tied to specific (axiomatic, historical, social, etc.) frameworks. In short, theoretical reasoning also exhibits the characteristics of practical reasoning. This explains why the shape of contemporary wisdom can be inferred from innovations on the theoretical side.
9. Elements Of Modern Epistemology Relevant For A Contemporary Concept Of Wisdom
As this view is unusual, I will set out in the following the relevant elements in some detail.
9.1 From Nietzsche To Quine: The Uncertainty Of Fundaments
Nietzsche can be regarded as a forerunner of the contemporary condition in having pointed out that our theoretical cognition is of a piece with practical and pragmatic cognition: ‘one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders’ webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind’ (Nietzsche 1979, p. 85). In the twentieth century Neurath said quite similarly, ‘we are like mariners who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to disassemble it in dock and reassemble it with the best components’ (Neurath 1932 3, p. 206). Popper’s diagnosis reads: ‘just when we believed that we were standing on firm and safe ground, all things are, in reality, insecure and unstable’ (Popper 1992, p. 65); ‘the basis is unstable’ (Popper 1969, p. 76). Quine later adopted Neurath’s phrase as the motto of Word and Object (Quine 1960, p. VII).
9.2 Scientific Pluralism (Quine)
The inevitability of scientific pluralism is a decisive insight of contemporary epistemology that was first formulated by Quine. Even in the strong realm of science no one, singularly valid theory is to be expected, but a multitude of equally valuable alternative candidates has to be taken into account. This is a consequence of the empirical under-determination of theory shown by Quine in his seminal essay ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ from 1951: ‘Total science, mathematical and natural and human, is … underdetermined by experience’ (Quine 1980, p. 45). Empirical tests can only tell us that something is in need of being altered in the theory, but not exactly which element is to be changed. ‘Any statement can be held true come what may. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision’ (Quine 1980, p. 43).
In Word and Object (Quine 1960), Quine resolutely drew the consequences of scientific pluralism: ‘we have no reason to suppose that man’s surface irritations even unto eternity admit of any one systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible others. It seems likelier … that countless alternative theories would be tied for first place’ (Quine 1960, p. 23). ‘We can never do better than occupy the stand-point of some theory or other, the best we can muster at the time’ (Quine 1960, p. 22).
9.3 The Impossibility Of Any Meta-Position (An Insight Common To Hermeneutics, Poststructuralism, And Analytic Philosophy)
This also means that it is impossible to assume some meta-position which would allow us to regard the multitude of scientific theories from a superior point of view and select the ‘truly right’ one among them. There is no God’s-eye standpoint, no view from nowhere—neither in theoretical nor in practical matters. The impossibility of such a meta-stance is a decisive insight of recent philosophy that is common to all (superficially so variant) strands: to Gadamer’s hermeneutics (according to which we cannot achieve a metahistorical standpoint towards history), to Lyotard’s poststructuralism (‘Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives,’ Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv), and, of course, to analytic philosophy, where this insight was first formulated not by Quine, but by Wittgenstein who declared it his ‘leading principle’ that there is no ‘metaphilosophy’ (Wittgenstein 1974, p. 116).
9.4 Wittgenstein: Limits Of Justification
Wittgenstein has developed insights crucial to the present understanding of cognition and also relevant to every conception of contemporary wisdom altogether.
First, Wittgenstein demonstrated limits of justification with respect to the certainties of common sense. These are neither based on cognition nor could they ever be secured by cognitive justification. For these certainties are by themselves constitutive of all our activities of justification: ‘All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is the element in which arguments have their life’ (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 16).
Second, Wittgenstein showed how this structure affects all our decisions: ‘Nothing we do can be defended absolutely and finally. But only by reference to something else that is not questioned’ (Wittgenstein 1984, p. 16). Decisions necessarily have recourse to something which they take for granted: ‘the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn’ (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 44). ‘If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put’ (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 44).
So far this means that not only the validity of scientific theories (Quine), but also of our everyday certainties and all our argumentation cannot be conclusively secured, they possess only conditional validity. In the regress of justifications one does not reach some incontrovertible ground, but only postulates, which in principle are once again questionable. While admitting good and varied justifiability, there is no such thing as an absolute, ultimate justification.
Finally, Wittgenstein has also shown how all this applies even to the whole framework of justification and argumentation (to ‘rationality’): ‘We can’t talk of reasons for thinking … We can describe the game of thinking, but not the reasons why we think. ‘‘Reason’’ only applies within a system of rules … It is nonsense to ask for reasons for the whole system of thought’ (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 88). What Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention to is that the quest for reasons (for example, for reasons for the whole business of reasoning) suggests leading behind this game, but obviously it does not do so: it asks the very question that typifies this game itself and thus remains within its realm.
Hence there is no possibility of justification which absolutely vouches for itself. This is expressed in the following sentence (which, significantly enough, sounds like the dictum of a sage): ‘You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there—like our life’ (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 73).
10. Epistemic Contemporariness And Wisdom
These epistemic advances, which characterize the present state of affairs in philosophy, surprisingly also correspond to contemporary standards of everyday consciousness. The latter is molded to a high degree by the acknowledgment that all validity is relative and by an awareness of the plurality of modes of experience, cultures, forms of life and even worlds. Owing to this correspondence, the new epistemic philosophical standards are also apt to serve as maxims for contemporary everyday orientation. They match our expectations and needs in matters of wisdom, and they do so in a manner specifically appropriate to the contemporary situation.
The present understanding of wisdom typically implies circumspection, awareness of limitation, and competence in dealing with uncertainty. The sage is someone who is attentive to neighboring and commonly neglected aspects. She is aware of the context and brings it to bear regulatively. Whereas an ignorant person confidently attributes himself a grasp of the whole, the wise person objects to such totalization. She recognizes the limited nature of all singular perspectives, is aware of differing viewpoints and attentive to the open potential for additional alternatives. She warns against misrecognizing particularities, infringements and overbearingness. She advocates justice at the level of detail and openness on the whole. So the wise person is an expert in uncertainty too. Wisdom is particularly needed in situations where justice is required with respect to diverging demands without a meta-rule being available from which one could deduce the right decision. In these cases, even though it be cognized, but only found, the wise person will have a sense for what is right. Sometimes, however, it will be important just to fend off the wrong thing while leaving open what’s right. Such composure also distinguishes the wise person.
Contemporary epistemology, which emphasizes the limits of all justification and demands their respect, is thus properly tailored to the aspects of wisdom just set out. It inherently works towards a consciousness which bears traits of wisdom in high measure.
This is why a state of consciousness that has incorporated those epistemic standards and which knows how to practice them can provide orientation for our time and satisfy our demands in matters of wisdom. Whoever has made this genuinely philosophical possibility her own will be in no great need of extra-philosophical and esoteric doctrines of wisdom that have become so popular in recent years.
Bibliography:
- Aristotle 1984 Complete Works of Aristotle. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
- Burkert W 1960 Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes ‘Philosophie’. Hermes 88: 159–177
- Descartes R 1983 The Principles of Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
- Descartes R 1998 Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. Rodopi, Amsterdam
- Diogenes L 1931 Lives of Eminent Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, Vol. 2
- Diogenes L 1972 Lives of Eminent Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, Vol. 1
- Goodman N 1978 Ways of World-making. Hackett, Indianapolis, IN
- Hegel G W F 1977 Phenomenology of Spirit. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK
- Husserl E 1965 Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Klostermann, Frankfurt, Germany
- Kant I 1983 Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, Germany [1978 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, IL]
- Kant I 1992 The Jasche logic. In: Lectures on Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
- Kant I 1993 Critique of Practical Reason. MacMillan, New York
- Luther M 1964 Wider die himmlischen Propheten, von den Bildern und Sakramenten. In: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe). Bohlau, Weimar, Germany, Vol. 18
- Luther M 1967 Wider der Vernunft In: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe). Bohlau, Weimar, Germany, Vol. 6
- Lyotard J-F 1984 The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN
- Montaigne M 1958 The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA
- Nietzsche F 1966 Thus Spoke In: The Portable Nietzsche. Viking Press, New York
- Nietzsche F 1974 The Gay Science. Vintage Books, New York
- Nietzsche F 1979 On truth and lies in a nonmoral sense. In: Breazeale D (ed.) Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870’s. Humanities Press, New York
- Nietzsche F 1980a Nachgelassene Fragmente. Juli 1882 bis Herbst 1885. In: Colli G, Montinari M (eds.) Samtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Banden. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, Germany, Vol. 11
- Nietzsche F 1980b Nachgelassene Fragmente. Herbst 1885 bis Anfang Januar 1889. In: Colli G, Montinari M (eds.) Samtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Banden. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, Germany, Vol. 13
- Nietzsche F 1989 Beyond Good and Evil. Vintage Books, New York
- Neurath O 1932–3 Protokollsatze. Erkenntnis. 3: 204–14
- Plato 1961 The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Pantheon Books, New York
- Popper K 1960 The Logic of Scientific Hutchinson, London
- Popper K 1969 Logik der Forschung. Mohr, Tubingen, Germany
- Popper K 1992 The Logic of the social sciences. In: In Search of a Better World. Routledge, London, New York
- Quine W 1960 Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
- Quine W 1980 Two dogmas of empiricism. In: From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
- Toulmin S 1990 University of Chicago Press, Chicago
- Voltaire 1967 Article on ‘philosophie’. In: Dictionnaire philosophique. Garnier, Paris
- Welsch W 1989 Weisheit in einer Welt der Pluralitat. In: Oelmuller W (eds.) Philosophie und Weisheit. Schoningh, Paderborn, Germany, pp. 214–59
- Welsch W 1995 Vernunft. Die zeitgenossische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der trans ersalen Vernunft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Main, Germany
- Whitehead A 1929 Process and Reality. MacMillan, New York
- Wittgenstein L 1972 Uber Gewissheit—On Harper, New York
- Wittgenstein L 1974 Philosophical University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles
- Wittgenstein L 1980 Wittgenstein’s Cambridge, 1930– 1932. Blackwell, Oxford, UK
- Wittgenstein L 1984 Culture and Value. University of Chicago Press, Chicago