Crimes of Globalization Research Paper

How is such crime best explained and understood? The basic parameters of an integrated theory of crimes of globalization are identified here. The overall lack of accountability and the profound challenges involved in controlling crimes of globalization are also addressed. Some concluding observations address the potential value of further criminological attention to crimes of globalization.

Crimes Of Globalization: The Fundamentals

Defining Crimes Of Globalization

Conventional crime and its control is principally a local phenomenon and somewhat less so a state and national (or federal) phenomenon. Accordingly, most criminologists are not especially receptive to adopting a global framework for defining crime or for the study of crime and its control. In the conventional view, crime as defined by law on the state level – or locally or nationally – is the proper domain of criminology, along with its control, and it is through the study of such crime and its control that criminology is most likely to make its contribution to the advancement of human knowledge and to produce knowledge specifically useful for identifying optimal public policies in response to crime.

Crimes of globalization are those demonstrably harmful policies and practices of institutions and entities that are specifically a product of the forces of globalization and that by their very nature operate within a global context. Although these crimes can involve violations of criminal laws on the state or international level, they may also incorporate harms not specifically addressed by statutory law. The vastly disproportionate influence of elite interests over the formal criminal law is accordingly taken into account in a definition that transcends the boundaries of such law. It is not typically the specific intent of those who engage in crimes of globalization to cause harm. Rather, the devastating harm to vulnerable people in developing countries is a consequence of the skewed priorities of institutions and entities which favor the interests of the powerful and the privileged.

The concept of crimes of globalization is not synonymous with two formulations that have received significant recent attention: the “globalization of crime” and “globalization and crime” (e.g., Aas 2007; Friman 2009; Larsen and Smandych 2008). The first of these terms refers broadly to long-standing forms of crime now carried out in an increasingly global context, and the second term refers broadly to the influence of globalization on crime, conventionally defined. Simon Mackenzie (2006) has introduced the term “systematic crime” in his discussion of the broad forms of global harm emanating from the practices of international financial institutions, and their complicity in denying the link between supporting interests of advanced economies and harm in developing countries.

The concept of crimes of globalization, as originally formulated, was limited to the demonstrably harmful activities of international financial institutions, with a special focus on one of these institutions, the World Bank. However, these crimes intersect with a range of other forms of crime engaged in by powerful entities, including crimes of states, political white-collar crime, and state-corporate crime (Friedrichs 2010). Multiple complex interconnections exist between these different types of globalized harm.

Some refinement of the definition of crimes of globalization seems warranted. In the interest of greater clarity, the notion of crimes of international financial institutions specifically is best classified as a subtype of the broader category of crimes of globalization. The two principal international financial institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which seeks to maximize financial stability, and the World Bank, primarily focused on promoting development (Woods 2006). The World Trade Organization (WTO) is often aligned with these international financial institutions and has many parallel attributes and issues but strictly speaking is an international regulatory entity, with its primary formal mission being to foster trade. In a rapidly changing global economy, the roles of the international financial institutions have been increasingly questioned. These institutions have many ties with each other, and the lines of demarcation between their activities can become quite blurred.

The World Bank And The International Monetary Fund: International Financial Institutions

The World Bank is here addressed in some detail, to exemplify the fundamental nature of an international financial institution (Goldman 2006; Marshall 2008; Weaver 2008). The World Bank, formally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), was established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 to help stabilize and rebuild economies ravaged by World War II. Eventually it shifted its focus to an emphasis on aiding developing nations. The Bank makes low-interest loans to governments of its member nations and to private development projects backed by those governments with the stated aim to benefit the citizens of those countries. The World Bank claims to contribute to the reduction of poverty and to the improvement of living standards in developing countries. Today the Bank is a large, international operation with more than 10,000 employees, 180 member states, and annual loans of $30 billion.

The World Bank was established, along with the International Monetary Fund, at the behest of dominant Western states, with little input from developing countries. They are disproportionately influenced by or manipulated by elite economic institutions and entities – e.g., transnational mining companies – and have been characterized as agents of global capital. In developing countries, they deal primarily with the political and economic elites of those countries with little direct attention to the perspectives and needs of indigenous peoples. They have loaned money to ruthless military dictatorships engaged in murder and torture and denied loans to democratic governments subsequently overthrown by the military. They have favored strong dictatorships over struggling democracies because they believe that the former are more able to introduce and see through the unpopular reforms their loans require. Borrowers typically are political elites of developing countries and their cronies, although repaying the debt becomes the responsibility of these countries’ citizens, most of who do not benefit from the loans. The Bank has lost $100 billion due to fraud and corruption, in one estimate, over a period of several decades. The privileged in developing countries have been the principal beneficiaries of World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans, not poor people in those countries.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been the target of much criticism, especially in the recent era. They have been characterized as paternalistic, secretive, and counterproductive in terms of their claimed goals of improving people’s lives. They have been charged with complicity in policies with genocidal consequences, with exacerbating ethnic conflict, with increasing the gap between rich and poor, with fostering immense ecological and environmental damage, with neglecting agriculture crucial to survival in developing countries, and with the callous displacement of vast numbers of indigenous people in these countries from their original homes and communities.

Critics claim that many less developed countries that received World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans are worse off today in terms of poverty and that the severe austerity measures imposed on borrowing countries, deemed necessary to maximize the chances of loans being repaid, impact most heavily on the poorest and most vulnerable citizens. The “structural adjustment agreements” in developing countries have been shown to also impact negatively on human rights in those countries. The building of dams has been the single most favored World Bank project, but even its own experts concede that millions of people have been displaced as a result of these dams. In many of these dam projects, resettlement plans either have been nonexistent – in violation of the Bank’s own guidelines – or have been inadequately implemented. In one notorious case in the 1970s, anti-dam protesters in Guatemala were massacred by the military.

At a World Bank meeting in Berlin in 1988, protesters called for the establishment of a Permanent People’s Tribunal to try the World Bank (and the International Monetary Fund) for “crimes against humanity.” An American anthropologist has characterized the forced resettlement of people in dam-related projects as the worst crime against them, short of killing them. An American biologist characterized the World Bank’s report on the environmental impact of a dam project in a developing country as “fraudulent” and “criminal.”

Globalization In Relation To Crimes Of Globalization

Globalization clearly has many different dimensions. Those most pertinent within the realm of white-collar crime generally, and crimes of globalization specifically, include the following: (1) the growing global dominance and reach of neoliberalism and a free market, capitalist system that disproportionately benefits wealthy and powerful organizations and individuals; (2) the increasing vulnerability of indigenous people with a traditional way of life to the forces of globalized capitalism; (3) the growing influence and impact of international financial institutions and the related, relative decline of power of local or state-based institutions; and (4) the nondemocratic operation of international financial institutions, taking the form of globalization from above instead of globalization from below.

Crimes Of Globalization, Transnational Crimes, And International Crimes

The relationship of crimes of globalization to the familiar but sometimes unclearly invoked terms transnational crimes and international crimes requires some attention here. Transnational crimes are essentially forms of crime that are increasingly carried out across borders and via international or global networks. The forces of globalization are transforming and amplifying structures of opportunity for a wide range of different forms of criminal activity (Aas 2007). Some of these forms of crime (e.g., human, arms, and drug trafficking) are hardly new, but the transnational dimension of them has expanded. Some of these forms of crime are quite new (e.g., cybercrime), but their transnational dimension greatly enhances the challenges of controlling them.

Organized crime has long had transnational dimensions. The processes of globalization have been transforming some dimensions of such crime, with these transnational dimensions increasingly central to the operation of emerging forms of organized crime. But Hazel Croall (2005) is surely correct in arguing that there has been a disproportionate amount of criminological attention to the globalization of organized crime, when the global activities of multinational corporations and financial institutions cause far greater harm. Certainly the threat of transnational or global terrorism is substantial, but the argument can be made that it also has received disproportionate attention relative to other forms of transnational or global harm. Especially since 9/11, there has been a huge amount of attention to transnational or global terrorism.

International crimes are best conceived of as violations of international law, which in their generic form (e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive violations of human rights) have a long history. Such crimes have often been committed within national boundaries but are increasingly carried out globally. International crimes are most typically thought of as crimes of states but may also be committed by insurgencies, militias, and other parties. Corporations – and increasingly multinational corporations – are also complicit in international crimes. For example, some of the corporations operating in Nazi Germany and its occupied territories played a role in the Holocaust, serving as classic cases of such crimes. In the more recent era, such corporations as Blackwater (XE), Sandline, and Halliburton have been accused of violations of international law (Rothe 2009). The conditions of globalization produce expanding opportunities for such crime.

The lines of demarcation between crimes of globalization, transnational crimes, and international crimes are sometimes fluid and complex. But the key actors typically involved, and the bodies of law violated, tend to be different.

Any coherent discussion of “crimes of globalization” must also address this phenomenon historically and cross-culturally. Some activities carried out in ancient times can be described as early forms of globalized white-collar crime. Monumental historical crimes were committed in the name of imperialism and colonial expansion globally, over a period of many centuries. Obviously the global slave trade in conjunction with this, continuing into the nineteenth century, was a crime of epic proportions. Furthermore, imperialistic enterprises continued through the twentieth century into the twenty-first, and slavery and a thriving slave market have hardly become extinct in the contemporary world, despite the collapse of traditional colonial regimes and forms of slave trade. More broadly, “crimes of empire” are a feature of our world today.

Crimes Of Globalization, State-Corporate Crime, And Crimes Of States

The crimes of international financial institutions (IFIs) have a generic relationship to state-corporate crimes insofar as they are cooperative ventures involving public sector and private sector entities and in some respects are hybrid public/private sector entities. The literature on state-corporate crime (e.g., Michalowski and Kramer 2006) has focused on crimes arising out of cooperative ventures involving states and corporations. In one sense, crimes of globalization could be characterized as a neglected, cognate form of such crime: i.e., state-international financial institution crime.

While the above categories may appear to be separate phenomenon, we suggest the connections between them are not so easily separated. The intersection of business and government has led to increased cases of a “globalized criminality.” In the recent era, Western states as well as corporations have promoted neoliberalism or a supposed “free market” model for the global political economy. Within such an environment, the crimes of globalization of international financial institutions are intertwined with crimes of states. The policies and practices of the international financial institutions are largely driven by the global agenda of powerful developed states such as the United States.

In many of the developing countries, corrupt political oligarchs facilitate the promotion of this agenda, despite it being largely at odds with the interest of their citizens. Cases of such corrupt practices have been especially pronounced and well documented in the case of sub-Saharan countries of Africa, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, and Senegal (Rothe 2010b). But altogether these corrupt practices are a global phenomenon.

Origins Of The Concept Of Crimes Of Globalization

The concept of “crimes of globalization” was first put forth in a paper for the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting in 2000 (subsequently published as an article in Social Justice in 2002) with the specific title “The World Bank and Crimes of Globalization: A Case Study” by David O. Friedrichs and Jessica Friedrichs. The specific inspiration for this concept was the experience of the junior author, Jessica Friedrichs, living among poor fishing people in northeast Thailand whose way of life was being destroyed by a dam at least partially financed by the World Bank. Jessica Friedrichs returned to the United States in April 2000 from her junior year experience in Thailand, 2 months earlier than anticipated, to make a presentation on the Pak Mun Dam situation at an antiglobalization (or global justice) demonstration in Washington, D.C., that month. The senior author of the article, David Friedrichs, with a long-standing interest in crimes of the powerful, realized that while at least some of the policies and practices of international financial institutions such as the World Bank had demonstrably harmful consequences, this form of harm had been quite wholly neglected by criminologists.

The Pak Mun Dam Case

In the Pak Mun dam case, the World Bank helped finance the building of the dam in eastern Thailand in the early 1990s. The process of planning, constructing, and operating this dam was undertaken without obtaining input from the fishermen and villagers who lived along the river. The construction of the dam had a detrimental effect on the environment, flooding the adjacent forests. This effect violated the World Bank’s own policies on cultural property destruction. Many edible plants upon which locals were dependent for their sustenance and for income were lost. Villagers who used the river waters for drinking, bathing, and laundry developed skin rashes. Most importantly, a severe decline in the fish population occurred. As a consequence, the way of life of indigenous fishermen dependent upon abundant fish for food and income was annihilated. The resettlement of the fishermen and compensation for their losses were wholly inadequate. Traditional communities began to disintegrate. Many of those affected by these developments organized protest villages and engaged in other actions calling for the Thai government and the World Bank to take responsibility for the devastation they caused by building the dam, which cost far more than expected and generated far less electricity than had been anticipated.

Crimes Of Globalization: Subsequent Studies

In the wake of the original article focusing upon the World Bank and the case of the Pak Mun dam, a number of criminologists have applied the concept of crimes of globalization to other circumstances. For example, (Rothe et al. 2006) conducted research that explored the interrelations between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and legacies of colonialism along with foreign policies that set the stage for large-scale atrocities and crimes of states. Exploring the circumstances leading to the sinking of the ferry Le Joola, the authors demonstrated that the state of Senegal itself had core liability for this maritime tragedy, with its dramatic loss of lives. The government readily admitted its errors and several ministers either stepped down or were removed from their positions. However, despite unequivocal governmental responsibility, Rothe, Muzzatti, and Mullins advance the case that the sinking could not be characterized simply as a case of state crime. Rather, a thorough investigation and analysis of the reasons and forces behind the Le Joola sinking suggested that international financial institutions bore some clear culpability for the disaster. In response to structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the Senegalese government was forced to cut spending in many areas. These spending cuts extended to ferry programs central to transportation in Senegal, especially in relation to its geographic location. This had a direct impact on the upkeep and return of the Le Joola to open waters. The ferry capsized with only one of its two engines functioning, resulting in the deaths of 1863 passengers. This was the second largest maritime disaster in history. Most crucially, the authors of this study demonstrated why scholars need to examine the criminogenic effects of policies and practices of international financial institutions in developing countries such as Senegal. These policies and practices privilege capitalistic profit over human lives and a better quality of life for people in developing countries. Accordingly, this is crime against vulnerable human beings.

An article by (Rothe et al. 2009) took a parallel approach, exploring the role of international financial institution policies in the conditions leading to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. While the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund did not seek to instigate economic collapse or to promote genocide, their policies and their systematic inattention in Rwanda set the stage for political and economic disaster as well as the genocide itself. The authors suggested that these international financial institutions knowingly violated their own standards as well as international human rights principles. Through the imposition of harsh conditions tied to their financial aid, they facilitated criminal activities on a massive scale.

In an article published in 2008, Ezeonu and Koku also adopted the crimes of globalization concept. They demonstrated the key contributing role played by the neoliberal policies of international financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, in expanding the vulnerability of people in this region to HIV infection. They called for more systematic criminological attention to the victimization of people in developing countries as a consequence of the promotion of neoliberal policies and practices in an increasingly globalized world (see also Ezeonu 2008).

In a similar vein, Rothe (2010a, b) has provided an analysis of the complicity of international financial institutions in heightened levels of corruption and the suppression or violation of human rights in developing countries. Analyzing such complicity seems especially important given that these institutions claim to be engaged in combating corruption in developing countries, including those linked to transnational and multinational corporations. The anticorruption initiatives include threatening to withhold much needed economic aid and loans in the absence of action taken against corrupt activities in these countries. Rothe has illustrated the specific role of the international financial institutions in the illegal expropriation of the rich natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo by the neighboring countries of Uganda and Rwanda. Beyond theft on a grand scale, Rwandan and Ugandan state forces and militias also engaged in especially atrocious human rights violations conducted against civilian populations, including forced labor, systematic rape, and widespread killing. Through their funding of African states engaged in crimes against both their own citizens and those of neighboring countries, the international financial institutions bear some responsibility for these crimes.

Parallel circumstances have arisen in other parts of the world. Stanley (2009) has analyzed the role of the international financial institutions in Indonesia. They directed some $30 billion to the Suharto regime, despite its known record of massive corruption, false accounting, and a militaristic appropriation of aid funds. As the World Bank’s focus was on supporting Indonesia, the state was able to use funds supposedly intended to reduce poverty in its brutal campaign against civilians in the state of Timor-Leste. This campaign had as its purpose terrorizing people to deter them from voting for independence from Indonesia. One could identify many other cases in Asia and other parts of the world where the international financial institutions have been complicit in supporting corrupt, authoritarian regimes and facilitating their massive violations of human rights.

The concept of crimes of globalization has also been adopted in relation to forms of crime that occur in the context of globalization but do not specifically involve the international financial institutions. Wright and Muzzatti (2007) have addressed the global restructuring of agriculture and food systems – agri-food globalization – with some specific attention to the victimization of huge numbers of animals: e.g., 58,000 sheep stranded at sea for almost 3 months in 2003, in violation of animal welfare law. Altogether, policies and practices relating to the global restructuring of agriculture and food systems were driving up food prices, pushing tens of millions of people toward hunger and starvation, and developed country farm subsidies were driving large numbers of farmers in developing countries into desperate circumstances – to the advantage of corporate and high finance interests in the wealthy countries of the world.

The notion of crimes of globalization has also been implicitly adopted by some authors who are not criminologists and who are addressing a broad public audience. A book by John Perkins (2005), entitled Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, became a best seller following its publication in 2005. He defined economic hit men (EHM) as “highly paid professionals who cheat countries around the globe out of trillions of dollars” (Perkins 2005, p. ix). In his case, as an employee of an international consulting firm, Perkins claims to have participated in a range of activities involved in funneling funds from international financial institutions and international aid organizations into the hands of major transnational corporations and a small number of wealthy and influential families in developing countries. Economic hit men are engaged in persuading developing country leaders to become part of a vast global network that ultimately serves the interest of US-based corporations and US businesses generally, at the enormous expense of the people of the developing countries. In a subsequent book, The Secret History of the American Empire, Perkins (2007) further explores some of these themes. Although these two books have been criticized as self-dramatizing, they may have succeeded in raising the consciousness of new audiences about crimes of globalization.

In A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption (Hiatt 2007), a book inspired by the Perkins’ best seller, various authors address aspects of “the corporatocracy” (“the powerful people who run the world’s biggest corporations, the most powerful governments, and history’s first truly global empire,” p. 20). These authors address such matters as the hundreds of billions of dollars that developing countries spend annually for servicing their debt, the world of offshore banking, the expropriation of Africa’s oil wealth, the role of export credit agencies in boosting overseas sales for multinational corporations, and the mirage of debt relief.

An Integrated Theory Of Crimes Of Globalization

On the global level, any initiatives at explanation should begin with a sense of humility: i.e., the globalized world we live in is so endlessly complex, with countless different variables interacting on multiple different levels, that full-fledged explanation (and prediction) is tremendously difficult. Nonetheless, the simplistic and one-dimensional explanations of crime advanced by some criminologists – e.g., low self-control theory – are quite useless in relation to crimes of globalization. To the extent that we can hope to understand crimes of globalization, an integrated theoretical approach is necessary.

There have been attempts to provide integrated theories to explain traditional street crime. Integrated theories have also been applied to organizational offending, including corporate crime, state-corporate crime and crimes of states, or violations of international criminal law (Rothe 2009). These integrated theories provide a foundation for the integrated theory of crimes of globalization outlined below.

An integrated model of offending takes into account motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints at four levels of analysis (interactional, organizational, structural, and international). In doing so, the integrated theory combines insights from criminological theories and other disciplines to explain the multiple levels at play within each specific case. Social learning (e.g., differential association), anomie, strain, rational choice, routine activities, techniques of neutralization, and control theories have been brought together within an integrated approach to address some specific components of organizational offending.

An integrated theory of crimes of globalization also draws from sociological organizational analysis (e.g., network and system analysis) and from political economy models to explain policies and practices pursued at the state and international levels. This integrated approach recognizes that organizations are not monolithic entities and do not operate within a vacuum. Instead, it recognizes agency at the interactional level while simultaneously noting the impact of organizational culture and the broader structure on the individual agency level of decision-making. Key components of an integrated theory of crimes of globalization include the motivating forces of pursuit of both legitimacy and profit as organizational goals, the internal structure and reward systems of organizations, and external pressures which are imposed on organizations.

The specific political context within which international financial institutions operate is one in which the interests of the powerful countries that provide most of the funding for their programs are aligned with those of the political and business elites of the developing countries which are being aided. On a structural (or state-based) level, then, international financial institution programs are ultimately skewed to advance or protect the interests of elites while all-too-often inflicting harm on ordinary citizens and indigenous populations in developing countries.

On the organizational level, a criminogenic environment is fostered within the international financial institutions. The officers and staff of these institutions are rewarded for getting out aid and loans and implementing programs in developing countries, not for ensuring that these programs do not cause long-term harm for the people of the countries being aided. The “success” of the programs is measured more in terms of their size and scope rather than their ultimate effect. International financial institutions reward their personnel for technical proficiency rather than for concerning themselves with the perspectives and needs of the ordinary people of developing countries. Despite professed noble objectives and the absence of a specific intent to do harm, the mode of operation of the international financial institutions is intrinsically criminogenic and undemocratic. Their key deliberations are carried out secretly and with an absence of accountability.

Controlling And Responding To Crimes Of Globalization

Throughout the course of the twentieth century and into the early stages of the twenty-first century, it became widely recognized that local, state, and national (or federal) institutions of social control were no longer sufficient for the challenges arising in an increasingly globalized world. The expanding adoption of transnational, international, and global institutions to address a broad spectrum of harmful activities – from cross-border trafficking to crimes of war – has been one of the defining attributes of the contemporary era. But the international financial institutions operate with a singular absence of effective accountability and oversight. There are a range of international declarations and accords that prohibit some of the harmful activities engaged in by the international financial institutions ranging from fostering corruption to complicity in violations of human rights. As specific examples, we have the United Nations Convention Against Corruption Article 2 (c) which defines officials of public international organizations in a way that could be applied to international financial institutions. Other such international accords define transnational criminal activities and human rights violations in a form that can also be interpreted as applying to the international financial institutions. However, no international institutions or tribunals specifically have jurisdiction over, take complaints on, or adjudicate the broad range of harmful activities engaged in by the international financial institutions. The powerful countries that dominate these institutions – notably, the United States and Western European countries – are highly unlikely to call them to account for their harmful activities, since their policies and practices are aligned with and advance the economic interests of these countries.

The Global Justice Movement And Crimes Of Globalization

To date, global justice (or antiglobalization) activists and their protest rallies have been the principal entities holding international financial institutions accountable for their harmful policies and practices in developing countries. A World Bank Bonds Boycott is one manifestation of this, since the World Bank raises most of its funds by issuing bonds, and these bonds are purchased by ordinary citizens through pension funds, labor unions, churches, municipalities, universities, and other entities.

In a world where citizens of developing countries increasingly have access through the Internet to specific information about the exploitative activities of Western institutions in their own countries, demands for addressing crimes of globalization are likely to increase. Populist challenges to autocratic, corrupt regimes and the immense economic inequality that they sustain will surely be one of the defining themes of the twenty-first century. In developing countries, growing numbers of people are characterizing themselves as victims of monumental crimes carried out by these regimes, and Western governments and institutions are seen as complicit in fundamental ways in these crimes. During 2011-2012 this situation played out in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and other Middle Eastern countries. The gross maldistribution in terms of consumption of natural resources that exists between the developed and developing world is also highly likely to be subjected to increasing challenge. Going forward, it seems highly likely that Western entities, including international financial institutions, will increasingly be “indicted” for their perceived crimes against the people of developing countries.

Concluding Observations

The “crimes of globalization” concept has not generated significant controversy to date because it continues to lie outside the focus of almost all students of crime and criminal justice. But criminologists are in collective denial if they fail to recognize that the crimes of the powerful – including those of international financial institutions – will attract growing attention from ordinary people all over the globe. In an increasingly globalized world, international financial institutions are immensely important players and are likely in the future to assume even greater importance and influence globally. A core premise for this research paper is that international financial institutions, whatever their stated missions, have in their policies and practices been complicit in very large-scale forms of social harm and that this harm should be recognized as a significant form of crime, and accordingly it is both a legitimate and a useful project for criminologists to apply a criminological framework to the understanding of these crimes of globalization and the challenges arising in relation to the prevention and control of such crime.

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